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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a psychoanalytic engagement with fashion. It follows from established 
work in literature, film and visual art, and deploys psychoanalysis, particularly the 
work of Jacques Lacan, as a critical theory in order to interpret a particular cultural 
form. It departs from other psychoanalytic cultural criticism in that it takes fashion as 
the object of study. 
 
Although fashion is not art there are moments where it can be discussed in the same 
terms as art, and it is with these moments that this thesis is concerned. The instances 
of fashion under discussion are selected from the unusual, innovative, avant garde 
fashions that are seen in galleries and museums, in the bi-annual, international 
Fashion Week shows, and in photography editorials in fashion magazines. Kristeva’s 
notion of the avant garde as a mechanism by which intractable gender conventions 
can be critiqued is central to my definition of the feminine in fashion as pertaining to 
feminine subjects, usually but not exclusively women, as pertaining to and contingent 
upon the body, in particular the female body, and, in a specifically Lacanian idiom, as 
following an impossible and contradictory logic. These three definitions of femininity 
allow for a reading of fashion that will anchor fashion to the category of the feminine, 
while also rejecting any notion of that category as in any way either biologically or 
anatomically determined, or reliant on social structures for its resonances and its 
meaning.   
 
If psychoanalysis is concerned with what cannot be said, then so is fashion, but 
despite the best efforts of both, the unsayable remains precisely that. Fashion is 
predicated on leaving contradictions intact, and a psychoanalytic reading of fashion 
demonstrates what these contradictions are and how they operate not just as instances 
of avant garde creative forms but also, and more importantly, as instances of the 
unspeakable impossibility of human subjectivity, writ large on the human body itself.  
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Introduction. 
 
Fashion is an accepted part of the cultural landscape. Many of its key practitioners are 
household names, a vast range of media are devoted to its dissemination and 
discussion, acres of space in prestigious galleries and museums around the world are 
given over to its preservation and presentation, and fashion design and related courses 
are taught to postgraduate level at many colleges and universities in the UK and 
elsewhere.1 Despite this, however, it was not until the 1980s that fashion was 
considered worthy of the same sustained level of scholarly attention that has 
traditionally been given to visual art, film, literature and other creative forms, and 
even so it has been studied in a somewhat piecemeal manner. It has fallen under the 
rubric of a number of disciplines, including costume history, art history, 
anthropology, sociology and cultural studies, and it has been approached from a 
number of critical perspectives, including structuralism, feminism, modernism and 
postmodernism.  
 
Much fashion scholarship tends to use the word fashion as an umbrella term that 
refers equally to haute couture, the street style of creative young people in urban 
centres, and the clothing trends that are sold cyclically in high street stores, as well as 
film costume and instances of art and performance that have a garment as their object. 
It also refers to the production and dissemination of fashion images in fashion 
magazines, fashion shows, and the business of fashion as an industry.2 This 
generalisation is all the more remarkable when you consider its absence in other 
fields. Such an oversimplified approach to literature, or art, or music, is unheard of. 
Fashion is very much a hybrid term, although its use, in the academy, in the press, and 
                                                
1 The Royal College of Art and Central St Martins College in London run some of the 
most prestigious fashion courses in the world. There are similar institutions in 
Antwerp, Paris and New York. Museums and galleries are too numerous to mention 
in one note, and are instead referenced throughout this thesis.  
2 See, for instance, Christopher Breward, Fashion (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003): Stella Bruzzi and Pamela Church Gibson, Fashion Cultures: 
Theories, Explorations and Analysis (London: Routledge, 2000): Jennifer Craik, The 
Face of Fashion: Cultural Studies in Fashion (London: Routledge, 1994) and 
Elizabeth Wilson, Adorned in Dreams: Fashion and Modernity (London: I.B. Tauris 
2003).  
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in popular discourse, suggests that its meaning is much more readily understood than 
is in fact possible. 
 
There are also some very obvious gaps and omissions in fashion scholarship. For 
instance, there is a wealth of scholarship on photography in general, but on fashion 
photography specifically, there is very little. When the Journal of Fashion Theory 
dedicated an entire issue to the topic in 2002, the issue’s editor commented at the 
time: “There are dissenters out there […] who think fashion photography is still just 
about selling the accoutrements of dress through pretty pictures. Not so, there is still 
so much more to be said.”3 Nevertheless, there is even now a dearth of critical or 
scholarly literature on it of any sort. Certainly, there is no significant psychoanalytic 
engagement with fashion photography, which is the subject of my first chapter.  
 
Where there is specific attention in fashion scholarship it is most notably to haute 
couture, or at least to recognised name designers, where a number of critical 
approaches have been deployed, in particular theories of modernity and the avant 
garde.4 However, there are no explicit psychoanalytic readings of haute couture, 
which is the focus of my second chapter. 
 
What is particularly astonishing is the lack of material on Leigh Bowery, the focus of 
chapter three, whose influence in art, fashion and queer politics has been profound, 
both during his life and posthumously. Besides one short chapter in the anthology The 
Art of Queering In Art, the British Library holds five books on Bowery. Two of these 
are coffee-table books of photographs with a few essays built in, one is a popular 
biography written by a friend of Bowery, one is an exhibition catalogue from an 
exhibition about Bowery that took place in the Museum of Contemporary Art in 
Sydney, Australia in 2004, and one is an exhibition catalogue from a show by Lucien 
Freud. The London College of Fashion library holds a video of a television show 
                                                
3 Carol Tulloch, ‘Editor’s Introduction’ Fashion Theory 6:1 (2002) 1, p. 1.    
4 See Ulrich Lehmann, Tigersprung: Fashion in Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: 
London: MIT Press, 2000), Caroline Evans, Fashion at the Edge: Spectacle, 
Modernity and Deathliness (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2003), 
Nancy J. Troy, Couture Culture: A Study in Modern Art and Fashion (Cambridge, 
Mass., London: MIT Press, 2003). 
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about Bowery from 1999 that is, at the time of writing, missing from the shelves. 
There has been no sustained critical engagement with Leigh Bowery and his work. 
 
One consistent theme in fashion scholarship, though, has been the idea that fashion is 
a language. This approach follows from Roland Barthes and his structuralist analyses 
of popular culture, in which visual images are read and interpreted as written words. It 
relies on the idea that language is a distinct and discrete entity that operates 
independently of the subject, and assumes from this that fashion operates 
independently of its wearer.5 The psychoanalytic approach to language devised by the 
French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, which sees language as integral to the 
constitution and maintenance of the self as well as being an external order into which 
the self must fit, has not thus far been considered, and in chapter four I argue that, 
given the nature of the relationship between fashion and the subject, the Lacanian 
psychoanalytic model of language is much better suited to the argument that fashion 
is a language than the Barthesian, structuralist one. 
 
Defining Fashion. 
 
Fashion is not necessarily a matter of expressing one’s “identity,” nor is it merely 
about trends or a matter of business, products, branding and economics, although 
there are many instances when these issues are very much in evidence. To my mind, 
fashion is primarily concerned with innovation in the surface decoration of the body, 
and the wider social and cultural responses to this innovation. Moreover, it is the 
wearer, and the act of wearing, that are central to fashion. Fashion is not a discrete or 
enclosed collection of fixed objects. A garment is not an independent, fully formed 
object that is superimposed on the blank canvas of a woman’s body. On the contrary, 
it exists only when it is in the process of being worn, and when fashion is encountered 
in contexts other than the act of being worn, it can often invoke a sense of disquiet. As 
Elizabeth Wilson has said, “Clothes without a wearer, whether on a second hand stall, 
in a glass case, or merely a lover’s garments strewn on the floor, can affect us 
                                                
5 See Alison Lurie, The Language of Clothes (London: Heinemann, 1981), Dick 
Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London: Routledge, 1998), Fred Davis, 
Fashion, Culture and Identity (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
Craik, The Face of Fashion.  
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unpleasantly, as if a snake has shed its skin.”6 This unease that wearer-less garments 
can induce is explored in the fashion/art installation Spring Summer Collection 1770 – 
1998 (1998), by Lun*na Menoh, which demonstrates the processual nature of fashion 
with a linear depiction from left to right of consecutive changes in style through time.7 
More interestingly, though, it demonstrates how imperative the wearer is to the 
operation of fashion. These ghostly garments, devoid as they are of any corporeal 
relation, are suggestive of a sinister otherworldliness that Freud calls ‘The Uncanny.’ 
They are simultaneously familiar, almost mundane, in the way that only something as 
ubiquitous as clothing can be, and also alienated, following their removal from their 
expected context. As Freud puts it, “…the uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, 
but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has 
become alienated from it.”8   
 
Besides its relation to the human body, fashion is also closely associated with 
femininity and with art. It was Baudelaire’s ‘The Painter of Modern Life’ that first 
distinguished this association and that tied this relationship to modern culture. In this 
essay, Baudelaire identifies a shift in fashion, from its role in revealing social 
distinctions predicated on class, to distinctions predicated on gender instead.9 He sees 
fashion as synonymous with the feminine:  
When he describes the pleasure caused by the sight of a beautiful woman, 
what poet would dare to distinguish between her and her apparel? Show 
me a man who […] has not enjoyed, in a wholly detached way, the sight 
of a beautifully composed attire, and has not carried away with him an 
image inseparable from the woman wearing it, thus making of the two, 
the woman and the dress, an indivisible whole.10 
                                                
6 Wilson, Adorned in Dreams p. 2.  
7 See Addressing the Century: 100 Years of Art and Fashion (London: Hayward 
Gallery, 1998) p. 63 for a photograph of this installation. 
8 Sigmund Freud ‘The Uncanny’ (1919) in Sigmund Freud, An Infantile Neurosis and 
Other Works, trans. by James Strachey and Anna Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 
1955) p. 363.  
9 Prior to the mid-nineteenth century fashionable dress was used as a marker of rank, 
with gender as only a subset within that. In particular, the Sumptuary Laws, 
vestimentary codes that were common across Europe until the Renaissance, dictated 
who could wear what fabrics, colours, and so on, so that social rank was clearly 
visually discernable. For a full description of them, see Marjorie Garber, Vested 
Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety (London: Penguin, 1993) especially 
pp. 35-32. 
10 Charles Baudelaire, Selected Writings on Art and Literature (London: Penguin, 
1992)  p. 424. 
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In ‘The Painter of Modern Life,’ Baudelaire uses the words fashion (mode) costume 
(costume) and dress (robe) to talk about a particular mode of dress that he describes as 
the historically specific aspect of beauty, and that renders beauty of a particular type, 
and in doing so makes it all together more human than it might otherwise be. He sees 
beauty, femininity and fashion as bound together, contingent upon one another, and at 
once a product of its time and a-historically classic.11 This association remains even 
today, as Anne Hollander points out: “‘men’s fashion’ is an acknowledged subset, and 
has scarcely any of the fame and resonance attaching to ‘Fashion.’”12 Fashion is 
unique in this. Usually, where cultural forms (literature, art, film, music) are gendered, 
they tend to default to the masculine, with the feminine as a sub-set within the form; 
there is literature, and there is women’s writing, for instance. There are artists, and 
there are women artists. Fashion alone defaults to the feminine. 
 
The mid-nineteenth century, when Baudelaire wrote ‘The Painter of Modern Life,’ is 
also the point in history when what J.C. Flügel calls “the Great Masculine 
Renunciation”13 occurs, when rational men renounced their right to adornment and 
chose useful work as an alternative means of gaining and maintaining status. 
Thorstein Veblen tells us too that the need of the new middle class to differentiate 
themselves from other social classes of the time led to the positioning of women as a 
vehicle for the vicarious display of her husband’s wealth, a display that was 
conducted through the physically restrictive and heavily ornamented fashion worn by 
women at the time.14 A shift occurred, then, at around the time fashion became 
distinct from mere clothing in the mid-1800s that led to the association of fashion 
with the feminine. 
 
Femininity is usually understood to refer to the attributes of woman, whatever they 
may be. Certainly, that is the context in which Baudelaire uses it. However, with 
regard to its relationship to fashion I will argue that it can be understood in rather 
                                                
11 Baudelaire, Selected Writings on Art and Literature p. 392.  
12 Anne Hollander Sex and Suits: The Evolution of Modern Dress (Brinkworth: 
Claridge, 2004) p. 11.  
13 John Carl Flügel, The Psychology of Clothes (London: Institute of Psycho-analysis, 
1930) p. 110. 
14 Thorstein Veblen: On Culture and Society ed. by Stjepan Mestrovic (London: Sage, 
2003) p. 121. 
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broader terms; as pertaining to feminine subjects, usually but not exclusively women, 
as pertaining to and contingent upon the body, in particular the female body, and, in a 
specifically Lacanian idiom, as following an impossible and contradictory logic. As I 
will show, these three definitions of femininity allow for a reading of fashion that will 
anchor fashion to the category of the feminine, while also rejecting any notion of that 
category as in any way either biologically or anatomically determined, or reliant on 
social structures for its resonances and its meaning.  
 
Besides becoming associated with the feminine in the mid-nineteenth century, fashion 
simultaneously became associated with art. Baudelaire’s ‘The Painter of Modern Life’ 
has been acknowledged as “the place in aesthetic discourse where fashion is isolated 
from history of costume, clothing or dress itself.”15 By suggesting that fashion has a 
place in artistic discourse, Baudelaire effectively identified fashion as a classification 
distinct from the operation of clothes, and advocated the centrality of fashion to 
modern aesthetic practice. This is not to say that fashion is art. Fashion relies on being 
worn by the human subject for its actualisation in a way that art does not, and fashion 
can and should retain its identity distinct from art because of this. However there are 
instances when fashion can be talked about in the same terms as art, and it is those 
instances that are of interest here. The premise that fashion is distinct from dress and 
that it creates this distinction through its aesthetic properties is central to the definition 
of fashion used in this thesis. It allows fashion to enter into artistic discourses while 
still retaining its disciplinary precision, and to simultaneously show up the limitations 
of existing gender specificity in art theory and practice.  
 
Fashion is too dependent on existing social (and psychic) structures to ever present a 
realistic or viable challenge to them, and it is therefore difficult to claim that fashion 
is radical or revolutionary. Fashion is not likely to change the world. I do believe, 
however, that it is inherently seditious, and can and does “subvert from within,” 
offering profound challenges to existing structures in the terms that are available to it. 
The point where fashion manifests most clearly the concepts that this thesis seeks to 
address - femininity, art and psychoanalytic notions of the subject - is also the point 
                                                
15 See Leila Kinney ‘Fashion and Figuration in Modern Life Painting’ in 
Architecture: In Fashion, ed. by Deborah Fausch and Paulette Singley (New York: 
Princeton Architectural Press, 1991) p. 291. 
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where fashion is at its most innovative, provocative, challenging, the moments that 
demonstrate its disruptive potential. For the purposes of this thesis, fashion is defined 
as a creative form, realised on the body, that articulates the feminine in innovative and 
disruptive ways.  
 
This thesis puts fashion in dialogue with surrealism, the avant garde, performance art 
and creative language, and interprets these dialogues within the frame of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in order to read fashion in new, and hopefully productive, ways. 
While many of the arguments here can be seen in any form of dress, they are 
articulated most clearly and unequivocally in the more extreme examples of dress that 
mark the point where dress becomes fashion. These extreme examples are sometimes 
referred to as show pieces, which is to say that they are not necessarily to be sold, 
either individually or made up in large numbers and distributed to retail outlets, but 
are instead one-off works whose purpose is to act as a very public instance of creative 
output. They showcase the talent of their creator, and are worn only for a fashion 
show, a photo shoot, or a public appearance or performance of some sort. While there 
are many possible cases I could have chosen for this thesis I have selected 
contemporary or near-contemporary practitioners who live and/or work in London: 
the photographer Nick Knight, the couturiers Alexander McQueen and John Galliano, 
the performance artist Leigh Bowery, and the conceptual designer Hussein Chalayan.  
 
These creative practitioners all have a connection with fashion, but fashion as 
concerned with innovation in the surface decoration of the body, rather than fashion 
as an industry. Nick Knight now photographs for Vogue and has won fashion industry 
awards, of course, but his portfolio also includes anthropological studies of skinheads, 
portraiture, and a project for the Natural History Museum in London where he 
photographed a selection of flora. Leigh Bowery was a performance artist whose 
hallmark was innovative use of costume that he designed himself. He made clothes 
for retail for a short period, but gave that up, preferring to focus on one-off show 
pieces that he wore himself. He may seem, perhaps, the “odd man out” in my list, but 
by virtue of his iconoclasm his work constitutes fashion as surely as it would if it 
were shown on the runway. Hussein Chalayan has a history of failed business, and 
prefers to show his work in a theatre rather than at a Fashion Week. His connection 
with the fashion industry is tenuous at best, despite his critical success. There is a 
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sense in which, of my examples, the only ones that are, strictly speaking, “fashion 
people” are John Galliano and Alexander McQueen, by virtue of their employment as 
couturiers in Paris fashion houses. Nevertheless, the work of all of these people 
evidences, as we will see, the aesthetic properties that turn dress into fashion, and that 
quality, I think, makes them more relevant to a study of fashion than either who they 
work for or where their work is seen.  
 
Psychoanalysis and Fashion. 
 
There are several journal articles that aim to discuss fashion and psychoanalysis.16 
Diana Fuss’s 1992 article “Fashion and the Homospectatorial Look” argues that 
fashion photography works not to create a heteronormative visual ideology, as one 
might suppose, but instead suggests a kind of femme-on-femme voyeurism that is 
inherently lesbian. Unfortunately for Fuss, her article does not actually talk about 
fashion photography (a very specific aesthetic form that I discuss in detail on page 51 
of this thesis) but instead talks about cosmetics advertising and magazine covers, 
which are something else entirely. While a lesbian voyeuristic identification may well 
be how advertising operates, the case for its application to fashion photography is not 
made clear. Another article, by Molly Ann Rothenberg and Joseph Valente, titled 
“Fashionable Theory and Fashion-Able Women: Returning Fuss’s Homospectatorial 
Look” follows from Fuss in its disregard for the specificity of fashion photography as  
a genre, but argue cogently against the theorising of the “lesbian gaze” that is 
supposedly active when women look at the advertising that they all think is fashion 
photography. Their key point is that Fuss fails to account for any libidinous 
motivation that precedes identification, and that for Fuss the libido is shaped by 
identification rather than the starting point for it. According to Lacan, the libido is the 
instigator for identification, and is not shaped by it (something I discuss on page 14 of 
this thesis) and by that reckoning, the notion of a “lesbian gaze” as a constituent 
                                                
16 See: Fuss, Diana, ‘Fashion and the Homospectatorial Look’, Critical Enquiry, 18:4 
(1992) 713-737; Rothenberg, Molly Ann and Joseph Valente ‘Fashionable Theory 
and Fashion-Able Women: Returning Fuss’s Homospectatorial Look’, Critical 
Enquiry, 22:2 (1996) 372-382; Silverman, Kaja, ‘Fragments of a Fashionable 
Discourse’ in Tania Modleski (ed) Studies in Entertainment, (Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press 1986) and Grant, Megan, ‘Dressing Up a Self: Fashion and 
Kristeva’s Subject in Process’, Melbourne Journal of Politics, v. 24, (1997) 128-139 
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process of viewing either advertising or fashion photography is ultimately 
unsustainable.  In a broad-ranging paper in which she discusses fashion in a whole 
range of  novels and films, Kaja Silverman’s briefly  detours through fashion 
photography and makes the point that fashion photography reinforces the role of the 
other in the process of identification. Her argument relies on a reading of a single 
photograph by Richard Avedon, taken in 1947, a documentary/reportage style image 
which shows three men looking at a woman in fashionable dress. Fashion 
photography of the last thirty years has followed a rather different style, one in which 
the reinforcing other is absent from the photograph itself, and in chapter one I argue 
that in contemporary and near-contemporary fashion photography, the identificatory 
process between the viewer and the image is direct. The other exists outside of the 
image, not within it. A more recent article, by Megan Grant, aims to use Kristevan 
theory to interpret empirical evidence gleaned from interviews with suburban 
Australian teenagers. Many of her conclusions, about identity being unstable, 
performative, constituted socially rather than being an internal fixity, and so on, have 
been theorised more fully elsewhere, most notably by Judith Butler, and are not really 
concepts that one would readily draw from the psychoanalytic work of Julia Kristeva.    
 
There have, however, been little sustained, book-length attempts to talk about fashion 
of any sort in psychoanalytic terms. One notable text, (1998) by Dani Cavallaro and 
Alexandra Warwick addresses psychoanalysis and the body, and their insights have 
been invaluable to aspects of this thesis, particularly in chapters one and two. That 
said, Cavallaro and Warwick make selected reference to fashion within this general 
discussion of the body and its framing, and their discussion of fashion itself is limited. 
Prior to their work, there are only two texts that directly address the question of 
fashion and psychoanalysis: J.C. Flügel’s The Psychology of Clothes (1930) and 
Edmund Bergler’s Fashion and the Unconscious (1953). 
 
Flügel employs Freudian concepts of narcissism to explain the gender specificity of 
fashion and its association with women and homosexuals. Narcissism is also used to 
explain the repression of masculine exhibitionism that underpins his concept of the 
Great Masculine Renunciation (of fashion) that he believes led to burgeoning 
uniformity of male attire in the mid-nineteenth century. His close reading of Freud 
and his literal application of Freudian concepts to dress are the foundations for his 
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explanation of the compulsion to wear clothes as “neurotic,” “irrational” and 
derivative of a human inability “to allow ourselves an undistorted recognition of our 
bodies.”17  
 
He concludes that the careful application of psychoanalytic principles to the minutiae 
of everyday life will ultimately lead to the rejection of clothing all together, and that 
advanced civilisations will go naked, marvelling at the primitiveness of the clothing 
that they used to think was essential.18 While it is highly unlikely that we will ever go 
routinely naked, Flügel’s “most perceptive insight” as Michael Carter puts it, “is his 
realisation that the reasons we put clothes on are intimately connected with the 
reasons we take them off,”19 a theme that is also addressed by Edmund Bergler.  
 
Bergler emphasises the erotic potential of dress, but his understanding of eroticism 
appears more embedded in social conservatism than psychoanalysis. He claims that 
fashion is a hoax perpetrated on women by misogynist homosexuals, and its creations 
are elaborate tricks sold to women as fashion but which are designed to induce 
discomfort for the wearer and ridicule from onlookers.  He sees the popular 
assumption that homosexuality is effeminacy, and the status of honorary woman that 
the homosexual enjoys, as facilitating this trickery. He also argues for the complicity 
of heterosexual man in this plot, saying that clothing is a masculine invention that 
protects men from the sight of the female body and the recollections of Oedipal desire 
for the mother and castration anxiety that the female body provokes. 
 
The ideas put forward by Bergler say as much about the author’s attitude to 
homosexuality, women and fashion as anything else, and his book (published in 1953, 
when Christian Dior’s New Look was at the height of its popularity) testifies to his 
bemusement at fashion and his own conventionalism and heteronormativity. His 
conclusion assures us that “normal” sexual relations are conducted between a married 
man and woman, and the increase in what he calls “neurotic sex” (which is all other 
sorts of sex) is due to the “aphrodisiac” qualities of women’s clothing. In his final 
                                                
17 Flügel, The Psychology of Clothes p. 234. 
18 Flügel, The Psychology of Clothes p. 238. 
19 Michael Carter, ‘J.C. Flügel and the Nude Future’, Fashion Theory 7:1 (2003) 79-
101, p. 92. 
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analysis he sees women as morally suspect and a danger to men, as well as being the 
passive, mindless dupes of hateful gays.20 
 
As with Flügel, Bergler’s formulations leave more than a little to be desired, but his 
observation, that dress and eroticism are inextricably intertwined, is, I suggest, exactly 
right. What is at issue in a contemporary reading of both Flügel and Bergler is the 
generalised treatment of bodily covering under the rubric of the term “dress” and the 
assumption that dress is a symptom of shared psychic processes gone awry and 
awaiting resolution. In addition, both of these early accounts treat the erotic as in 
some way symptomatic of psychic or social failure. Eroticism, though, is neither 
neurotic nor irrational but is instead one of the integral, indeed essential, features of 
psychic life, as we will see. 
 
Lacan and Fashion. 
 
The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) structures human experience 
into a tripartite model, built around the three psychic realms of what he calls the 
imaginary, the symbolic and the real. There is constant interplay between these three 
orders, they are as inextricably linked as the Borromean knot that Lacan chose to 
illustrate their relationship in his seminars, and they offer a model by which the 
contradictions and impossibilities of the human subject can be understood. In fact, 
they offer an explanation as to why such contradictions and impossibilities are central 
to the subject and must be retained. Lacan’s paradigm of the human psyche, then, is 
of a structure riven with conflicts and ambiguities in and between language, body, self 
and other, that are constantly negotiated and renegotiated in and through the three 
orders.  
 
Lacan is famous for his “return to Freud,” in which he called for a re-reading of Freud 
and a restatement of psychoanalytic principles that followed from Freud’s original 
work. Implicit in the “return to Freud” is a rejection of the post-Freudian 
psychoanalytic developments in ego psychology and object relations theory. Lacan is 
instead committed to reasserting the centrality of language to Freud’s ideas, and so 
                                                
20 Edmund Bergler, Fashion and the Unconscious (New York: R. Brunner, 1953) pp. 
297, 295. 
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psychoanalysis is above all an interpretive art that functions in and through language. 
For Lacan, with his interest in structural linguistics, nothing knowable exists outside 
of language, and in this insistence Lacan is emphasising the significance of 
language’s relation to the human psyche. He famously argued that the unconscious is 
structured like a language, and was quite clear when he said this that he was not 
saying that the unconscious is structured by language.21 His point was twofold: firstly, 
to emphasise the reciprocity between the subject and the external world or the 
symbolic order, and that the subject is not merely a blank slate upon which the 
external world or the symbolic order inscribe themselves, and secondly to suggest that 
the unconscious is not a primitive, inchoate mechanism that is distinct from the ego, 
but is a configuration that is integral to and as complex as consciousness itself. His 
work confronts an entire cultural system created in and sustained by language, but he 
also acknowledges the place of body and corporeality in this system, saying that the 
body in the place where erotogeneity is negotiated, and suggesting that desire and 
erotic experience are both integral to the constitution of sexed subjectivity and, 
crucially, are experienced corporeally, particularly in the case of the feminine 
subject.22 The dissonances between the body and the mind, language and the visual, 
self and other, that are integral to human experience, underpin his understanding of 
what it means to be human.  
 
If Freud saw psychoanalysis as a science, for Lacan, in the words of Malcolm Bowie, 
it “cannot be other than ‘cultural studies.’”23 By putting ‘cultural studies’ in 
parenthesis, Bowie is making it clear that he is not referring to the discipline that 
started at the famous Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies, set up in 1964 as a 
research centre for the study of cultural phenomenon and artefacts from subcultures to 
soap operas. Instead, the emphasis on language, as Bowie sees it, anchors the subject 
equally to the external world as well as their own psyche, and thus, for Lacan, the 
relationship between the subject and the external world, a relationship that is mediated 
                                                
21 Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge (The 
Seminar of Jacques Lacan; Book XX) trans. by Bruce Fink (New York, London: 
Norton, 1998) p. 48. 
22 See ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire’ in Jacques Lacan, 
The Écrits, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. 2006), and ‘God 
and Woman’s Jouissance’ in Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality.    
23 Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 
1991) p. 12. 
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through the experience of language, is central to the psychoanalytic project. Lacanian 
psychoanalysis seeks not to uncover new theories of human experience, necessarily, 
but to demonstrate in the process of theorising ways in which human experience 
might be understood. 
 
Lacan’s tripartite model of a conflicted subject, I believe, will lend itself to a study of 
fashion in which fashion, a corporeal experience that operates both visually and 
linguistically, can be understood without compromising any of the paradoxes upon 
which it seems to be based. Fashion is experienced intimately, when it is worn, and at 
a distance, when it is seen on others. It is a creative form that provokes delight and 
approbation equally, and sometimes simultaneously. Negotiating it in Lacanian terms 
will allow an exploration of the different experiences of fashion, all of which revolve 
around the central nexus of the wearing, viewing, responding human subject. 
 
This is not to say that this thesis will be a straightforward application of 
psychoanalytic principles to fashion. Fashion is not an analysand. Indeed, despite his 
ready use of art and literature to illustrate his ideas, Lacan himself was concerned that 
the interpretive possibilities of psychoanalysis should not be diluted by a disregard for 
genuine and integral differences between patients and creative forms. He was of the 
firmly held belief that “psychoanalysis can only be applied, in the proper sense of the 
term, as treatment and thus to a subject who speaks and listens.”24 This concern 
underpinned much of his reading of art works, and culminated in one of the last 
seminars of his career, Seminar XXIII, discussed in chapter four, in which he tries to 
transcend the difficulties of theoretical discourse through the practice of writing. With 
this in mind, this thesis will read instances of fashion with art theory and practice, in a 
psychoanalytic frame, in order to draw out some possible interpretations of some of 
the most profoundly challenging and recalcitrant fashion objects and images of recent 
times.   
 
A Note on Terminology. 
 
This thesis will follow the chronology of Lacan’s thought. It will address the nodal 
points, of identification, desire and the sinthome, around which his psychoanalysis is 
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constituted, in the order in which he himself addressed them. Within this chronology, 
though, there are themes that arise repeatedly and they should be explained here. 
Ideas of the feminine and the term jouissance often arise in Lacan’s thought, but the 
precise meaning is not necessarily consistent and is often dependent on the context in 
which the terms are used. In addition, the idea of the sinthome is problematic for a 
number of reasons. Its reception amongst Lacanian scholars has been mixed, and its 
difficulties should be remarked upon.  
 
The notion of the feminine is essential to Lacanian psychoanalysis. For Lacan gender 
(or “sexuation” as he calls it) in fact refers to a psychic position that does not 
necessarily correlate to the category of “woman.” Nevertheless, for the most part, the 
feminine for Lacan refers both to the psychic state of the female subject, woman, and 
to the difficulties, the problems, the disruptions, of human experience, which are then 
articulated variously as hysteria, discussed in chapter one, the real, discussed in 
chapters two and three, and the sinthome discussed in chapter four. The feminine can, 
of course, be experienced by man, but even if it is not directly experienced by him, it 
is most certainly encountered. 
 
The word jouissance has no direct translation into English but is generally taken to 
mean some kind of powerful orgasmic joy. How this is experienced depends on the 
subject and their circumstances, but in terms of desire, discussed in chapter two, the 
masculine subject will experience merely phallic jouissance (something Slavoj Zizek 
calls “stupid”) while the feminine subject will enjoy a “jouissance of the other,” an 
altogether more intense, ecstatic and troubling experience.25 The jouissance of 
transgression, discussed in chapter three, offers another model of jouissance, one that 
is not contingent on sexed subjectivity necessarily, but one that arises from breaching 
the social contract. In chapter four, the jouissance inspired by the sinthome is one that 
occurs at the realisation of the impossibility of being.   
 
The sinthome is a difficult concept. It is concerned with language, specifically 
unreadable literary language of the kind Lacan sees evidenced in the work of James 
Joyce. It is presented in very different terms to other aspects of Lacan’s thought, in 
                                                
25 Slavoj Zizek, Interrogating The Real: Selected Writings (New York, London: 
Continuum, 2005) p. 307. 
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particular his ideas regarding language, and it seems to contradict earlier work. Where 
previously Lacan had been emphatic in his belief that there is disjuncture and an 
irreconcilable tension between corporeality and language, he suggests in his seminar 
on the sinthome that the sinthome harmonises them. He suggests also that the 
sinthome is a part of language, which he had always associated with the symbolic, but 
here he says too that the sinthome is an aspect of the real, and suggests a 
reconciliation between the symbolic and the real by way of the sinthome where in 
earlier work such a reconciliation had been impossible. While working with the 
concept of the sinthome one is aware of the very distinct differences between it and 
Lacan’s earlier work, and chapter four in this thesis strikes a rather different tone to 
previous chapters as a consequence. 
 
There is very little work on the sinthome in English, not least because the seminar has 
not yet been published in English. However, initial responses to the sinthome are 
summarised in Reinventing the Symptom: Essays on the Final Lacan, edited by Luke 
Thurston.26 In this volume, the question of whether the sinthome marks an 
epistemological break from Lacan’s previous work is considered. Dany Nobus, 
Dominiek Hoens and Ed Pluth, and Philip Dravers argue that it is a continuation of 
previous work. Paul Verhaeghe and Frederic Declercq, and Roberto Harari consider it 
a reworking of previous ideas, that is neither continuous nor a break, and Slavoj Zizek 
sees it as a complete departure from previous thought. It is not my project here to 
reach a conclusion on the place of the sinthome in Lacan’s oeuvre, but the contentious 
nature of the content of Seminar XXIII should be remarked upon in order to put the 
arguments of my fourth chapter into context.  
 
Fashion and the Subject. 
 
I aim to show how fashion is concerned with both the body and the mind, and is 
complicit in the psychic processes of identification, desire, and language (especially 
language as sinthome) that are central to human subjectivity.  
 
                                                
26 See Re-inventing the Symptom: Essays on the Final Lacan, ed. by Luke Thurston 
(New York: Other Press, 2002).   
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Chapter one begins with Susan Sontag’s observation, that “the greatest fashion 
photography is more than the photography of fashion.”27 The question then, is how is 
fashion photography understood, and if fashion is not its priority, what is? The answer 
lies in the status of the image as an artwork and the interpretive possibilities that 
spring from that, as well as the relationship between the viewer and the image that is 
constituted through the psychic process of identification.   
 
Psychoanalysis can be said to concern itself with, amongst other things, the various 
ways in which the subject endeavours to contain themselves, to hold themselves 
together, and the psychic processes that make this holding together simultaneously 
possible and impossible. Within psychoanalysis generally there is a privileging of 
visuality as the means by which the self is constituted. From Freud’s Oedipus 
complex onwards, it is what the subject sees that shapes their subjectivity, and for 
Lacan in particular, “the sight alone of the whole form of the human body gives the 
subject an imaginary mastery over his body.”28  
 
Lacan’s account of the way in which subjectivity is formed is the mirror stage, Le 
Stade du Miroir, in which he foregrounds the centrality of identification to the human 
experience.29 Lacan suggests that the subject’s ego is constituted when the infant 
takes on the illusion that they are an independent and cohesive being, an event that 
occurs in infancy, at around the age of six months, when the child sees itself in a 
mirror and recognises itself. The problem is that the mirror image is not the actual 
child, but its reflection, and the conflict between the fragmentation of subjectivity and 
the view of the self as a false unity is a central feature of subjective existence. The 
word stade, stage, refers both to a developmental process and a site of enactment, and 
the mirror stage, once it occurs, does not stop occurring but becomes fundamental to 
the on-going constitution and maintenance of the self. As Lacan puts it, the mirror 
stage is not simply a “moment in development” but also has an “exemplary function, 
                                                
27 Susan Sontag, ‘The Avedon Eye,’ British Vogue, December 1978, p. 105.  
28 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar, Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953 – 1954, 
trans. by John Forrester (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 79. 
29 See ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalysis’ in Lacan, The Écrits. 
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because it reveals some of the subject’s relation to his image, in so far as it is the 
Urbild of the ego.”30  
 
By considering fashion photography in terms of the mirror stage, chapter one argues 
that fashion photography does not, as is often supposed, maintain the individual as a 
unified subject in the Cartesian sense, and the female subject in particular as object 
and a passive participant in visual currency. It contends instead that fashion 
photography is in fact a commentator on and a participant in, the dissolution of the 
subject. Also in this chapter, the concept of hysteria is deployed to demonstrate how 
fashion photography is actually a site of resistance to dominant cultural discourses 
pertaining to models of femininity. Hysteria has a long and illustrious history in 
Western medicine and thought, although definitions have varied widely.31 The Greco-
Roman notion of hustera, a “wandering womb,” a uterus that roamed freely within the 
body and that was responsible for the afflictions of the parts of the body to which it 
had migrated, has been credited as the source of hysteria, and is followed by the view 
in the Middle Ages, that hysteria was a curse brought on by sexual congress with the 
devil. Hysteria was a heresy and was treated accordingly by the Inquisition. In fact, 
though, the word appears only towards the end of the Renaissance, and offers a 
medicalised explanation of what came to be called “nerves,” that were common to 
both men and women. It was only in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
that hysteria came to be sexualised and moralised, and used as a mechanism to control 
feminine sexuality through pathology.  Since then, it was historically been considered 
an ailment that was exclusive to women, and the association between hysteria and the 
womb continued until the end of the 19th century when, through the work of Jean-
Martin Charcot and later Sigmund Freud, hysteria came to be an illness of the mind 
rather than the reproductive organs. As a consequence of this, hysteria also came to be 
associated with the psychic state or position that is femininity, as opposed to the 
biologically sexed female.32  
 
                                                
30 Lacan, The Seminar, Book I, p. 74. 
31  A comprehensive history of hysteria is found in Ilsa Veith, Hysteria: The History 
of a Disease (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).  
32 See Mark Micale, Hysterical Men: The Hidden History of Male Nervous Illness 
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2008) for an account of the gendering of 
hysteria. 
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Charcot arranged for a vast number of photographs to be taken of his patients while 
they were having hysteric fits and seizures, which he them published in the three-
volume Iconographie Photographique De La Salpêtrière (1879-1880).33 So extensive 
is this collection of images that it is less a medical textbook and more an anthology of 
the aesthetics of madness, and in his study of the Iconographie Photographique 
Georges Didi-Hubermann goes so far as to suggest that hysteria should be considered 
“as a chapter in the history of art.”34 The surrealists especially were concerned with 
the manifestation of psychic processes in art, and recalled hysteria in their idea of 
convulsive beauty as well as foregrounding, as Charcot did unwittingly, the crucial 
importance of photography to the relationship between art and the unconscious mind. 
In its negotiation of subjectivity generally, and femininity and hysteria in particular, 
this chapter investigates the work of the award-winning fashion photographer Nick 
Knight as a paradigm of the extent to which fashion photography causes the very 
notion of a unified subject to crumble, and puts in its place a means of psychic 
feminine resistance to the prevailing social structure.  
 
Chapters two and three are concerned with Lacan’s concept of desire; chapter two 
addresses the desire of men and women, and chapter three considers the consequences 
of desire “queered.”35  Both of these formulations are predicated on Lacan’s thinking 
on the constitution and maintenance of the feminine and the masculine, and how they 
conduct their relations with one another. This is set out in the famous Seminar XX, 
On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love And Knowledge, where many of Lacan’s 
most provocative statements around matters of sex, including “Woman cannot be 
said; nothing can be said of woman” and “there is no such thing as a sexual 
relationship,” first appeared. Seminar XX is also one of the points where Lacan’s 
belief in the relationality between subject and language is most clearly expressed. It is 
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34 Georges Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria: Charcot and the Photographic 
Iconography of Salpêtrière, trans. by Alisa Hartz  (Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT 
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impossible to discuss desire without reference to the theories of subjectivity that are 
set out in this seminar.36  
 
It should be said that the reception of many of Lacan’s thoughts on sexuation and 
desire has been mixed at best. While some feminist writers have found much in Lacan 
that is helpful to the articulation of female experience, notably Jacqueline Rose, Juliet 
Mitchell, and Parveen Adams in the UK, Julia Kristeva in France, and Joan Copjec in 
the US, there are as many critics who have raised objections to the Lacanian model of 
sexed subjectivity and sexual relations. The most well-known and controversial 
protest against Lacan’s treatment of sexuality, in particular his assertions regarding 
femininity, was made by Luce Irigaray, in Speculum of the Other Woman (1974.)37 In 
this book, Irigaray criticises what she sees as the phallocentrism of Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. She argues that under contemporary psychoanalysis and 
philosophy an independent subject position for women is impossible, and that women 
can only ever be subjects relational to men. Following the publication of Speculum 
she was expelled from Lacan’s Ecole Freudienne de Paris and she lost her job at the 
University of Vincennes too. Stephen Heath’s 1978 essay, ‘Difference,’ followed 
Irigaray’s logic and suggested that when Lacanian psychoanalysis posits woman as 
not-all, it is in fact psychoanalysis itself that is lacking, through its refusal to consider 
that woman, as he sees it, has what he calls “the political claim on psychoanalysis.”38 
Teresa Brennan has objected to the way in which Lacan’s model of the symbolic 
makes patriarchy, as she sees it, inevitable, and Jane Gallop protests the split that she 
believes psychoanalysis makes between the biological body and the human subject. 
The historian Lisa Jardine, meanwhile, sees psychoanalysis as politically ineffectual, 
arguing instead that it is the material and historical conditions of male/female 
relations that frame inclusion and exclusion.39 Nevertheless, despite these oppositions, 
Lacan can be used as a productive framework for the analysis of fashion in this thesis, 
and I aim to show from this that it is possible to make political claims for fashion. 
                                                
36 Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, p. 76 and p. 71. 
37 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, translated by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985). 
38 Stephen Heath, ‘Difference’ in The Sexual Subject: A Screen Reader in Sexuality 
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Later in this thesis we will see that what Brennan sees as patriarchy is in fact a bind 
that ties both men and women to its structure,  and also that psychoanalysis is rather 
more concerned with the body than it may first appear. I would also suggest that 
while the material and historical conditions of male/female relations are of course 
significant, they do not in and of themselves offer a satisfactory account of how and 
why such relations arose in the first place, and for that we must turn to 
psychoanalysis.   
 
It is worth noting that nowhere in Seminar XX does Lacan talk about gender. This 
concept, so essential to feminist and social constructivist theories of selfhood, does 
not appear anywhere in his work. The term gender appears in French language as a 
grammatical feature; as a political term, it is specific to Anglo-American discourses 
and as such was not generally in circulation in the French intellectual milieu of the 
early 1970’s, when Seminar XX took place. Also, the concepts to which gender refers 
– learned patterns of behaviour that are artificially associated with a particular 
biological reality – are in direct conflict with Lacan’s thinking on the feminine, the 
masculine, the male, the female. Matters pertaining to the sex of an individual are 
referred to by Lacan as ‘sexuation.’ They have no basis whatever in either anatomical 
difference or in cultural construction, but instead are predicated on the subject’s 
psychic structures, the object of the subject’s desire, and the operating principles of 
that desire. This means that while the masculine structure usually pertains to men, and 
the feminine to women, this is neither inevitable, nor the only model possible, and 
biological/anatomical men can occupy the feminine position as easily as women, and 
vice-versa.40  
 
                                                
40 Lacan establishes the processes by which sexuation takes place in a quasi-
mathematical table, and it is from this that Lacan’s theories of sexual differentiation 
are reached. The reception of Lacan’s use of topological paradigms to explore 
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Mathematical Paradigms’ in Reading Seminar XX: Lacan’s Major Work on Love, 
Knowledge and Feminine Sexuality, ed. by Suzanne Barnard and Bruce Fink (Albany, 
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debates.  
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Lacan describes the masculine subject as “altogether determined by symbolic 
castration, that is, every bit of him falls under the sway of the signifier.”41 A signifier 
is a basic unit of language, a term that Lacan transposed from linguistics to 
psychoanalysis. Here it refers to the idea of the signifier-phallus, which is the psychic 
signifier of sexual difference. Phallus does not refer to the male genital organ, but 
rather is the primary signifier that initiates the process of signification, the process of 
language and the entry into the symbolic that is the founding moment of human 
subjectivity. Thus the idea of sexual difference is for Lacan constituted and 
maintained in language and in the unconscious. The signifier-phallus stands outside of 
signification and defines subjectivity by the subject’s relation with it. 
It is what Lacan calls The Law of the Father that allows men a privileged position in 
the symbolic, and a specific relation to the signifier-phallus, but only on condition of 
their symbolic psychic castration. In particular, the masculine Lacanian subject, 
operating within the symbolic order, is nowhere more subject to the Law of the Father 
than here, in respect of sexual difference. Man may be considered a coherent subject 
because his existence is delimited or circumscribed by the existence of the Father, 
which in psychoanalysis is not the biological father, but rather the primal father, first 
identified in Freud’s Totem and Taboo, who stands outside symbolic castration and 
exists only as a psychic stipulation.  
 
Anyone who falls under the psychoanalytic category of the feminine subject will, at 
least in part, avoid complete definition by the signifier-phallus. Conversely, though, 
woman is never completely out-with the phallic function either. By Lacan’s 
reckoning, no subject can avoid the signifier-phallus entirely, as this would result in a 
breakdown of coherence and consequent psychopathy. What we see though is that 
woman is woman because she is structured differently at the level of the psyche, and 
not because of any anatomical, biological or socio-cultural difference. This means 
that, contrary to some interpretations of Lacan’s position, woman is no less complete 
than man.42 As Bruce Fink puts it: “Man is whole only with respect to the phallic 
                                                
41 Bruce Fink The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton, 
N.J.; Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1995) p. 109. 
42 See Nancy J. Chodorow, Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory (New Haven; 
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function; women are no more ‘undefined’ or ‘indefinite’ than man, except in relation 
to the phallic function.”43  
 
Besides the formulas of sexuation that represent the subject in language, Lacan also 
describes the location of the sexuated subject within patterns of desire and jouissance. 
Man cannot have a directly desirous relationship with woman. He must instead be 
content with objet a, a substitute for the real object of his desire. Lacan writes woman 
as woman, as a way of expressing the idea that woman does not exist in the field of 
language and the symbolic, but only inasmuch as she is not signified in relation to the 
phallus, and so can only be written under deletion: “…she has different ways of 
approaching the phallus and of keeping it for herself. It’s not because she is not-
wholly in the phallic function that she is not there at all. She is not not there at all. She 
is there in full. But there is something more.”44 Man exists insofar as he can be 
defined by his relationship to the phallic function, the master signifier, but for woman, 
with no such relationship to the phallic function, a position in the significatory field of 
the symbolic is only possible in terms of desire, situated relationally between the 
phallus and the signifier for Lack in the Other, which is to say the signifier of 
incompletion and desire. 
 
Within Lacan’s schema of sexuation, there are two positions of subjectivity; the 
speaking subject, that operates within the symbolic order, and the subject of desire, of 
either phallic jouissance or jouissance of the Other. Desire is an invariably mediated 
experience, because of the overarching signifier-phallus within the desirous dynamic. 
Because masculine and feminine subjects have different relations to the phallus, they 
occupy different positions within the symbolic and so have different relations to the 
Other. Their relations are inherently asymmetric, there is no complementariness 
between the masculine and the feminine, and their difference is borne out within 
desire and the experience of jouissance.  
 
Chapter two begins with a quote from an interview with the couturier John Galliano, 
who believes that the purpose of fashion is to make men desire women. I aim to show 
that while fashion, and in particular haute couture, may inspire desire in men, and 
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may make women the object of masculine desire, women are by no means passive 
within this process, nor are they entirely absent from it. Haute couture can also 
operate as an instance of feminine desire and jouissance, and the fundamental 
asymmetry of desire as Lacan sees it in fact goes a long way to explaining the 
paradoxes and illogicalities of haute couture. The avant garde is the artistic model 
used here, and is brought into dialogue with contemporary and near-contemporary 
couture creations to show how Lacan’s principles of desire operate in couture. In 
particular, the disruption and challenges presented by the avant garde evidence a 
disturbing interjection of the real into the stability of the symbolic, while avant garde 
historicity, with its repetitions and its doubling back, provides a cogency and 
coherence to the duality of couture and its capacity to simultaneously reveal both 
positions of feminine subjectivity, as the object of man’s desire and as the troubling, 
unspeakable subject. 
 
Chapter three looks at Leigh Bowery, a unique man whose life and whose art were 
inseparable from one another. Bowery was a contentious figure, not particularly 
likeable or endearing, but whose creative output in terms of art, fashion and 
performance was distinctive and inimitable. He distorted his body through creative 
dress and temporary modification, and rendered in his costumed performances the 
uniquely visceral and violent aspects of human experience. He also sat for the English 
portraitist Lucian Freud, who painted several nude studies of Bowery’s prodigious 
form. Recent work by Joan Copjec and Tim Dean argues that Lacan’s model of sexed 
subjectivity can suggest a non-normative model of sexuality, one that can be 
considered “queer” and that problematises the idea that masculinity is stable, just as it 
accepts and celebrates the instability of all gender.45 Bowery uses fashion and 
performance to evidence this instability, and the idea of the metonymy of 
performance, put forward by Peggy Phelan, shows how Bowery’s performances 
invoke a transgressive jouissance that engenders nothing less than the dissolution of 
the self.46 This is Bowery’s point, precisely, but crucially it is not unique to him. It is 
integral to the experience of being human, and it is this that led the London gallery 
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owner Anthony D’Offay to describe him as a “shiny mirror [that] allowed you to see 
yourself in this strange shape that he took.”47 However vulgar, or grotesque, or 
obscene his work was, and however distasteful or dislikeable he may have been, 
Bowery appeared to manifest a profound human commonality, something that was 
recognisable to all his audiences, and that resonates posthumously when his work is 
viewed today.   
 
My fourth and final chapter concerns itself with Lacan’s last seminar, Seminar XXIII, 
in which he developed the idea of the sinthome and its relation to subjectivity and 
language. As I said earlier, the concept of sinthome is not without its problems. 
However it does provide a way of negotiating fashion as language in a way that 
retains fashion’s relation to the body and to the human subject. The sinthome is a 
wholesale reclassification of the symptom, and is remarkable in that it removes the 
symptom from the subject and suggests instead that it is an entirely independent 
aspect of the psyche, one that is not a problem to be cured as such but instead the tie 
that binds the entire structure together. The centrality of language to the subject 
remains, as does the relationship between language as one experience and 
corporeality as another. The sinthome is evidenced in “difficult” language, language 
whose meaning is abstruse and deliberately unclear. Lacan sees it in the work of 
James Joyce, and I argue for its existence in the work of the conceptual fashion 
designer Hussein Chalayan. 
 
Previously, the premise of fashion as language has been based on the structuralist 
theory of Roland Barthes, who argues in The Fashion System (1967) that fashion is a 
language, but it can only be read when it is transposed into existing stylistic 
discourses of image and text in fashion magazines. He does not acknowledge 
fashion’s relationship to the subject and to the body, and rejects the idea that fashion 
has any meaning or internal coherence in its own right.  
 
The structuralist approach set out by Barthes in The Fashion System can be seen in 
much fashion writing that has followed. It has been applied in a literal (some would 
say overly so) manner by Alison Lurie who claimed in The Language of Clothes 
                                                
47 Anthony D’Offay, interviewed for Sue Tilley, Leigh Bowery: The Life and Times of 
an Icon (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1997) p. 216. 
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(1981) that clothing is a language, with various garments acting as aspects of 
grammar, syntax and vocabulary. Bizarrely, perhaps, Lurie’s logic suggests that the 
more clothes one owns, the greater one’s social vocabulary, an approach that may 
well appeal to an advertiser, but which does not represent anything approaching the 
actual lived experience of the human subject. Structuralism is also the conceptual 
approach that underpins the arguments put forward by Dick Hebdidge in Subculture: 
The Meaning of Style (1988) where he asks, a propos of punk, “But what, if anything, 
were these subversive practices being used to signify? How do we ‘read’ them?” It 
appears again in Fred Davis in Fashion, Culture and Identity (1992) when he says that 
“what we wear, including cosmetics, jewelry and coiffure, can be subsumed under the 
general notion of a code,” and in The Face of Fashion (1994) by Jennifer Craik, who 
suggests that “A fashion system embodies the denotation of acceptable codes and 
conventions.”48   
 
The centrality of the subject to fashion, and of fashion to the subject, is a key theme 
throughout this thesis. By negotiating fashion as a language in terms of Lacan, rather 
than of Barthes, this centrality is maintained. We see again an instance of the 
asymmetry and the disruption of the feminine, jouissance, and, because a 
reconciliation with one’s sinthome represents for Lacan the end of analysis, the 
recognition of the impossibility of ones own subjectivity.  
 
In this thesis, I will read fashion as art in terms of psychoanalysis to show that fashion 
is a cultural and creative site where issues of subjectivity are constituted and 
maintained. However, I believe that fashion offers an insight into the difficulties of 
subjectivity, not neat and contained resolutions. In its instancing of Lacanian ideas of 
femininity, jouissance and language, and the negotiation of these ideas through the 
structure of the imaginary, symbolic and real, the conflict that lies at the heart of the 
human condition can be seen being played out in the innovative and artistic relation 
between iconoclast fashion and its wearer. I aim to demonstrate too how the political 
capital that circulates as a result of this relationship being played out is seditious 
almost by default, challenging the legitimacy of social structures and, on occasion, 
even undermining sociality itself. 
                                                
48  See Lurie, The Language of Clothes, Hebdige, Subculture: the Meaning of Style p. 
106, Davis, Fashion, Culture and Identity p. 12, Craik, The Face of Fashion p. 5.  
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Chapter One. 
 
Fashion Photography and the Myth of the Unified Subject. 
 
On 28th August 2006, the supermodel Erin O’Connor was interviewed on BBC Radio 
4 Woman’s Hour. She related the tale of a photo shoot she did for American Vogue, 
where the photographer wanted to photograph her naked, with her body representing a 
flower. She refused, but agreed to the alternative suggestion of head-to-toe green 
body paint, and a hat that looked like a flower on her head. The shoot itself was, 
apparently, less than successful, but what is interesting about the anecdote is this: 
there is a paradox at the heart of fashion photography, in that it is not generally 
concerned with representing clothes. If you want to know what fashionable clothes 
are, or have been, or are going to be, appropriate and accurate reference points might 
include pictures of film stars and pop stars, advertisements, store window displays, 
and the editorials of fashion magazines and newspaper supplements for coverage of 
fashion shows. You might also observe what inner city black teenagers are wearing, 
because their style and taste have been plagiarised by fashion “leaders” for years.49 If 
you look at fashion photography, it will tell you virtually nothing about the garments 
themselves. It would appear that Susan Sontag was quite right when she said that: 
“the greatest fashion photography is more than the photography of fashion.”50 How, 
then, is fashion photography understood? If fashion is not its priority, what is?  
 
Identification in Freud and Lacan. 
 
In psychoanalysis, identification is one of the two psychic processes by which the self 
is constituted, the other being desire. Freud develops theories of identification 
throughout his career, and the term appears in a number of his writings where it is 
continuously explored and developed, but its vicissitudes are never entirely resolved. 
One consistency, though, is the differentiation Freud makes between identification 
and desire. In a discussion of the melancholic position in ‘A General Theory of 
                                                
49 The trend for appropriating black style goes as far back as the 1920s, when fashion, 
music and dance styles made the journey from Harlem to Broadway and thence to 
Paris. See Cecil Beaton, The Glass of Fashion (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1954) pp. 133-135. 
50 Susan Sontag, ‘The Avedon Eye,’ p. 105. 
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Neuroses’ (1917) he says “by a process which we must call ‘narcissistic 
identification’ he has set up the object within the ego itself, projected it on to the 
ego.”51 Later, in ‘Group Psychology and The Analysis of the Ego’ (1921) he again 
defines identification as “the introjection of the object into the ego.”52 Identification 
and desire are, for Freud, parallel processes that are differentiated from one another in 
terms of their relation to the object.53 Put simply, the operation of identification is the 
wish to be the object, while the operation of desire is the wish to have the object. In 
Freudian psychoanalysis identification can take several forms. Laplanche and Pontalis 
have categorised these according to the point in Freud’s thinking in which they 
appear.54 The idea of oral incorporation appears in ‘Totem and Taboo’ (1912-13) 
while a year later the idea of narcissism evolves, where Freud “introduces the 
dialectic which links the narcissistic object choice […] with identification.”55 Finally 
the essential effect of the Oedipus complex on the structuring of the subject is 
described in terms of identification with the parents, although, as is pointed out by 
Laplanche and Pontalis there is an ambivalence in Oedipal identification. The subject 
both loves and admires their same-sex parent but also hates them. The ambivalence of 
identification in the Oedipus complex renders the ostensible distinction between 
identification and desire, if not obsolete, then certainly unclear, particularly for girls.  
 
Lacan, however, objects to the unnecessarily complicated theory of identification put 
forward by Freud. He suggests instead that while identification is indeed the starting 
point for the self, and is the source of the subject’s psychic structure as well as the 
impetus for exchanges and interplays between the individual and others, it pre-dates 
the Oedipus complex and instead emanates from an anterior world where the 
individual has only one object of desire and only one alias – himself. Lacan reorders 
Freud’s theories of identification and prioritises narcissism over and above oral 
                                                
51 Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. by James Strachey, Anna 
Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1963) p. 357. 
52 Sigmund Freud, Beyond The Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and Other 
Works, trans. by James Strachey, Anna Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1955) p. 108. 
53 I should also point out that desire is a specifically Lacanian term. Freud rarely used 
it, preferring instead the terms libido, eros, and drive. I follow Diana Fuss here in 
using desire in its broader Lacanian sense when referring to the set of concepts that 
Freud sets up as oppositional to identification. 
54 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-anlaysis, 
trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Hogarth Press, 1973) pp. 206-7.  
55 Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, p. 208. 
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incorporation and Oedipal identification, which are moved into subordinate positions 
relative to narcissism and play only a supporting role in the identificatory drama. 
Whereas for Freud identification with the father arises from a desire for incorporation 
through oral ingestion Lacan instead speaks of the maternal embrace that inspires the 
wish for oral fusion: “The creature who is absorbing is completely absorbed and the 
archaic complex resonates in the maternal embrace. We shall not speak here with 
Freud of auto-erotism, … still less of oral erotism, since the longing for the nurturing 
breast, over which the psychoanalytic movement has equivocated, arises again from 
the weaning complex only through its restoration by the Oedipus complex.”56  
 
For Lacan, the role that identification plays in the constitution of the self must be 
understood in terms of narcissistic identification, which he reconstitutes from its 
original context as set out by Freud in ‘On Narcissism’ (1914) and develops into one 
of his best-known and most remarkably accessible concepts, Le Stade du Miroir (the 
mirror stage), which is set out in ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of 
the I.’ (1936) 
 
The Mirror Stage: Le Stade du Miroir.  
 
Freud’s work on narcissism developed significantly from its initial position in 1914 to 
a final version in ‘The Ego and The Id’ (1923). Primarily, though, narcissism refers to 
a state described in Freud’s ‘On Narcissism’ (1914) where a subject’s “later choice of 
love-objects has taken as a model […] themselves. They are plainly seeking 
themselves as a love object and are exhibiting a type of object choice which must be 
termed ‘narcissistic.’”57  Narcissism, for Freud, is at once a state or a condition for the 
adult ego, and a developmental phase, and it is the latter that is of interest for our 
purposes here.  He sees narcissism is a necessary intermediate stage between 
autoeroticism and object-love. It is quite distinct from both of these other stages, and 
is a part of the pre-oedipal transition from being an inchoate bundle of drives to 
                                                
56 Jacques Lacan, Les complexes familiaux dans la formation de l’individu (1938), 
cited in Shuli Barzilai, Lacan and the Matter of Origins (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1999) pp. 119-120. 
57 Sigmund Freud, On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on 
Metapsychology and Other Works, trans. by James Strachey, Anna Freud (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1957) p. 88. 
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starting to become a subject. For Freud, though, the ego is already active, and 
narcissism is engendered by some sort of act upon the ego itself: “There must be 
something added […] a new psychical action – in order to bring about narcissism.”58 
 
In the Écrits Lacan reverses the relationship between ego-formation and narcissism, 
and departs from Freud by arguing that narcissism is the starting point for three 
constitutive activities – the formation of the ego, the principle of recognition and the 
subsequent realisation of the object, and the consequent aggressively and libidinal 
object choice.59 It is this reversal that forms the basis for the Mirror Stage and that 
Lacan then suggests is the point at which the self is constituted. It occurs at around the 
time the infant is six months old and recognises its reflection in the mirror for the first 
time. The child’s reflection, though, is itself and not itself at one and the same time; it 
is the child’s image, but not the actual child itself. Lacan emphasises the disjuncture 
between Gestalt, the child’s ability to perceive a sense of wholeness as a means of 
understanding exteriority, and the conflict between this visual Gestalt and actual 
existence. Before this visual recognition, the self is experienced as fragmented, 
contingent, disorganised, because there is no position external to the on-going lived 
experience from which a unified subjectivity can be ordered. The mirror stage 
provides just such a position, but the self whose constitution it facilitates is not the 
actual “self” but a reflection, a representation. The mirror, then, presents what 
Malcolm Bowie called an “epistemological void” that for the infant is “a trap” in 
which it is, perversely, content to be caught. “Falsehood and underhandedness,” he 
tells us, “are somehow ingrained into the ego during its first formative moments.”60  
 
Significantly, the Mirror Stage is a stage in every sense. It is a phase and, 
simultaneously, a performance arena in which the misrecognition and alienation that 
are fundamental to the self are constantly enacted and re-enacted. The misrecognition 
and alienation engendered by it are essential as well as permanent: 
This development is a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the 
formation of the individual into history. The mirror stage is a drama 
                                                
58 Freud, On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on 
Metapsychology and Other Works, p.77. 
59 See  Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision (London: Verso, 2005) pp. 
170-171 for a full discussion of this transition. 
60 Bowie, Lacan, p. 23. 
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whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation – 
and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial 
identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a 
fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call 
orthopaedic – and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an 
alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s 
entire mental development.61 
 
The continuing tension between fragmentation and unity that are the inevitable 
consequence of an alienated self takes place on the surface of the body, a site 
described by Cavallaro and Warwick as “a threshold, neither (or both) mind or body, 
individual or social, natural or culturally constructed … the site of the ongoing 
processes of subjectivity.”62  
 
In The Psychology of Clothes (1930) J.C. Flügel suggested that a resolution of 
neurotic symptoms would lead us away from fashion, but by Lacan’s reasoning 
fashion can be seen as one of the inevitable strategies employed to reconfigure the 
alienation at the centre of the self. Lacan himself talks of the “Procrustean 
arbitrariness” of fashion, which “denies respect for the natural forms of the human 
body.”63 Procrustes is a robber from Greek legend who forced his victims to lie on a 
bed that he made them fit by cutting off or stretching parts of their body64, and by 
invoking him in the context of fashion, Lacan seems to suggest that dress does not act 
as it is often assumed to, demonstrating the body’s limits and presenting a unified and 
contained self, but on the contrary invokes the violence and mutilation that 
characterises the subject’s sense of their relationship with themselves. It would appear 
that dress “threaten[s] the precarious sense of self by its insistent marginality,”65 as 
Cavallaro and Warwick have argued. For Caroline Evans, using Lacan’s mirror phase 
as a vehicle for a study of the Italian surrealist fashion designer Elsa Schiapparelli, 
“the scopic regime of the mirror becomes the place in which the script of the self is 
                                                
61 Lacan, The Écrit: A Selection p. 5. 
62 Dani Cavallaro and Alex Warwick, Fashioning the Frame: Boundaries, Dress and 
the Body (Oxford: Berg, 1998) p. 25. 
63 Lacan, The Écrit: A Selection p. 13. 
64 Cavallaro and Warwick discuss this particular Lacanian concept in relation to the 
body, in Cavallaro and Warwick, Fashioning the Frame,  p. 26. 
65 Cavallaro and Warwick, Fashioning the Frame, p.25. 
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written.”66 Following from Lacan and his interpretation in relation to the body by 
Cavallaro and Warwick it should be argued instead that the scopic regime of the 
mirror is the place where the self is constantly negotiated and renegotiated, in an 
interminable process of mis/identification that is the certain consequence of an 
alienated subjectivity. 
 
Image, Identity, Identification. 
 
The visual is privileged in the construction of the ego, and the mirror stage is the 
interface between image, identity and identification: 
We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the 
full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation 
that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image – whose 
predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in 
analytic theory, of the ancient term imago.67  
 
This emphasis on visuality has had far reaching consequences within visual culture 
and theory, initially in film criticism.68 Christian Metz, in particular, has written 
extensively on the implications of the mirror stage for film theory, specifically with 
regards to the spectator’s relation with the image on the screen. Metz considers 
identification between the viewer and the screen to be a secondary identification, as it 
is not the viewer’s own body on the screen. Moreover, the viewer is already a subject 
within the symbolic order, having already experienced the mirror stage, and is capable 
of differentiating between object and subject. For Metz, the viewing subject’s 
identification is with the camera itself, rather than the images on the screen.69 
Jacqueline Rose has taken issue with Metz, saying that in fact identification with 
images is more than possible. Not only does the subject never see its own body as 
such, the phenomenon of transitivism, where one child cries when another is punished 
                                                
66 Caroline Evans, ‘Masks, Mirrors and Mannequins: Elsa Schiaparelli and the 
Decentred Subject,’ Fashion Theory, 3:1 (1999), 3-31, (p. 18). 
67 Lacan, The Écrits: A Selection, p. 2.  
68 Apart from the mirror stage, a range of psychoanalytic concepts have been 
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(for example) demonstrates that mirror identification can be with another subject. 
Additionally, Metz’s ‘presentified absence’ of the object in cinema is equally 
applicable to any visual representation, and offers the possibility that mirror 
identification can take place between the subject and almost any image.70 The 
possibility of a mirror identification taking place between a viewer and a fashion 
photograph has not, thus far, been a feature of scholarship in either visual culture, 
psychoanalysis or fashion, but it is central to the premise of this chapter.  
 
Lacan’s distinction between a lure and trompe-l’oeil, in his discussion of the art of 
Zeuxis and Parrhasios illustrates the complexities of viewing and relating to an image. 
He writes: “if one wishes to deceive a man, what one presents to him is the painting of 
a veil, that is to say, something that incites him to ask what is behind it […] The image 
pretends to be something other than what it is.”71 Lacan’s point here is that the illusion 
of substance, created by an allusion to the possibility of an unknown depth, is 
effectively a confidence trick that allows the subject to relate to an image. This idea 
has been developed by Michele Montrelay and others in order to explain the 
masquerade of femininity, and is discussed in detail in the next chapter. What is 
important for this chapter is that fashion, which can be seen as a form of veiling, 
provokes just such a demand to know, but the demand can never be met, precisely 
because the operation of the veil and what it is covering, the body, are indivisible and 
are interdependent on one another.  
 
The relationship between the body and the veil (the body’s covering) is analogous to 
Lacan’s conceptualisation of subject and object, and being and meaning. The 
relationship is demonstrated by Lacan in the diagram: 
 
                                                
70 Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision, pp. 196-197. 
71 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Alan 
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The issue here is not a distinction between one side or the other, and the consequences 
of that distinction, but rather, the existence of the illusion of this distinction in the first 
place, and the contingency that the ‘or’ brings to the existence of the subject. Lacan 
uses the example of the highwayman’s cry ‘your money or your life!’ to illustrate the 
point: “If I choose the money, I lose both. If I choose life, I have life without money, 
namely, a life deprived of something.”72  There is, for Lacan, no real ‘choice’ at all. 
He argues instead that the alienation of the self that is instigated at the moment of the 
emergence of subjectivity is written into language. It is figured upon the continual 
visual mis-recognition of the mirror that entry into language depends upon. 
 
The subject’s entry into language is a corporeal, even visceral process. In 
‘Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis,’ Lacan talks of bodily imagos in terms of “castration, 
mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the 
body.”73  Despite his emphasis on language, Lacan is also concerned with the 
experience of the body, which he sees as central to subjectivity and to psychic 
processes. The libido, the motivational force behind narcissism and the consequent 
mirror stage is, he says, “an organ. This organ is unreal. Unreal is not imaginary. The 
unreal is defined by articulating itself on the real in a way that eludes us […] but the 
fact that it is unreal does not prevent an organ from embodying itself.”74  It can, like 
many other real and unreal concepts, be “traced in the history of its effects.”75 Lacan 
uses the example of tattooing to illustrate how the bodily effects of the libido on 
subjectivity are materialised:  
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74 Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 205. 
45 Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 205. 
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The tattoo certainly has the function of being for the Other, of situating 
the subject in it, marking his place in the field of the group’s relations, 
between each individual and all the others. And, at the same time, it 
obviously has an erotic function, which all those who have approached it 
in reality have perceived.76 
 
The surface decoration of the body is therefore an arena in which subjectivity and 
eroticism can be delineated.  
 
If fashion is indivisible from either the wearer or the body that upholds the garment, it 
follows that sartorial mores – more usually dismissed either as feminine 
capriciousness or the inevitable product of capitalist excess - are a key site where the 
effects of the libido are evinced. I suggest that it is in the contradictions of fashion, its 
provocations and its impossibilities, that such conflicts of subjectivity are played out.  
 
Identification.  
 
Although identification is a psychic process, it is also very much a social process too. 
As Diana Fuss says,  “identification operates precisely as social relations; the 
psychoanalytic theory of identification is, from the outset, a theory of sociality, an 
analysis of the role of culture in shaping identity.”77 The self does not constitute itself 
by itself. Psychic processes do not instigate themselves of their own accord. They are 
a consequence of the interplay between the subject and the world around them, and 
can best be understood with reference to this interplay. It is because of the importance 
of social relations to psychic processes, and the political implications of these 
relations, that the concept of identification has proved to be immensely influential. 
 
The queer theorist Eve Sedgewick is concerned with issues of sexuality and 
identification, and in her 1990 book The Epistemology of the Closet argues that there 
is no automatic and/or direct correlation between (sexual) identity and identification, 
saying instead that sexuality is experienced in a multitude of forms that are specific to 
each subject. “To identify as,” she says, “must always include multiple processes of 
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identification with.”78 The suggestion is that the relationship between the subject and 
its object is not necessarily only one of alterity. 
 
The notion of identity, with its political impetus and its centrality to the various 
categories of subject, has been inflected by processes of identification. However, the 
relation between identity and identification is not straightforward. In particular the 
political fudge that facilitated the conceptualisation of private identifications and 
public identities is losing currency. Diana Fuss argues that, rather than identity and 
identification being categories of a dialectic self, the very operation of identification 
renders the category of inherent identity as unworkable: “Identification is a process 
that keeps identity at a distance, that prevents identity from ever approximating the 
status of an ontological given, even as it makes possible the formation of an illusion 
of identity as immediate, secure and totalizable […] it is precisely identity that 
becomes problematic in and through the work of identification.”79   
  
The emphasis on visuality that is evident in both psychic and social processes of 
identification has been crucial in the development of a framework by which visual 
culture can be negotiated. Feminist film theory of the 1980s in particular was 
concerned with the relationship between the viewer and the screen, and has made 
extensive use of the concept of identification to critique the apparent gender-
normativity of the cinematic process, specified most succinctly in Ann Kaplan’s 
question, ‘Is the gaze male?’80 Laura Mulvey’s seminal 1976 essay ‘Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema’ was the point of departure for much of these theorists. Where 
Mulvey argued that the gaze was indeed male and women’s identification was 
essentially passive, Teresa de Lauretis suggested that a “double identification” 
operates, where women’s identification can be figured as much as possible outside of 
the masculine parameters of film. Mary Ann Doane suggested that the gap between 
identification and desire is merged for the female viewer through a process of 
overidentification with the image of the woman on the screen, and Kaja Silverman 
extends this to include the male viewer too, by placing identification very firmly 
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within the social order and insisting on the political dynamic that binds subjectivity 
and ideology.81 
 
Within the theorising of visual culture, though, the process of identification and 
fashion photography has not yet been discussed.82 While the various points of 
feminist film theory outlined above have much with which to recommend themselves, 
I contend that, in terms of fashion photography, the processes of identification that 
take place between the viewer and the image are constituent of a very particular 
model of subjective feminine experience. I suggest that fashion photography offers a 
model of feminine subjectivity that reflects fragmentation rather than cohesion, and 
that the recognition of this fragmentation has political potential in that it can be seen 
as a resistance to the subjective unity that images are presumed to represent. This 
model is most clearly seen in the work of Nick Knight, as I will show. 
 
Julia Kristeva considered identification in her 1987 publication Tales of Love, in 
which she developed the concept of narcissism and its role in the constitution of the 
subject. She talks of the “emptiness” that is inherent in the constitution of the ego and 
that is the manifestation of the distance between the nascent subject and the incipient 
object. Narcissism is vital, she argues, for the protection of this essential emptiness, as 
without it “chaos would sweep away any possibility of distinction, trace and 
symbolisation, which would in turn confuse the limits of the body, words, the real and 
the symbolic.” For Kristeva, the child “needs the real and the symbolic [because] it 
signifies itself as a child … precisely in that zone where emptiness and narcissism, 
one upholding the other, constitute the zero degree of the imagination.”83   
 
                                                
81 See Teresa De Laurentis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema 
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Narcissism, with its capacity to see oneself as an object as well as to perceive oneself 
as a subject, is essential to the stability of the ego. Narcissism is, by Kristeva’s 
reckoning, a defensive action that protects the subject from the emptiness that 
engenders subjectivity, and the “whole contrivance of imagery, representations, 
identifications and projections” are the means by which the emptiness might be 
exorcised. Separation, she says, is our opportunity to become “subjects of 
representation”84    
 
There are gender implications involved here, too. Kristeva’s formulation suggests that 
it is far from certain that women would be more narcissistic than men, as Freud 
maintained. Moreover, to suggest that fashion photography, and indeed all pictorial 
representations of human subjectivity, render women passive – in the words of John 
Berger, that “men act: women appear,”85 - neglects the very active role that 
representation plays in the constitution of the subject. Far from women passively 
appearing in representations, the representations themselves interact with the 
inquiring psyche that, in the terms of the mirror stage, seeks itself and not itself at one 
and the same time. Writing of fashion photography, Glen O’Brian makes reference, 
albeit unwittingly, to the pre-symbolic imaginary evoked by Kristeva: “Fashion 
photography is a world without men. It is a world of self-referentiality, possibly but 
not necessarily lesbian, but nevertheless there is still the sense that the “world of men” 
exists just outside the frame.”86 It may well be the case that the passive eroticism by 
which fashion photography is usually understood is in fact a misreading of the genre. 
The appeal of fashion photography comes instead from the, usually female, viewer. In 
Kristeva’s words, if she redirects “the insatiable craving for a fine distinctive image 
towards her … inner solitude, in the exquisite pain of contemplation, daydreaming or 
even hallucination – that amounts to a true resolution of narcissism that is not at all 
erotic … but is, quietly or fanatically, wholly amorous.”87 Importantly, though, 
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Kristeva suggests that this “amorousness” is in fact “the most subtle sublimation of 
the secret, psychotic ground of hysteria...”88  
 
 
Hysteria. 
 
The understanding of hysteria as a condition or illness of the mind comes from the 
work of Jean-Martin Charcot, the chief physician at the Hôpital de Salpêtrière in Paris 
throughout the 1870s and 1880s. However, the discovery that hysteria is psychic rather 
than physical is not his only legacy. Charcot was, and remains, a controversial figure, 
and his studies in hysteria are as contested as they are legendary. His patients were 
called upon to perform their hysteric fits under hypnosis at the weekly lectures 
Charcot gave in the amphitheatre at Salpêtrière, and he employed photographers and 
artists to record the seizures suffered by the patients during their time at the hospital. 
These photographs were published as the three-volume Iconographie Photographique 
de la Salpêtrière (1878-1880.) Charcot insisted on the theatricality and the spectacle of 
hysteric symptoms, and although he did not theorise an etiology of hysteria he 
nevertheless understood its symptoms as traces of psychic trauma. Elizabeth Bronfen 
has suggested, in light of this, that “precisely because the knowledge at stake is 
inevitable but also unknowable, hysteria also involves mimesis as simulation. It 
articulates through an unjust image, speaking deceptively, obliquely and even 
treacherously, even as it requires an interpellator and an audience.”89 Bronfen’s 
reading of Charcot reiterates the idea that hysteria is a psychic illness whose 
symptoms appear in and through the body and are social by their very nature. Indeed, 
in the Iconographie Photographique itself, hysteric symptoms are explicitly described 
in terms of their corporeal affect: 
If one carefully examines the various organic acts of hysterics one 
soon convinces oneself that they are almost never in a normal 
condition. The hysteric seems always to be outside the rules: 
sometimes their bodies behave in an exaggerated manner, 
sometimes, on the contrary, their acts are slowed to the point of 
seeming sometimes suppressed. 
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It is in this way that the need to eat can be exaggerated (bulimia) or 
entirely absent (abstinence); that a stubborn constipation can be 
replaced by diarrhoea; that incontinence can become a more or less 
complete retention of urine; that in an aesthetic illness one will find 
a considerably heightened sensibility; - it is in this way that the 
breakdown of intellectual faculties will follow their ecstasy.90 (my 
translation.)    
 
What is of particular interest in this passage is the connection made between hysteria 
and food intake. It could be argued from this that eating disorders (as they are called 
now) are a hysteric symptom, and are one of the ways by which hysterics mark their 
resistance to “normal” social rules. It is evident too, that eating disorders by far pre-
date the popular understanding of them as a contemporary phenomenon, and this 
compels a re-examination of the argument that media representations of idealised 
female forms inspire anorexia and bulimia. The debate around eating disorders should 
be reframed in light of hysteric resistance and questions must then be raised regarding 
the identification between female subjects and their representation within visual 
culture, rather than the popular and simplistic assertion that the latter unilaterally 
influences the former, who remain passive recipients of this influence.  
 
Freud worked under Charcot at Salpêtrière, and this shaped his firm belief that 
psychoanalysis’s raison d’être was its capacity to treat what he called the neuroses, 
including hysteria. His commitment to the treatment of hysteria led to his early 
psychoanalytic discoveries that he put forward in Studies on Hysteria. Following from 
this early work, Freud repeatedly made it quite clear that hysteric symptoms 
manifested themselves physically as well as psychically.91 Thus, he departed from 
Charcot in two crucial ways; firstly by emphasising the unconscious as the location of 
hysteria, and so suggesting that bodily symptoms were secondary to psychic 
processes, and secondly by taking hysteria out of the realm of specialist illness, and 
making it instead central to the psychic experience generally. “Her hysteria,” he wrote, 
                                                
90 Renard, Iconographie Photographique, p. 3. 
91 See Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams and on Dreams. trans. James 
Strachey, Anna Freud, ed. by James Strachey. Vol. 4, Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1953) 
p.115 and Freud, Sigmund, An Infantile Neurosis, and Other Works trans. James 
Strachey, Anna Freud. ed. by James Strachey. Vol. 17, Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1955) pp. 
75-76, 113-114. 
  46 
“can therefore be described as an acquired one, and it presupposed nothing more than 
the possession of what is a very widespread proclivity – the proclivity to acquire 
hysteria.”92 He suggested too that male as well as female patients could suffer from the 
condition, and removed it from any biologically  or anatomically determined cause or 
context.93 
 
It is also worth noting that it was in his reading of Jensen’s novel Gradiva and his 
recognition of hysteric symptoms in the central character, in his essay of that title from 
1907, that Freud first noticed similarities between psychoanalysis and literature, a 
theme developed by Lacan that we will discuss in detail in the final chapter of this 
thesis.94  
 
Lacan followed Freud by restating the centrality of hysteria to psychoanalytic thought 
when in 1970 he declared it one of the four discourses, the others being the discourses 
of the Master, the University, and the Analyst.95 The Discourse of the Hysteric, for 
Lacan, is a model for the ambiguous relationship between the subject and the so-called 
master signifier, where the hysteric at once refuses the master signifier and is in 
harmony with it. The refusal of the master signifier manifests itself in bodily 
symptoms and is a result of the alienation that results from the subject’s entry into 
language. Where in the other Discourses this alienation is suppressed, in the Discourse 
of the Hysteric it gains expression and authority.96 According to Lacan’s thesis, the 
hysterical discourse can also be seen in moments of dissent and refusal more 
generally, at points where, according to Mark Bracher, there is a “failure of the subject 
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to coincide with or be satisfied by the master signifiers offered by society and 
embraced as the subject’s ideals.”97 
 
Jacqueline Rose has read Freud and Lacan together in terms of their understanding of 
hysteria, and concluded that the famous Lacanian declaration, that the unconscious is 
structured like a language, is in essence an attempt to connect the apparent disorder of 
a symptom with the process of language through which the subject speaks and fails to 
speak. This in turn adds a level of meaning to corporeal experience, because it means 
that the body is the site of the articulation of the otherwise inarticulable. The 
importance of the linguistic sign, she argues, was that it “provided a model internal to 
language itself of that form of indirect representation (the body speaking because there 
is something which cannot be said) which psychoanalysis uncovered in the 
symptomatology of its patients. Only if one thing can stand for another is the 
hysterical symptom something more than the logical and direct manifestation of 
physical or psychic (and social) degeneracy.”98   
 
Hysteria has historically been associated with femininity, although it is not necessarily 
a condition that is exclusive to women, and Ilsa Veith’s conclusion, that throughout 
history hysteria’s symptoms have been modified according to the prevailing concept 
of the feminine ideal, is the starting point for much feminist engagement with the 
question of hysteria.99 The debates spanned a range of positions, where hysteria is seen 
at worst “as a male fantasy which locks women into infantilism and debility” and at 
best “as a disorder that allows women to speak the unconscious truths of the body and 
desire which patriarchy has repressed and men cannot stand.”100 Outside of a 
specifically feminist engagement, cultural historians like Mark S. Micale have argued 
for the acknowledgement of male hysteria, while Elaine Showalter has suggested that 
hysteria has reinvented itself as an ailment of the postmodern cultural condition that 
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manifests itself in contemporary maladies such as chronic fatigue syndrome and post-
traumatic stress disorder.101 Hysteria no longer appears as a clinical term, but its 
currency as a critical and conceptual tool is still very much in evidence. 
 
The mutability and persistence of hysteria make it a source of endless fascination, and 
the hysteric’s corporeal enactment of psychic anguish speaks eloquently of the 
contingency of culturally defined femininity and the effect of this on female subjects. 
What is central to the concerns of this chapter is the representation of discourses of 
hysteria in visual culture, specifically fashion photography. Representations of 
hysteria and their relation to the Mirror Stage were explored by the psychoanalyst 
Françoise Dolto in her experiments with poupée fleurs (flower dolls) in the 1940’s in 
which dolls made to look like flowers, with no limbs or facial features, were used to 
treat hysteric female children who had refused language and would only communicate 
with screams or else not speak at all. The dolls were objects with which they could 
identify, but which, crucially, encouraged them to identify in the dolls not their 
present-day condition but instead what Dolto calls “a wholly archaic feeling.”102 The 
analysands were encouraged, through an identification with the poupée fleurs to revisit 
their entry to the Mirror Stage and to re-enter language in a way that would not 
provoke mutism and hysterical resistance. What Dolto discovered in these analyses is 
that narcissistic and hysteric identification are possible in the imaginary as well as the 
symbolic, and that both are central to the constitution and the maintenance of 
subjectivity. This dual centrality of narcissism and hysteria to subjective experience is 
now seen, by Julia Kristeva, as a very contemporary malaise, and one which is key to 
negotiating between the subject and the highly visual modern world. 
 
Identifying With Fashion. 
 
The subject’s lived experience of modern life is, according to Kristeva, inherently 
narcissistic and if we accept this, the questions that this chapter will consider are 
concerned with the forms that narcissism takes and what it is that is particular to 
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certain images that inspire narcissistic identification. Moreover, the hysteric subject 
is, by Kristeva’s reckoning, as inevitable as the narcissist. She writes, “We are all 
hysterics, at least intermittently.”103 Both conditions are contingent upon the 
identificatory processes of the Mirror Stage, where the imaginary mobilises the image 
of the body, as well as the ego and the other, through identification.104 Narcissistic 
and hysteric identification are just two of the strategies deployed in the constitution of 
the self; that they are symptomatic of current crises of subjectivity that are made 
manifest in visuality is indicative of the centrality of visual culture to contemporary 
subjectivity and, more importantly, its discontents.  
 
The popular argument about identification between the viewer and fashion 
photography assumes that fashion photography (and indeed fashion generally) is a 
pernicious influence on women that inspires them to self-loathing, and an antagonistic 
relationship with their body that can and often does result in eating disorders and 
psychological disturbances ranging from depression to body dysmorphia. Since the 
1990s, though, there has been a growing body of feminist criticism that argues to the 
contrary, that women are in fact not passive cultural dupes whose feeble minds are 
overrun whenever they open a magazine by the malevolent intent of patriarchal 
capitalism, but instead make active choices regarding their response to images and 
gain considerable pleasure from an engagement with fashion, and may even be 
empowered in some way by it.105 However, the flaw with both of these positions is 
that they fail to take into account the inherent instability of the subject. There is the 
underlying assumption that there is some sort of core identity that is either worked 
upon by, or that engages with, fashion photography and that is either impoverished or 
enriched as a result of the encounter. Under the terms of a psychoanalytic analysis 
though, the identificatory relationship between the subject and the image is always, in 
Kristeva’s words “unstable and in motion” within an economy that is “ambiguous, at 
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once symbolic and real.”106 The contingency of subjectivity, predicated on 
identification with the image as set out in the Mirror Stage, motivated by libidinal 
drives and caught in the bind of self-as-other and the illusion of a distinction between 
self and other, assumes instead that identification is not a matter of statement “that is 
me” with various courses of action that emanate from that. Instead, identification is a 
matter of questioning, of interrogation “is that me?” and “what is me?,” questions that 
the subject asks of the image but must ultimately direct back to themselves. 
 
The action of primary identification in relation to fashion is clearly understood by the 
photographer, Cecil Beaton. For Beaton, engagement with fashion is quite clearly a 
constituent of subjectivity. Fashion is not concerned with just garments, but the 
wearing of those garments, firstly, and also the ways in which those garments are seen 
by others when they are in the process of being worn. Beaton conceives this viewing 
of fashion in terms that are redolent of psychoanalytic debates around identification, 
when he writes: “Fashion is a mass phenomenon that feeds the individual. The true 
representatives of fashion are often those whose surprising originality leads them to a 
very private outward expression of themselves. In some given decade they may 
appear somewhat outré, they may border on exhibitionism or even eccentricity, but 
their means of self-expression curiously corresponds to a need in others who, in a 
modified way, copy them.”107 (my italics.) Evidently, fashion is tacitly understood in 
terms of an identification that reinforces the self. Kristeva has suggested that where 
once Flaubert said “Madame Bovary, c’est moi”, some women these days say 
“Flaubert, c’est moi”, a claim which points “not only to an identification with the 
power of the imaginary, but also to women’s desire to lift the sacrificial weight of the 
social contract and to furnish our societies with a freer and more flexible discourse 
that is able to give name to that which has not yet been an object of widespread 
circulation: the mysteries of the body, secret joys, shames, hate displayed towards the 
second sex.”108  
 
An individual identifies with fashion when fashion is in the process of being worn. 
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Only a select few are invited to the prestigious Fashion Week shows that are held 
quarterly in London, Paris, Milan and New York. By far the more usual encounter 
takes place when the viewing subject sees fashion being worn by mannequins, either 
the fibreglass figure in a shop window display or, more often, the flesh-and-blood 
model in fashion photographs.  
 
The fashion photograph is a very particular instance within visual culture. It is at once 
ubiquitous and ephemeral. It is found in glossy magazines and on websites, but is 
equally at home in museums and galleries, and it is reprinted in lavishly illustrated 
coffee table books and academic texts alike. Critical responses to fashion 
photography, such as they are, have been as diverse as fashion photography itself. 
Paul Jobling identifies it largely as a constituent of mass media, and is primarily 
concerned with theories of reception of the image, while Anne Hollander and Valerie 
Steele, amongst others, locate it within the context of art. For the historian Martin 
Harrison fashion photography gets its context and meaning from its creator (the 
photographer), its physical location (the magazine, specifically high-end glossy 
magazines like Vogue and Harpers Bazaar) and its historical position (i.e. the 
time/era in which it is published). The sociologist Angela McRobbie suggests that the 
aesthetic conventions of the genre (the appearance of the models, narrative features, 
camera angles and the organization of space within the image) are the criteria by 
which fashion photography is identified and assessed.109  
 
Since the 1980s, under the rubric of postmodern fragmentation and inspired by the 
anarchic creativity that emanated from the D.I.Y ethos of punk subculture, fashion 
photography has sought to redefine itself in ways that circumvent such definitions. 
The publication of magazines like The Face, I-D and Dazed and Confused, subverted 
the dominance of established publications like Vogue, and through their work with 
the innovative photographer Nick Knight established new aesthetic criteria for fashion 
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photography; I-D magazine also pioneered the so-called “straight-up” model of 
fashion photography, where photographers took pictures of “real” people, in situ, 
whom they approached spontaneously on the basis that the person had an interesting 
“look” or style. Nick Knight is on record as having consciously rejected the clichéd 
sexualized aesthetic that had been popularized by Helmut Newton and Bruce Weber 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, calling fashion photography’s representation of 
sexuality “crass” and arguing for a more sophisticated and diverse portrayal of the 
human form.110  In 1993 the American art photographer Cindy Sherman produced a 
landmark series of photographs for the British magazine Harpers Bazaar, using as her 
subject her trademark self-portraiture rather than models. Meanwhile the love affair 
between the art establishment and fashion photography continued a-pace, with major 
exhibitions taking place in galleries and museums from the Hayward Gallery to the 
Photographers Gallery to the Victoria and Albert Museum, demonstrating that 
identifying fashion photography as an either/or, either art or media, was an 
increasingly pointless exercise.111 
 
Contemporary fashion photographs reflect both the history of the genre, and the 
innovations of the last twenty or so years, and while latter-day Cecil Beatons like 
Mario Testino photograph for Vogue one week and take family portraits of the British 
royal family the next, there has also been a conspicuous shift in the aesthetic features 
of fashion photography that has reshaped the visuality of the form. The examples 
above are key features in this shift, but are by no means the only instances of it. 
 
Fashion photography is in every sense an aesthetic hybrid, in that it makes reference 
to the formal doctrines of portraiture and the colloquialism of the snapshot, but also, 
as I will now show, the subversive force of surrealism. In this chapter I suggest that it 
is in fact the terms of surrealism, its artistic and critical approaches and its particularly 
profound connections to psychic processes, that facilitate a closer reading of fashion 
photography, rather than the dualism of art/media, high art/mass culture that has so far 
framed the debate.  
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Surrealism. 
 
Surrealism is one of the twentieth century’s most enduring artistic revolutions and has 
been active in all creative forms since its inception in the 1920s. In many ways, 
surrealism, particularly surrealist painting, is an accepted part of the cultural 
landscape. René Magritte paintings are often used as cover illustrations for books with 
a psychological theme, for instance, while Duchamp’s urinal is held up for good or 
for ill as the degree zero of modern art, and posters of Salvador Dalí’s The 
Persistence of Memory have adorned the walls of several generations of 
undergraduate bedsits. Moreover the strategies of surrealism are employed in all the 
creative forms and industries, including film, advertising, video and photography, and 
so on. It holds an enduring fascination and has been the subject of two major 
exhibitions in London alone in 2006-2007.112 Surrealism is most usually associated 
with painting, although it is explored too in photography (by Man Ray, Claude Cahun 
and Lee Miller), fashion (Elsa Schiapparelli and Salvador Dalí), material objects 
(Dalí’s “Lips” sofa, Man Ray’s “Iron”) and theatre design (Joan Miró and Max Ernst 
designed sets and costumes for the Diaghilev Ballet). It also experimented in literature 
and the written word, with journals like Minotaur, La Révolution Surréalist and 
Documents all serving literally and figuratively to spread the surrealist word. 
 
What is of particular note is that surrealism has, from the outset, refused a specific 
cultural or historical location. It is not just an art school or movement made up of like-
minded practitioners who all happened to know each other and produce work around 
the same time and in the same vein. Surrealism is a way of thinking, of working 
creatively, a way of understanding and representing the self and the object. André 
Breton, the charismatic author of The Manifesto of Surrealism (1924), argued for the 
ahistoricity of surrealist practice, saying that “Dante and, in his finer moments, 
Shakespeare, can be considered Surrealist.”113 It is this belief, that surrealism is the 
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modus operandi of creative radicality, which has ensured its on-going relevance to 
creative practice. 
Surrealism is profoundly influenced by Sigmund Freud and the discovery of the 
unconscious, and its radicalism comes from the desire to engage with the unconscious 
and with dreams in art and writing. As Mary Ann Caws suggests, “To shake off the 
fetters of the rational in the thinking individual – permitting the imagination to take its 
free course – was to undercut the terms of the conventional, to find out what lay 
beneath the veneer of an over-sophisticated society.”114 Although surrealism enjoyed 
a brief liaison with communism in the 1920s, ultimately this was rejected in favour of 
psychoanalysis. Breton, when asked if literary and artistic output is in fact a reflection 
of socio-economic, political and cultural concerns, responded “… to say that this 
output [Hegel, Lautréamont, Rimbaud, Freud] can or must reflect the main currents 
which determine the economic or social evolution of humanity would be offering a 
rather unrefined judgment, implying the purely circumstantial awareness of though 
and giving little credit to its fundamental nature: both un conditional and conditional, 
utopian and realistic, finding its end in itself, etc.”115 The centrality of psychoanalytic 
theory to the surrealist project is reinforced by Salvador Dalí who described the 
Surrealist object as being that which “lends itself to a minimum of mechanical 
functions and is based on phantoms and representations liable to be provoked by the 
realization of unconscious acts.”116 This led to the now well-known definitions of 
surrealism put forward by Breton in the first Surrealist Manifesto of 1924: 
SURREALISM, n. Psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one 
proposes to express – verbally, by means of the written word, or in any 
other manner – the actual functioning of thought. Dictated by thought, in 
the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any 
aesthetic or moral concern. 
 
ENCYCLOPEDIA. Philosophy. Surrealism is based on the belief in the 
superior reality of certain forms of previously neglected associations, in 
the omnipotence of dream, in the disinterested play of thought.117   
 
One of the key issues that is of particular interest in terms of surrealism’s continued 
influence within fashion photography is its conception of the object. From Dada there 
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comes the idea of “ready-made” objects, such as Duchamp’s urinal, and “assisted 
ready-mades”, like Man Ray’s iron with metal tacks set into its plate. Natural objects, 
such as the stones and landscapes we see in the photography of Lee Miller, formed 
another category of surrealist object. Then there were “perturbed objects” that have 
been disfigured or deformed in some way, phantom objects, assemblages, poem-
objects, and so on.118 The interest in the object, and the subsequent exploration of the 
concept within surrealist practice, comes from André Breton and his notion of the 
found object, which he considered central to the surrealist project. He describes the 
found object as an object manufactured by the artist, of the kind “only found in 
dreams” and which are “as hard to justify on the ground of utility as on that of 
pleasure.”119 
 
André Breton was preoccupied with the notion of the “found object” over several 
years, from the late 1920s to the mid-1930s. At its simplest a “found object” is one 
that is “found” in a particular context, and which is then moved to another context 
where it “finds” another meaning or narrative. The tenet here is firstly that everyday 
objects might surprise and disturb per se, in advance of the witty juxtapositioning for 
which surrealism is famous, and secondly that it is the perceptual regime into which 
the object is introduced that dignifies it with a “found” status. For Breton, moreover, 
photography was the scopic regime in which the “found” status could be constituted 
and maintained in perpetuity. Simon Baker’s insight into the surrealist status of 
photography is instructive in terms of fashion photography, precisely because it 
highlights photography as the cultural form by which the surrealist challenge to an 
exclusively conscious reality can best be realised. He suggests that Breton prioritises 
photography “for the necessity of expressing internal perception of the object, in order 
to combat incipient realism and fidelisme for which mechanical processes are prized. 
In fact, realism and the reality principle constitute the sum of barriers that the object 
but, more importantly, those conditioned to perceive the object, can overcome”120 The 
surrealist use of mannequins and the photography of Man Ray come together to 
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Univeristy of Nebraska Press, 1999)  p. 22. 
120 S. Baker, ‘Psychologie Des Foules: Surrealism and The Impossible Object’ in 
Brandon Taylor, Sculpture and Psychoanalysis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) p. 46. 
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illustrate precisely how something as seemingly conceptually banal as clothing can, 
when repositioned within a photograph, transform both the object and its image from 
being a static representation of inanimacy to an altogether more dynamic agency of 
identificatory possibilities that emanate precisely from the perceptual instability of 
their status as found.  
 
Besides the status of the object, surrealism is also concerned with the manifestation of 
psychic processes in and through creative practice, a concern embodied in Breton’s 
concept of “convulsive beauty” and in Dalí’s “paranoiac-critical position”. Breton 
wrote at the end of a short narrative piece, Nadja, that “beauty will be convulsive or 
not at all.”121 There is the implication here of an involuntary physical action at the 
heart of the surrealist concept of beauty that is reminiscent of the bodily seizures of 
female hysterics. Later, in an essay in the journal Minotaur, Breton discusses the three 
tenets of convulsive beauty: explosante-fixe, an object that is at once fixed and 
exploding with energy, the erotique-voilée, that is both heavily eroticized and in some 
way hidden or veiled, and the magique-circonstancielle, the chance event that 
becomes significant.122  
 
Breton’s Minotaur essay on convulsive beauty is illustrated with a photograph by 
Man Ray. The photograph is of a dancer in motion, and, as Rosalind Krauss suggests, 
exemplifies the way that the three categories identified by Breton in convulsive 
beauty shift from their initial literary context to photography. As with the found 
object, photography is central to the interpretation and exploration of surrealist 
concepts and their relation to the surrealist understanding of the world. Krauss writes 
“In cutting into the body of the world, stopping it, framing it, spacing it, photography 
reveals that world as written. Surrealist vision and photographic vision cohere around 
these principles. For in the explosante-fixe we discover the stop-motion of the still 
photograph; in the erotique-voilée we see it’s framing, and in the magique 
circonstancielle we find the message of it’s spacing.”123  
                                                
121 André Breton, ‘Nadja,’ Nouvelle Revue Français trans. Richard Howard (New 
York: Grove Press, 1960; reprinted London: Penguin Books, 1999) p. 67. 
122 See Caws, Surrealism, p.24 for a précis of Breton on convulsive beauty. 
123 Krauss, R (1985) “Photography in the Service of Surrealism” in Rosalind Krauss, 
Jane Livingstone and Dawn Ades, L’amour Fou: Photography and Surrealism 
(Washington, D.C.: Corcoran Gallery of Art, New York: Abbeville Press, 1985) p. 40.  
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In particular, while photography may represent visually the operation of language as 
set out by the poetic notion of convulsive beauty, beauty itself has little to do with 
anything tangible, whether the world of language or anything else. Rather it is “the 
marvelous [that] is always beautiful, anything marvelous is beautiful, in fact only the 
marvelous is beautiful”.124 Put simply, photography is the point at which the world of 
language and the world of the imagination meet. More specifically, and in a Lacanian 
idiom, Breton and Man Ray show us that photography offers a particular encounter 
between language and the symbolic, and images and the imaginary. This encounter, 
with its intimations of the dilemma of the mirror stage, invites an identification, 
specifically a hysteric identification, with the photograph by the viewer. Breton and 
Man Ray seem to suggest that it is possible to see in the photograph the dilemmas of 
ones own subjectivity, rendered in aesthetic form.  
 
Breton’s early career was as a psychiatrist training under Dr. Charcot at the clinic at 
Salpêtrière hospital, and the critic David Lomas sees a challenge to patriarchal 
authority in the figure of the female hysteric that is paradigmatic of surrealist 
radicalism. Images of the female hysteric, like surrealist images, he suggests, invoke 
“the uncanny as a conceptual parallel for the state of estrangement the surrealists 
sought to induce in the beholder, whereby the family, and also the self (including 
oneself) is suddenly rendered strange or alien.”125 The surrealist narrative is thus 
allied unequivocally with unconscious desires, drives and actions. 
 
While Dalí was exploring his theory of the paranoiac-critical position, which was a 
complete rejection of the idea that paranoia involved a voluntarily directed thinking or 
was in any way systemizable, Jacques Lacan was advancing his doctoral thesis on 
paranoid psychosis, in which he suggested that: “Far from constituting a passive 
element, … propitious for interpretation and suitable for intervention, the paranoiac 
delirium constitutes already in itself a form of interpretation.”126 Both men found 
                                                
124 Breton, Manifestoes of Surrealism, p. 14. 
125 D. Lomas, The Haunted Self: Surrealism, Psychoanlaysis, Subjectivity (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001) p. 7. 
126 Lacan, J (1932) “De la psychose paranoiaque dans ses rapports avec la 
Personalité” cited in The Collected Writings of Salvador Dalí ed. by Haim. N. 
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corroboration of their ideas in each other’s work, and shared a fascination with the 
aggressivity at the heart of the human psyche and also with identity formation and the 
constitution of the self. Besides the parallel investigations into the paranoid condition, 
Dalí’s idea of a “corps démontable” appears conceptually quite similar to Lacan’s 
“corps morcelé” or fragmented body that is central to the theory of the Mirror 
Stage.127 
 
Dalí’s paranoiac-critical position defined paranoia as a “delirium of interpretation 
bearing a systematic structure” and the paranoiac-critical position itself as 
“spontaneous method of irrational knowledge based on the critical and systematic 
objectification of delirious associations and interpretations.”128 It can be seen in 
operation in images where multiple interpretations of a given image are possible, for 
instance where a suggestion of a face appears within a configuration of objects or 
figures, or where meaning is multiplicitous due to the willful ambiguity of the 
selection and presentation of the object(s). Breton emphasized the “uninterrupted 
becoming” of the object of paranoiac activity as the means by which the “paranoiac” 
(the artist) is able to convince people that his images of instability and transition are in 
fact the reality of the object. This idea of “uninterrupted becoming” leads Breton to 
proclaim with confidence “Surrealism can flatter itself today that it has discovered 
and rendered practicable many other ways leading to the unknown.”129   
 
In this chapter I suggest that fashion photography, specifically the work of Nick 
Knight, should be interrogated through the terms of surrealism - not surrealism as an 
art movement, but surrealism as a creative and interpretive mode. Surrealism’s 
interrogation of the object, its positioning of photography at the boundary between 
language and the unconscious, and, most importantly, its demand that the artist 
represents what is experienced as much as what is seen, all contribute to the location 
of fashion photography as a representation of the processes of subjectivity. We will 
see, in Nick Knight’s work in particular, the fragmented body and the alienated self 
presented within a single unified image, as a paradigm of the on-going conflicts of the 
                                                
127 As identified in Finkelstein (ed.) The Collected Writings of Salvador Dalí, p. 409, 
n.62. 
128 Salvador Dalí, cited in André Breton, What Is Surrealism?, trans. by David 
Gascoyne (London: Faber and Faber, 1936) p. 83. 
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  59 
self, with which the viewer can identify only too well.  
 
Existing literature on fashion photography, such as it is, is generally concerned with 
what Paul Jobling has called the “apostolic succession of the great and the good who 
have been involved in the production of fashion.”130 In this chapter it is the tenets of 
surrealism that will facilitate a psychoanalytic reading of fashion photography, and by 
negotiating fashion photography within the terms of surrealism, what will be of 
greater concern is the reception of the image and the relationship between it and the 
viewing subject. Additionally, it is this that will transcend the embedded debates 
around art/media, production/consumption that have shaped considerations of fashion 
photography thus far.131  
 
The Photography of Nick Knight. 
 
Nick Knight (1958- ) is a British photographer. His early work captured the rise of 
neo-Nazi skinheads in Britain in the late 1970s, and from that he went on to work as a 
fashion photographer for the glut of new fashion magazines that appeared in the 
1980s. His first commission of note was ‘100 Portraits,’ a series of portrait shots of 
hip designers, models, musicians, and so on, that appeared in I-D magazine in 1985. 
From 1985 onwards he has produced editorial photography for fashion and lifestyle 
magazines from the innovative (The Face, I-D, Dazed and Confused) to the 
traditional (Vogue) and for catalogues for designer collections (most notably the 
Japanese designer Yohji Yamamoto 1986-88). His images have featured in 
exhibitions at London’s Victoria and Albert Museum and the Photographers Gallery, 
amongst others, and in 2006 he was awarded the prestigious Moet et Chandon prize 
for his contribution to fashion. 
 
A key identifying feature of Nick Knight’s photography is that there is rarely, if ever, 
any “background” to his pictures. There is no context, no narrative in which the 
models participate. Rather, he deals exclusively with a decontextualised form of 
subjectivity. From his early portraits of skinheads to his recent work for Vogue, 
human sitters for a Nick Knight photograph are inevitably cropped, blurred, reflected, 
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distorted or mis-shaped, an aesthetic decision that is entirely in keeping with the 
body-morphic design philosophy of avant-garde fashion and which makes his work at 
once innovative and radical. This chapter will look at two of his best-known projects. 
His 1998 project ‘Access-Able’ for Dazed and Confused magazine was an exercise in 
Knightian naturalism, in that it featured disabled models who present the body as 
already fragmented, while his work for the Yohji Yamamoto campaigns 1986-88 are 
evidence of a resistance to clichés of beauty and eroticism, reformulating the 
photographic representation of these concepts as challenges to the popular expectation 
of what beauty and the erotic should be.  Surrealism, as mentioned earlier, is not only 
an art movement but can also be seen as a particular approach to creative work. It is 
because of this that it is in evidence in many radical or innovative forms, and the 
fashion photography of Nick Knight is no exception to this. Key surrealist tenets are 
apparent in his work and because of this it lends itself particularly well to a 
psychoanalytic critique that circumvents the binary media/art debates around the 
reception of the image by which fashion photography is usually understood.  
 
When one writes of items of clothing, say, “shoes, green coat, blue dress,” it looks not 
unlike a list of items one intends to pack in a suitcase for a weekend away. The 
objects seem recognisable, mundane. When Nick Knight photographed a shoe, a 
green coat, a blue dress, for the Yohji Yamamoto campaign of 1987, these items 
become articles “of the kind only found in dreams,”132 as André Breton would have it, 
and their representation within the perceptual regime of the photograph positions 
them within the status of “found objects.” The paranoiac-critical position, whereby 
optical illusions in an image provide the possibility of multiple interpretations, is 
evident in the photograph of the Yamamoto shoe, as well as the David Toole picture 
from the 1998 Access-Able series. The process of uninterrupted becoming that marks 
the transitionality of the object within the paranoiac-critical position, a process by 
which the artist convinces the viewer that this transitionality is in fact the reality of 
the object, is evident throughout Knight’s oeuvre. The object is represented as 
unstable precisely because it is unstable, and not because a presentation of instability 
is an artistic device. To present the object as stable would be an incomplete and 
inaccurate representation that leads to limited knowledge and understanding. To 
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present it as unstable gives the viewer a pathway to the unknown. The fragmented 
body, whether considered in terms of Dalí’s corps démontable, or as Lacan’s corps 
morcelé, also features strongly in Knight’s work, and reflects a concern with the 
constitution of the self and the representation of subject-as-object that is an aesthetic 
paradigm of the surrealist and the Lacanian psychoanalytic concern with identity 
formation.  
 
For the purposes of our enquiry, the notion of convulsive beauty, particularly its shift 
from literature to photography, is imperative. This shift in register suggests that there 
is something inherent in photography that is a manifestation of a confusion and 
disorder in the symbolic, with the innate alienation of the subject’s existence in 
language being represented within the photographic medium itself. Simultaneously 
beauty, which under the terms of surrealism only occurs in the “marvellous,” the 
world of phantasy and the Lacanian imaginary, is also manifested in fashion 
photography. There is then a case to be made for fashion photography representing 
the interface between subject and object, as well as the interface between the three 
psychic realms. 
 
Nick Knight’s photographs in particular “deal in a supreme articulation of the surface 
of the image”133 which means that they lend themselves particularly well to 
narcissistic identification precisely by their refusal of three-dimensional depth and the 
illusion of perspective. As a consequence, Nick Knight’s images are ideally suited to 
a study of contemporary subjectivity. They are acknowledged as capturing the 
temporality of the zeitgeist and Julia Kristeva’s recent identification of contemporary 
psychic ailments will facilitate an understanding of them within a psychoanalytic 
frame.134 Yohji Yamamoto suggests that there is something innate in fashion 
photography that renders whatever it represents as false, and he said of Nick Knight’s 
work: “Fashion photography is fake by its very nature. Nick has presented the 
extreme quality of fake, and his super-fake becomes genuine.”135 Dominique Autié 
also raises the issue of fake, in the context of mannequins, and asks, given the abyss 
                                                
133 Nick Knight and Cindy Palmano, Out of Fashion: Photographs (London: 
Photographers Gallery, 1989) p. iii. 
134 See Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul. 
135 In Nick Knight and Satoko Nakahara, Nicknight (München, London: 
Schirmer/Mosel, 1994).  
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between the flawed human form and the perfection of a mannequin in fashion 
representation, “how can there be any identification, however slight, between a 
woman and her impassive double?”136 Fashion photography is understood in terms of 
deceit, underhandedness, or even treachery.  
 
If the fashion photography of Nick Knight, with its surrealist lexicon, can be seen as 
an exemplar of psychoanalytic processes in action, then psychoanalysis must also 
identify itself within the terms of this photography. The psychoanalytic theories that 
lend themselves most readily to these discussions are, as I have argued, the aspects of 
debates around Lacan’s Mirror Stage that reflect on key tenets of Surrealism, in 
particular the idea of the fragmented body. More specifically, the tension between the 
lived experience as fragmented and imaginary gestalt, derived principally from 
Lacan’s corps morcelé but also Dalí’s corps démontable, is represented in Knight’s 
work. Kristeva’s ideas regarding narcissism and identification-as-interrogation, the 
constant and interminable questioning that underpins the instability of subjectivity, are 
also evident in the photographs and is generated by the “uninterrupted becoming” of 
the objects depicted. Finally, primary identification, and the notion that self-as-other is 
essential to the constitution and maintenance of the “I”, is central to the discourses 
generated by these photographs.        
 
Hysteria, as a particular method by which the fragmented, pre-linguistic self is 
articulated, can also be seen in the work of Nick Knight. The body is represented as 
speaking, or at least represented as inviting a reading, with the intimation that the 
clothed body in particular is an eloquent expression of that which is usually 
inarticulable. In short, the body is speaking because there is something unsayable to be 
said. There are suggestions of hysteric opposition and defiance within these images, 
too, that invite in particular a feminine identification. The surrealist appreciation that 
hysteria, although an affect of resistance to language and the Symbolic, is nevertheless 
a form of (corporeal) poetry, is the vehicle by which these associations can be made 
when looking at Knight’s work: and from this, convulsive beauty, with its intimations 
of the bodily expression of the hysteric’s psychic experience, becomes clear. If Man 
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Ray’s photographs moved convulsive beauty from a linguistic to a visual form, while 
still retaining elements of both, then Nick Knight can be seen to be Man Ray’s heir, in 
that his work embodies precisely the language of the unconscious of which the 
hysteric body speaks.  
 
Access-Able. 
 
In September 1998 Alexander McQueen guest-edited an edition of the magazine 
Dazed and Confused. In that edition, there was a series of photographs taken by Nick 
Knight, the ‘Access-Able’ series, which photographed the results of a pairing of 
disabled “models” with designers. The editorial copy that prefaced the images in the 
magazine said that the purpose of the project was to challenge the preconceptions of 
what or who is considered beautiful, but what the resulting images express with 
abundant clarity is, I suggest, the representation of fragmented self-hood within 
fashion photography. These images invite, precisely, a mirror identification, with all of 
the problems that that entails, and they eschew any notion of subjective unity. What is 
particularly interesting about this series of images is the evident, self-conscious, and 
deliberate insistence on bodily marginality. The models have physical disabilities, but 
they are not evident in the photographs themselves. It is as if the physical disabilities 
are rather beside the point. Certainly, in my first viewing of these images, in the book 
Fashion Today, the original premise of the series from which these photos are taken 
was completely absent.137 
 
I have selected four photographs, three from the series of eight that appeared within 
the magazine, and the image from the cover of the magazine itself. The cover 
photograph is of Aimee Mullins, dressed in running tights and wearing the specially 
adapted prosthetic legs that are usually seen on disabled athletes, specifically runners. 
From the pages inside the magazine I have selected Aimee Mullins again, wearing a 
crinoline and garments designed by Alexander McQueen, David Toole, wearing a fan-
skirt by Jean Paul Gaultier, and Alison Lapper, famous now for Mark Quinn’s statue 
of her, pregnant, that occupied the fourth plinth in London’s Trafalgar Square in 2005. 
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She is “wearing” a projection of geometrically shaped light spots in various bright 
colours, designed by Hussein Chalayan.   
  
Access-Able, Cover Photo. 
  
The cover picture sets up the terms of reference for the series within the magazine. 
Mullins is at one and the same time the slender attractive cover girl and the disabled 
freak. Her naked torso and shapely buttocks stand in stark contrast to the bizarre 
contraptions that function in place of legs. This image presents a deliberate 
provocation to the myth of bodily unity and suggests instead the possibility of a 
multiple corporeal experience, a possibility that, as I will show, is developed through 
the other images in the series. 
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Access-Able - Aimee Mullins 
 
The first picture in the series, of Aimee Mullins again, makes reference to china dolls 
and surrealist mannequins, with the blank facial expression and the foregrounding of 
prosthetic legs, and her heels lifted, ready to receive the spikes that will secure her to 
the floor of the window display or in-store podium. As with the cover image, any 
notion of bodily integrity is problematised and challenged. Her legs, and the 
continuity/disjuncture between fleshly reality and fibreglass prosthesis that they 
present, are evidence that the transference in identification between viewer and image, 
woman and mannequin, is never complete. The identificatory process locks them both 
in a perpetual and irresolvable dialectic exchange, and this constant dynamism, this 
perpetual psychic motion, that we see in Aimee Mullins legs is in fact a visual 
paradigm of the experience of subjectivity. They present continuity and discontinuity 
as the symbolic embodiment of the ongoing tension between illusory unity and the 
fragmented and unwhole self. They are her legs and not her legs at one and the same 
time. The issue here though is that you cannot see the join. It is not clear if the 
prosthesis starts at the knee or the hip. The white thighs and the skintone calves 
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compound this confusion by gesturing in the direction of underwear, albeit the 
bloomers favoured in the 1880s and that match the crinoline frame; and conspicuously 
avoid more contemporary lingerie with its cultural associations of socially understood 
models of sexuality.  
 
This in itself provokes a set of questions regarding the framing of the body both by 
specific garments, and, figuratively, by fashion generally. These questions challenge 
the idea that the body is exclusively a discreet and enclosed physical organism, and 
indicate instead that the boundaries of the body are subject to the interminable psychic 
negotiations that constitute the lived experience. They also remind the viewer that they 
are not outside this process, viewing its representation in popular media, but are 
instead actively participating in it themselves through their engagement with the 
images. When one is in one’s underwear one is dressed and not dressed at one and the 
same time, and a fashion photograph that shows someone dressed in underwear is an 
image predicated on contradiction. Such an image reminds us that clothing 
deliberately sets out the insistent marginality of the body that renders selfhood 
precarious and unstable.  
 
If in either of these pictures Mullin’s legs were naked, the physical limits of the body 
could at least be perceived as visible. That she is clothed renders even the perception 
of these limits as impossible. Fashion is posited here as refusing the possibility of 
corporeal integrity, colluding instead with a psyche that wishes such integrity was 
possible, at least in the realm of the visual, but that cannot reconcile the knowledge of 
this possibility with its own experience. 
 
The crinoline frame acts as a framing device, a walking frame that will assist in the 
rehabilitation of the crippled body, or a cage, that will contain the unruliness of the 
unwhole. That the crinoline is held at an angle by the model would suggest, though, 
that framing and caging, as forms of containment, are impossible. There will always 
be hints and glimpses of on-going incompletion. The crinoline itself introduces a 
random a-historicism to the image, not by anchoring the image in a specific time 
period but by instead pointing to the continuity of women’s dress that is eternally 
temporal, which is demonstrated by the frame standing alone, used for its inherent 
aesthetic merits rather than for its original purpose, of supporting a wide skirt and 
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reshaping the female silhouette. The question of contemporary identification raised by 
Kristeva, of whether narcissism is a consequence of something specific to the zeitgeist 
or if it is merely a modern rendition of the narcissistic inadequacies common to all 
times, is said by the terms of this image to be unanswerable. The contradictions of 
history, presented here as simultaneously linear and temporal, suggest that 
identification is common to all times but manifests itself within the subject in terms of 
the subject’s historic specificity.    
 
 
Access-Able – Alison Lapper 
 
Hussein Chalayan’s projection of light onto Alison Lapper’s body on the one hand 
takes considerable liberties with the definition of fashion as a tangible form of 
material culture, but on the other highlights how imperative the human body is to 
fashion. Fashion operates on the surface of the body before it does anything else at all. 
Chalayan has also clearly taken to heart the temporality of fashion. This design of his 
will never end up in a costume museum or archive. It quite literally ceases to exist the 
moment the plug is removed from the socket. The bodily imagos by which the 
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experience of the pre-mirror stage body is understood are, for Lacan, innately violent. 
He describes them in terms of “castration, mutilation, dismemberment”138 Alison 
Lapper’s body was mutilated as a consequence of the Thalidomide scandal of the 
1960s and its deformity invokes disquiet because of the symbolic disruption that it 
invokes, disruption of the constitution of the ego idealised subject, and disruption also 
to the cultural order in which subjectivity functions. Chalayan’s design colludes with 
this disruption, by demonstrating the hopelessness of bodily containment, and sets out 
instead a provocation to and a refusal of any suggestion of a unified subjectivity.  
 
It is the libido that motivates the narcissism of the Mirror Stage and that consequently 
engenders the subject. Lacan uses the example of a tattoo to demonstrate how the 
bodily effects of the libido are brought into being, as we saw earlier in this chapter, 
and the events of the Mirror Stage perpetuated, as a constituent of the subject, a tattoo 
being both an inscription on the body and extension of it. The unstable marginality of 
the body is exacerbated by tattoos, for Lacan, and in the cases of Alison Lapper by the 
impossibility of bodily framing or containment that the idea of light as dress implies, 
and Aimee Mullins, by the mutability of the boundaries of her body set out by her 
body, her underwear, and by the transparency of the crinoline frame. In looking at this 
image, the identification made by the female viewer, which is provoked by the image, 
is precisely the question – is that me? - that she reflects back from the image to 
herself. Angela McRobbie recently suggested that the viewer is then blighted by the 
realisation that it is not her but is the other, and the subsequent loss of the same-sex 
object, but by Lacan’s reasoning, she is in fact (re)constituted as a subject in this very 
moment of alienation, because of the essentiality of identification with the same-sex 
object that is central to subjectivity.139 
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Access-Able – David Toole 
 
David Toole is balanced in an acrobatic pose, on one hand. The gap where his 
(presumably missing) legs should be is hidden by a skirt that is structured like an 
oriental fan, or an angel’s wing. The athletic physicality of the model’s pose is, 
unusually for an athlete, only half the story. The garment deliberately interrupts the 
physique and bodily agility that is usually essential to any representation of athletes. 
The garment, however, is contingent upon the body it is severing. There is here a sense 
in which the garment may be in some way responsible for the violence that has been 
done to the body that the garment is simultaneously concealing. The skirt here 
provokes the question of what is beneath it, as well as making the viewer question 
whether or not they really want to know.  Such knowledge, even if it were possible to 
attain, would strike at the very heart of subjective unity, demonstrating that the 
symbolic belief of the whole is in fact an impossibility. The fact that it cannot be 
known, we will never see behind the skirt, maintains the illusion, at the same time as it 
casts doubt on it. The image is a paradigm of the dilemma of subjectivity that it played 
out continuously at the level of the psyche.  
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The Lacanian idea of anamorphosis demonstrates that the matter of viewing involves 
far more than a conscious engagement with visual signifiers. The phenomenon of 
anamorphosis involves a projection that is distorted from the point of view of the 
subject who is perceiving the rest of the picture. Lacan uses the example of the skull 
in Holbein’s The Ambassadors, which looks like a smudge from one angle and that 
only becomes a skull when viewed askance. The picture is “simply what any picture 
is, a trap for the gaze. In any picture, it is precisely in seeking the gaze in each of its 
points that you will see it disappear.”140 Anamorphosis illustrates that the gaze and the 
picture are disrupted, detached from one another, by the skull, which “castrates” 
perspective. It also reveals the illusion inherent in any visual space, discussed earlier 
in this chapter, and suggests that the very condition of the illusion is that there is 
something concealed behind and/or within this space. What is at issue in the 
experience of anamorphosis is, according to Lacan, “the effort to point once again to 
the fact that what we seek in the illusion is something in which the illusion as such in 
some way transcends itself, destroys itself, by demonstrating that it is only there as a 
signifier.”141 Anamorphosis, then, shows up the gap. This has led Parveen Adams to 
suggest that “in effect the experience of anamorphosis in general is to discover that 
what we take as reality is based upon a trick, a trick of the light. One experiences a 
momentary headiness, a sudden capacity to think. In going beyond the signifier the 
subject gains a certain leeway.” She cites the artist Della Grace, and her photographs 
of dildos, arguing that these photographs illustrate the gap between the phallus and 
the penis. The dildo, she says, is anamorphotic.142         
 
The fan skirt worn here offers a similar example of anamorphosis to Della Grace’s 
photographs of dildos. Where the dildo shows up the conceptual gap between the 
phallus and the penis, the fan skirt shows up the gap between the body and the self. 
Something is concealed behind or within the visual space, and it is never quite clear 
what that something is. All that is visible is the act of concealment itself. There is a 
mobile and fragmented identificatory process in play that subverts subjective 
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wholeness and instead offers the continued tension between fragmentation and unity 
that is what, in fact, underpins human experience of the self. 
 
In this image, as with all the images in the series, questions are raised by the image 
but never answered by it. Fashion here, as elsewhere, is predicated on a body that is 
experienced and represented contradictorily. The tension between the experience and 
the representation constitutes a model of subjectivity that is inherently alienated and 
contingent upon processes of identification that are negotiated between, precisely, the 
experience and the representation. What is of particular relevance to contemporary 
debates on fashion photography, and the social contract between the image and its 
viewer, is that identification takes place not just in the literal terms of the symbolic 
order, but, more importantly, in terms of the real, where the body is experienced, and 
also the imaginary, the realm of the visual. The images of Aimee Mullins, in 
particular, by insisting on the inscription of the real on the body, and by inviting 
(provoking?) a rhetorically impossible identification (Flaubert, c’est moi? Aimee, 
c’est moi!) between the woman viewer and the woman image, challenges the purely 
symbolic terms of the social contract and suggests instead ways in which the social 
contract may yet be rewritten, and it may well be that the disjuncture represented by 
these images offers a discourse that speaks of and to the second sex in and of their 
own terms. What is embedded in these images, with their dual emphases on corporeal 
dis/continuity and the impossibility of containment on the one hand posed against a 
coherent and continuous subjective unity on the other, is that subjective unity is, 
precisely, a myth. This recognition offers an opportunity for a rewriting of the model 
of selfhood that circumscribes women’s lives, and intimates the possibility of a 
disruption through which the feminine experience of subjectivity can articulate itself.      
 
The Yohji Yamamoto Campaigns. 
 
Nick Knight is also famous for the work he did for the Yohji Yamamoto campaigns 
1986-88. These images were originally published in the catalogues that accompanied 
the collections and were not generally available to the public, however they have 
subsequently been used in several exhibitions, including Addressing The Century at 
the Hayward Gallery, London (1999) and Radical Fashion at the Victoria and Albert 
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Museum, London (2002) They were also published in book form, in the retrospective 
of Nick Knight’s work Nicknight (1992)    
 
If the ‘Access-Able’ series dealt with corporeal marginality and the fragmented self, 
the images from the Yamamoto campaigns rely on their “uninterrupted becoming” (to 
use Breton’s phrase) in order to generate the interrogative process upon which the 
viewer’s intrinsically unstable subjectivity is predicated. Following from the inherent 
instability of the objects represented in the Yamamoto campaigns, though, the 
question then posed is what it is, precisely, that the viewer is identifying with when 
they look at these images. Where in Access-Able the tension between what is 
experienced and what is represented is explored, here only one side of the tension, the 
disintegrated subject, is prioritised. There is a sense in which these images are 
wilfully disruptive of any notion of a unified subjectivity, and this time, rather than 
representing the struggle between coherence and disintegration, Knight deploys the 
disintegrated subject as a conscious and deliberate challenge to the very idea of 
subjective coherence. In these images the body, or more importantly, the clothed 
body, becomes a site of resistance to psychic integrity, and is represented as the 
articulation of resistance and protest. The dual centrality of hysteria and narcissism 
that has been identified by Kristeva as a contemporary malaise and one that is, 
moreover, central to negotiating between the subject and the highly visual modern 
world is, I suggest, evident in the photographs of the Yamamoto campaigns.143  I have 
selected four images from these campaigns for discussion here: Sarah Wingate for 
Yohji Yamamoto (Paris 1986), Green Coat – Naomi Campbell for Yohji Yamamoto 
(Paris 1987), Blue Dress – Naomi Campbell for Yohji Yamamoto (Paris 1987) and 
Shoe by Yohji Yamamoto (Paris 1987). 
 
The process of uninterrupted becoming, by which the artist demonstrates to the 
viewer that the instability and contingency of the object are in fact its “truth” is 
evident in all of these images. All of them at first sight (and indeed subsequently) 
provoke the question “what is that?” When the question is answered, by the caption 
next to the image, it only answers the question raised by the viewer, and not the 
question raised by the image. All there is to go on, as it were, is the text that anchors 
                                                
143 See Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, discussed on p. 46-47, above. 
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the representation within the image to a reference point within the material world, a 
reference point that requires a pre-existing knowledge that the viewer brings to the 
image. The photographic representation itself remains unstable and contingent. 
 
Yohji Yamamoto, Shoe 
 
The image of the shoe is the clearest example of this contingency. The shoe is entirely 
without context, in that it makes no reference of the foot upon which it sits, and it is 
viewed from an angle from which shoes are not usually viewed (from the back and set 
at eye level). It has been blurred and distorted, so that its form is only hinted at, and 
the only confirmation that it is a shoe comes from the well-hidden plastic-coated 
shoelace tip. Shoes are generally visualised either from above or in profile, their 
physical form and practical (or impractical, depending on the shoe) purpose clearly 
evident. By representing the shoe as an amorphous shape, which, arguably, is how 
shoes are experienced and viewed in reality, it is placed in a process of Breton-esque 
“uninterrupted becoming” that instigates and interrogation of the object but that the 
object can only deflect back on to its questioner.   
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Sarah Wingate for Yohji Yamamoto. 
 
The picture of Sarah Wingate is of interest, because the only three-dimensional 
feature of the image is the red net bustle that appears from under the back of the coat. 
She herself appears blacked out, less in silhouette than as a shadow puppet. She is a 
two-dimensional figure, projected onto a white wall by someone holding a cardboard 
cutout of her in front of a light source. She’s not a subject, a “real person” at all. She 
is made tangible by the red bustle, although the long coat and the cap pulled low over 
her face indicates a narrative possibility of her personhood that is unlikely to be 
fulfilled by her. Instead the viewer is invited to augment her narrative through the pre-
existing cultural knowledge that they bring to the image. As with the shoe, the 
representation itself remains unstable. In this instance, though, the instability belongs 
entirely to a human subject, and not an object. The instability is, moreover, 
exacerbated by the subject’s clothing. Where usually clothing is considered in terms 
of augmenting subjectivity within the symbolic, here the opposite is the case, and 
what the viewer identifies with is the manner in which dress instead can articulate, or 
indeed participate in, the degeneration of subjectivity.   
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Naomi Campbell for Yohji Yamamoto, Green Coat. 
 
 
  
Naomi Campbell for Yohji Yamamoto, Blue Dress. 
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The pictures of Naomi Campbell (Green Coat and Blue Dress) are noteworthy in the 
first instance because this most iconic woman is entirely unrecognisable in them. Her 
face is covered and shadowed, and the colours have been filtered so that she is 
rendered an entirely anonymous figure. What is central to these images is less the 
model and more the clothes, and due predominantly to the movement within the 
photographs, the clothes as they are being worn. These two pictures are, moreover, 
conspicuously reminiscent of the Man Ray picture of a dancer that was used to 
illustrate Breton’s Minotaur essay on convulsive beauty, and embody exactly the 
same principles - the explosante-fixe, the erotique-voilée, and the magique-
circonstancielle. 
 
Convulsive beauty is evocative of the physical spasms of the female hysteric – a 
figure that some feminist critics have read as resistant to patriarchal authority, and 
that provides a paradigm of this resistance for surrealist art. The surrealist concept of 
beauty positions itself in direct opposition to the notions of beauty usually explored 
by art and photography, and questions the usual processes of identification that are 
assumed to take place when art and photography are viewed, suggesting instead that 
identification is in fact an altogether more disruptive experience than more passive 
modes of representation would suggest. Hysteria is a rejection of the position of 
femininity offered to the subject, usually woman. We have seen already that the body 
speaks because there is something that cannot be said in language. What the hysteric 
body says, in essence, is “no.” It says “no” to the gendered (sexuated, in Lacanian 
terms) subjectivity offered by the symbolic order, refusing the symbolic order itself in 
fact, because of the relational and lacking experience offered by it. 
 
If identification with images and the self-as-other is one of the ways by which the 
subject is constituted, what does it mean to identify with the convulsive beauty of 
fashion photography, with all its intimations of hysteria and a resistance to the 
symbolic? If, as Rosalind Krauss has suggested, photography is what reveals the 
world as written, as a manifestation of the world of language that is the symbolic 
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order, what are the implications for this world if we see embedded in it the anarchy of 
resistance in the form of the hysteric?144 
 
It is possible that there is something in photography then that is a manifestation of the 
confusion and disorder of the imaginary, with the inherent alienation of the subject’s 
existence within language being represented within the photographic medium itself. 
The world of the image is precisely a world of disruption and alienation, where the 
subject’s very subjectivity is contingent and unstable. It is a world where relationality 
is central. To identify with the imaginary world presented in representations of 
convulsive beauty, a resistant, pre-linguistic world, is to ones self resist the forfeit 
required by the social contract. The duality of existence structured around the 
topography of the imaginary and the symbolic that is inherent in subjectivity posits 
the centrality of resistance to the very existence of the subject. Under the 
circumstances it is no coincidence that it is generally women who identify with 
fashion photography. Because women are constituted as other by the social bond, they 
represent a different form of discourse to that offered by the symbolic and the Law of 
the Father. Their resistance takes on the form of a resistance within language, and the 
possibility of what can be said by them and about them. Fashion photography, with its 
embedded resistance that is evident in Nick Knight’s Green Coat and Blue Dress, 
provides a cultural location for an identification that is profoundly resistant to the 
symbolic. That fashion photography is routinely denigrated as a malignant influence 
on women is, I suggest, an unwitting acknowledgement of the disruptive refusal of the 
symbolic that is inherent in it.
                                                
144 Rosalind Krauss, ‘Photography in the Service of Surrealism’ in Krauss et al, 
L’amour Fou: Photography and Surrealism, p. 40. 
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Chapter Two. 
 
Inspiring Desire: The Case for Haute Couture. 
 
I want people to forget about their electricity bills, their jobs, 
everything. It's fantasy time. My goal is really very simple. When a 
man looks at a woman wearing one of my dresses, I would like him 
basically to be saying to himself: "I have to fuck her." […] I just think 
every woman deserves to be desired. Is that really asking too much?  
 
John Galliano.145 
 
John Galliano is the design director at Christian Dior, part of LVMH (Louis Vuitton 
Moet Hennessy,) the most dominant luxury goods corporation in the world. For 
Galliano fashion must first of all be a tangible commodity that exists in the here and 
now with the sole purpose of generating a financial profit. He is quite clear though 
that despite this economic imperative, eroticism is couture’s primary consideration, 
and, within that, his design philosophy prioritises heterosexual masculine desire. 
However, Galliano’s model of desire is not the only one available to couture. Man 
desiring woman is not its sole purpose. There is always a place for the feminine to 
make an appearance, as we will see.  
 
In the previous chapter the psychoanalytic concept of identification threw new light 
on the ways in which the fashion photograph, and the relationship between it and the 
viewer and the fashion photograph, can be understood. This chapter will consider the 
second psychoanalytic strand of subjectivity, that of desire. Desire, a specifically 
Lacanian term, is of particular relevance to fashion because it is directly connected to 
positions of sexed subjectivity, and notions of masculine and feminine. Our concern 
here is what is means “to be feminine” in Lacanian terms, and what implications this 
might have for female subjectivity, for fashion, and for the relationship between the 
two. 
 
 
 
                                                
145 Michael Specter, ‘Le Freak, C’est Chic’, The Observer, 30th November 2003, 
Magazine section, p. 17. (John Galliano is the Design Director at Christian Dior). 
  79 
Lacan On Desire. 
 
The world inhabited by Lacan in Seminar XX, where he sets out his thoughts on 
femininity and desire, is one characterised by divisions and splits, of the subject, 
between subjects, between signifiers, between jouissances of the drives and the Other. 
Such relations that do exist are fragile and contingent. Desire operates within this 
space, shaping the experience and process of sexuation, as well as informing relations 
between subjects. 
 
The masculine or feminine sexuated subject is constituted through desire, as are 
relations between sexuated subjects. What is significant is that the cause of desire and 
the object of desire are two separate and distinct issues. Strictly speaking, desire has 
no object. Rather, desire is a constant search for something more. To desire something 
is to be in a state of perpetual dissatisfaction. Desire is self-perpetuating, with the only 
object of desire being desire itself. The cause of desire is what Lacan calls objet a, the 
substitute for the lost object upon which symbolisation is founded. For Lacan, man 
can never desire woman herself. Instead, “what he approaches is the cause of his 
desire that I have designated objet a.”146  The desire caused by objet a is always male, 
with a standing in for, or substituting itself for the woman in the mapping of desire 
that is ineluctably bound up within the symbolic order. The masculine subject is, as a 
result of the limits placed on him by his relation to the phallic function, bound firmly 
to the symbolic order. Woman does not exist within the symbolic order, and so 
masculine desire is caused by her substitute, objet a.  
 
The jouissance experienced by the male subject, tied as he is by the phallic function 
within the symbolic, is phallic jouissance. At every turn, those who in psychoanalytic 
terms are called men are circumscribed by and within language. The boundary, in 
terms of desire, is the Father and the incest taboo. Man’s pleasures, then, are limited 
to what is permitted by the signifier, and it is this circumscription by the phallic 
function that is the definition of masculine, phallic jouissance. 
 
                                                
146 Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality p. 72. 
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The symbolic castration that defines the male subject is experienced in and through 
the desiring of objet a, where objet a stands not for woman-as-subject but rather for 
woman as symbol of lack. The impossibility of overcoming the lack caused by 
castration is represented in objet a and is then the cause of male desire. Phallic 
jouissance presents the phallus as the signifier of lack, insofar as desire always 
correlates with lack. It is Lacan’s assertion, then, that “jouissance, qua sexual, is 
phallic – in other words it is not related to the Other as such” 147  
 
For the feminine subject, the cause of desire and the experience of jouissance are 
qualitively different. Because the male-sexuated subject is always under phallic 
inscription, his desire is motivated by objet a as it stands in for his Other, which is 
woman. The female-sexuated subject is only partially under phallic inscription and so 
her desire is motivated both by the signifier, that is to say the phallus, and also by the 
signifier of lack in the Other. The desire of both sexes is caused by that which is 
Other, but their approach to this other, and their understanding of this other, is 
dependent upon their sexuated subjectivity; a dilemma described by Bruce Fink in 
these terms: 
Both sexes subjectify that which is their Other at the outset, yet 
their approach to this Other, the facet of the Other they deal with, 
differs. It is as if the Other were instated lock, stock and barrel in 
men, their ‘problem’ being with the object; whereas in women the 
other is never completely instated as such. Women’s ‘problem’ 
thus would not be to make the Other exist or to complete it – which 
is, after all, the pervert’s project – but rather to subjectify it, to 
constitute it within herself. Subjectification for those characterised 
by feminine structure would […] require an encounter with the 
signifier.148  
 
Desire as it is manifested in the female subject leads to a jouissance that is determined 
by lack, of course, but this lack is in herself as other and leads her to direct her desire 
towards what Lacan calls the real, which is to say that which cannot be spoken or 
represented. Feminine jouissance does not exist as such. It can be traced, in Suzanne 
Barnard’s words, only in “the history of its effects.”149  The Other is forever barred to 
all subjects. For male subjects, this leads to a desire motivated by objet a, whereas 
                                                
147 Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality p. 9. 
148 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p. 118. 
149 Barnard and Fink (eds.), Reading Seminar XX, p. 12. 
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feminine desire is caused by the tension between two desirous trajectories, desiring 
the phallus as the signifier of difference within the symbolic on the one hand and the 
intervention within the symbolic of the castration threat posed by women herself on 
the other.  
 
Lacan seems to link feminine jouissance with a transcendence of sorts when he says 
“If by S(A) I designate nothing other than woman’s jouissance, it is assuredly because 
it is with that that I am indicating that God has not yet made his exit.”150 In one of his 
discussions of desire, Lacan suggests Bernini’s statue of St Teresa is an aesthetic 
rendering of feminine jouissance, contending that “the essential testimony of the 
mystics consists in saying that they experience it, but know nothing about it.”151 He 
goes on to say that the realm of the mystic is not just everything that is not political, 
but rather a unique experience that can be undergone by either male or female 
subjects that is an encounter with a jouissance beyond the phallus. This jouissance of 
the other is not, on account of its mysticism, “not political.” On the contrary it is, as 
Jacqueline Rose has identified, “one of the available forms of expression where 
‘otherness’ in sexuality utters its most forceful complaint.”152 This is of the body, it is 
at once corporeal and of the real, and it is this unspeakable corporeality, Lacan 
suggests, that is the lived experience of the effects of feminine desire. As he puts is, 
“And I fail to see in what sense I am stooping to the ideals of materialism ... when I 
identify the reason for being of signifierness in jouissance, jouissance of the body.” 
He inquires, “in what respect the jouissance of the body can serve a purpose here,” 
especially in light of the fact that “there’s no such thing as a sexual relation.”153 I 
suggest that the corporeal jouissance of the other is political precisely because of, 
rather than in spite of, it’s mysticism or transcendence. Its inarticulability is 
oppositional to, and indeed disruptive of, the order of language and so presents a 
challenge to the seeming stability of the order into which it interjects. 
  
Lacan’s theories of desire as caused by an object, rather than being created 
autonomously for an object, and the organisation of these theories along the axes of 
sexuation, create a new topology for the understanding of sexual difference. There is 
                                                
150 Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, p. 84. 
151 Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, p. 76. 
152 Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision, p. 76. 
153 Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, p. 71.  
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no polarity here, no sense of symmetrical opposition. Instead, subjectivity is relational 
to a structure, it is constituted independently of its opposite, its other, and the radical 
splits and divisions are organised then around asymmetrical and mediated relations. 
This has clear political consequences, as Jacqueline Rose points out; “femininity can 
only be understood in terms of its construction […] if a woman is defined as other it is 
because the definition produces her as other and not because she has another 
essence.”154 
 
Despite the fact that John Galliano’s views are manifestly not psychoanalytic they can 
nevertheless be understood in psychoanalytic terms. Fashion can contribute to the 
constitution of woman as objet a, as “false” object that stands in the stead of woman 
in the symbolic order, and can emphasise the erotic potential of woman-clothed. If we 
understand fashion in terms of its centrality to the constitution and maintenance of 
sexed subjectivity, then couture fashion can be negotiated in terms of objet a and its 
contribution towards the creation of woman as a “false object,” and also in terms of 
its corporeal pleasure, of a jouissance experienced bodily that is expressed 
aesthetically, that cannot be understood as symbolic but which instead is where, as 
Suzanne Barnard has suggested, “the real finds a signifier.”155  
 
Fashion, Fantasy, Desire and the Body. 
 
Fashion, as it is articulated by the couture industry, can be understood within Lacan’s 
schema regarding masculine patterns of desire. The male subject cannot desire 
women, they are forever unattainable to him. Where he believes he is desiring a 
woman he is in fact desiring her substitute, objet a. The statement by John Galliano’s 
that opened this chapter provides evidence of the way in which fashion can be the 
cause of desire (in its Lacanian sense as well as its popular sense) in the masculine 
subject every bit as much as it is the cause of desire in the feminine subject. In its 
popular sense it refers to the vulgar literalism of sexual intercourse and the notion of 
that intercourse as a clichéd expression of masculine approval that women are meant 
to take as a compliment.  
                                                
154 Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision, p. 80. 
155 Suzanne Barnard,  ‘Tongues of Angels: Feminine Structure and Other Jouissance’ 
in Barnard and Fink (eds.), Reading Seminar XX, p. 179. 
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I would like to appropriate this quote, and put it to a rather more interesting purpose 
by reading it in a Lacanian sense. While it is possible to desire the garment itself, the 
subject also desires the garment as a representation of the woman wearing it. For the 
male subject, fashion, in this case a Galliano dress, is objet a, which introduces the 
potential for merely phallic jouissance. It is the dress that arbitrates between the 
viewing male subject and the mediated feminine subjectivity that is open to him. 
Insofar as a man forms a relationship with a woman, she is likely to be reduced to an 
object – objet a. Within the patriarchy of the symbolic, she is, as Bruce Fink puts it, 
“reduced to nothing more than a collection of male fantasy objects dressed up in 
culturally stereotypical clothes.”156 Although this has been the root of many feminist 
complaints against fashion since the 1970s, the loss of subjectivity in the usual sense 
of the word does not suggest a loss of subjectivity in the Lacanian sense, and in this 
instance, we can read Fink’s clothes metaphor as less a figure of speech and all the 
more literal. 
  
For both subjective positions within Lacan’s schema, desire is motivated by lack. In 
the case of the female subject, it is the being or not-being the phallus. For the male 
subject, it is the having or not-having the phallus. Fashion can be read as an attempt to 
fulfill the lacuna in subjectivity caused by lack, but is destined to continually fail. The 
lack cannot be made good, and the built-in obsolescence that fuels the perpetual 
innovation that characterizes fashion may arguably be read as a tacit 
acknowledgement of its own limitations in this regard. 
 
Of course, the association between dress and desire has a long antecedent, which can 
be traced back to the earliest tailored garments of the fourteenth century. This 
association has been particular and pronounced in terms of fashion and modernity, 
starting with narratives of perverse pleasure (for the wearer) and subsequent social 
approbation around the tight-lacing of corsets in the mid-nineteenth century and 
continuing through to the cruelty of Alexander McQueen’s late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century designs.157  
                                                
156 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p. 117. 
157 For a detailed discussion of the socio-sexual implications of corset wearing from 
the mid-1800’s to the present day, see David Kunzle, Fashion and Fetishism: Corsets, 
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The apparent irrationality of dress and desire has been understood by fashion 
commentators so far as being a form of fetishism. The term fetish has been used by 
critics to connote the erotic relationship that exists between individuals and items of 
clothing, notably those items of clothing most closely associated with popular 
constructions of feminine sexuality, such as corsets and stiletto-heeled footwear. That 
said, when deployed in this way, the term fetish often means something very different 
to its psychoanalytic definition. The art historian David Kunzle, for example, has 
distilled the concept of fetishism down to mean “an individual or group redirection of 
the sexual instinct on to an aspect of dress”158 and the costume historian Valerie 
Steele is only a little more specific in her definition of fetishism as “loosely referring 
to the objectification of the female body … a type of variant sexuality involving the 
use of specific stimuli … for sexual arousal.”159 To compound the distance of the 
concept from its discipline, the term fetish is used simultaneously in its Marxist 
context of commodity fetishism, where it refers to the irrational and illusory 
relationship between a person and a given material object, in the context of a capitalist 
society, as well as derivatively in terms of an object revered by a primitive society as 
having some sort of otherworldly significance. The word has become such common 
currency that it now references anything sexy and/or irrational and constructs the 
fetishiser as in some way feminised through the relationship they have with their 
fetish. However, the relationship between dress and desire, discussed thus far in 
fashion theory under the rubric of “fetishism” is in fact precisely the sexuality of 
fashion that Galliano alludes to. Rather than being aberrant, though, as the use of the 
term fetish would suggest, it is instead a component of sexuality that is integral to the 
general experience of subjectivity, albeit differently negotiated depending on the sex 
of the subject in question. Fashion, particularly couture, I suggest, can be understood 
in terms of asymmetric Lacanian sexuality rather than the specifically Freudian 
theories of perversion that construct sexualities around a basis of ‘normal’ and 
(perhaps more commonly) non-normal sexual desires and behaviours.160  
                                                
Tight-lacing and Other Forms of Body Sculpture, (Stroud: Sutton, 2004), especially 
chapters 3, 4 and 7. 
158 Kunzle, Fashion and Fetishism, p. xi. 
159 Valerie Steele, The Corset: A Cultural History, (New Haven; London: Yale 
University Press, 2001), p. 96. 
160 Sigmund Freud, A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays on Sexuality, and Other Works, 
trans. by James Strachey, Anna Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1953) 
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Although his intentions in terms of creating feminine desirability can be read in terms 
of patriarchal heteronormativity, it is also possible to read Galliano against himself, 
by taking his use of the words “fantasy” and “desire” out of their everyday context 
and according them their specific meanings within psychoanalysis instead. By taking 
this license with the quote, it will be possible to develop a quite different 
interpretation of Galliano’s approach to fashion than the very literal one that is offered 
at first reading. 
 
Fashion is, most certainly, a cultural form, and so must in some ways be understood 
within the context of the symbolic. It is precisely this that gives rise to notions of “the 
fashion system” and “the language of clothes” that I discuss in chapter four. However, 
for Lacan, it is the effect of language on the surface of the body that gives rise to 
fantasy and, in doing so, “decomposes imaginary unities into fragments (a), thereby 
multiplying desires possibilities.”161 Lacan’s discussions of the body are relatively 
rare, however there is a passage in his essay ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the 
Dialectic of Desire’ in the Écrits that is particularly instructive in terms of the 
relationship between desire and the body. Lacan suggests that the body is the site 
where erotogeneity is negotiated, specifically the perimeter of the body, in places of 
corporeal discontinuity: 
The very delimitation of the “erogenous zone” that the drive 
isolates from the function’s metabolism ... is the result of a cut that 
takes advantage of the anatomical characteristics of a margin or 
border: the lips, “the enclosure of the teeth,” the rim of the anus, 
the penile groove, the vagina, and the slit formed by the eyelids, 
not to mention the hollow of the ear. ... Let us note that this 
characteristic of the cut is no less obviously prevalent in the object 
describes by analytic theory: the mamilla, the feces, the phallus (as 
imaginary object) and the urinary flow. (An unthinkable list unless 
we add, as I do, the phoneme, the gaze, the voice ... and the 
nothing.) For isn’t it plain to see that the characteristics of being 
partial, rightly emphasised in objects, is applicable not because 
these objects are part of a total object, which the body is assumed 
to be, but because they only partially represent the function that 
produces them? 162  
 
                                                
161 Tim Dean, Beyond Sexuality (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 
2000), p. 256. 
162 Lacan, The Écrits, p.692. 
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It is, then, what marks the cut, rather than the cut itself, that denotes the focus of 
desire. Moreover, the list of items given by Lacan as being sites of the erotic can be 
characteristics as well as physical entities. In this regard, Cavallaro and Warwick 
suggest that “dress can easily be seen as another possible addition to the catalogue ... 
the entire body becomes a rim, because it is incomplete without the superimposition 
of clothes.”163  Beyond the symbolic, fashion emphasises the gap, it turns the body 
itself into a cut, and besides accentuating the partiality of the corps morcelé in 
contrast to bodily unity, it also creates the erotic function of body-as-gap.  
 
In the introduction I said that fashion is not a matter of material objects, but rather 
exists when it is worn. In terms of theorising fashion and desire it is the operation of 
fashion-as-language, as a signifier within the symbolic, on the surface of the body that 
renders it as fantasy; and which leads subsequently to the role that fashion can play in 
the process of desire. It is precisely the point at which it contributes to this operation 
that transforms fashion into the concept of process by which I believe it can be best 
understood. Moreover, it is the specifically psychoanalytic definition of fantasy that 
facilitates this transformation. As Victor Burgin reminds us: “Psychoanalysis 
deconstructs the positivist dichotomy in which fantasy is seen as an inconsequential 
addendum to ‘reality.’ It reveals the supposedly marginal operations of fantasy to be 
constitutive of our identity, and to be at the centre of all of our perceptions, beliefs 
and actions.”164 
 
The modes of desire by which particular forms of the clothed body are experienced 
will of course be circumscribed according to the location of the subject within 
Lacan’s mathemes of sexuation. As has already been discussed, the feminine subject 
has a plural relationship with the Other, and her desire is caused by both the phallus 
and the signifier of lack in the Other. This means that, as Suzanne Barnard has 
summarised, “the feminine subject’s ‘other’ relation to the Other correlates with a 
jouissance “beyond” the phallus, a jouissance that belongs to that part of the Other 
that is not covered by the fantasy of the ‘One’ – that is, the fantasy sustained by the 
                                                
163 Cavallaro and Warwick, Fashioning the Frame, p. 27. 
164 Victor Burgin, ‘Fantasy’, in Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary, 
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positing of the phallic exception.”165 Jouissance beyond the phallus is inscribed in 
what Lacan calls the en-corps, an “enjoying substance”166 that suggests a body 
beyond the physical sexuality represented by the phallus, and which is, in fact, 
inscribed in and through the whole of his thinking throughout Seminar XX, which is 
called, in French, Encore. “Encore!” is also a popular cry from enthusiastic theatre 
audiences and its translation in the instance of Seminar XX, “more! more!” is a 
reference to the idea that desire only desires itself. The only thing that will satisfy 
desire is more desire, and the perpetual cry of desire is, in fact, the theatrical 
“encore!” Although both of these allusions are evident in the French title for Seminar 
XX, they are lost in the rather wordier English translation, On Feminine Sexuality, 
The Limits of Love and Knowledge.  The beyond-physical body of Encore/en-corps, 
which is experienced outside of the anatomical corporeality of bodily sensation is, I 
will argue, the clothed body. More specifically, it is the female clothed body, where, 
as Baudelaire suggested, the woman and fashion are indivisible.167  
 
Female/Feminine, Male/Masculine? 
 
It is generally acknowledged that there is no direct correlation between gender 
(feminine/masculine) and sex (male/female.) Gender is seen as a set of socially 
constructed and culturally determined characteristics that are arbitrarily associated 
with one of two anatomically given sexes, and the analysis of the relationship 
between the two has long been a preoccupation for U.K. and U.S. feminists. However, 
for Lacan, the relationship between the sexuated subject and the biological body the 
subject inhabits is predicated, as we have seen, on patterns of desire, and not on 
external social patterns. What is significant is that, for Lacan, the position occupied 
by the subject within schemas of desire is alighted upon almost randomly: “One 
ultimately situates oneself there by choice – women are free to situate themselves 
there if it gives them pleasure to do so. Everyone knows there are phallic women and 
that the phallic function doesn’t stop men from being homosexuals.”168 The question 
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for now must be this: what is the nature of the relationship between the sexuated 
subjectivity and the anatomically defined social subject known as woman? The 
“choice” that Lacan refers to is more than a matter of free will. One does not wake up 
one morning and decide that henceforth one will be, for instance, a phallic woman. 
Rather, the sexuated subject position is played out across the symbolic but is subject 
to psychic strategies and interventions that remove any notion of pure agency or will 
from the positioning of the subject.  
 
It is consistently recognised that there is an obstacle to the ordering of feminine 
sexuality in the symbolic, and for Michelle Montrelay this recognition is linked to the 
insistence of the real of women’s bodies, the real that is by definition outside 
symbolisation.169 Femininity is the blind spot of symbolic actions; woman is 
constituted through these actions; and it is the condition of woman that representation 
consistently fails. The question, for Montrelay, is how the failure of representation 
can be surpassed.  
 
Parveen Adams has suggested that femininity may well be the effect of the failure of 
women in the symbolic, rather than the cause, arguing that this shift of perspective 
will “put femininity in a different relation to the problem of representation of the 
woman’s body.” The issue would then become the conception of the enigma of 
woman “not in terms of her relation to language, but in terms of her relation to her 
body.”170 There is the proposition in Montrelay’s essay, though, that that the woman’s 
own body is her Other, precisely the Other that is forever barred (S(A)). Lacan talks 
about the Other to which half of all speaking beings (i.e. women) “se réfère” (refer 
themselves to, relate to) and points out that despite the operation of A (Autre, Other) 
in the symbolic and a in the imaginary, a may still be confused with the barred A.171 
This curious operation, Lacan explains, occurs “by means of the function of being [...] 
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It is here that a scission or detachment remains to be effectuated”.172 The case seems 
to be made here for the woman’s body as at once Other and objet a, and as the locus 
of expression for the real in both the imaginary and, more importantly for our 
purposes here, the symbolic.  
 
Following Joan Rivière’s influential 1929 essay ‘Womanliness as Masquerade’ the 
association between femininity and masquerade has become a widely accepted critical 
position.173 In this essay, Rivière argues that femininity is not covered or hidden in 
some way, but rather is itself the cover, the mask. The question of what it is that 
femininity masks is precisely what makes the condition of femininity so problematic; 
it masks that which cannot be represented. Mary-Ann Doane describes it as a 
“decorative layer that conceals a non-identity.”174 There is, moreover, hostility within 
patriarchy to femininity that emanates from the perception of its duplicity. There is a 
sense in which the masquerade that is femininity is seen as a willful act of treachery, 
that women don a mask in order to deliberately mislead men. Examples abound in 
Western culture of the inherent deceitfulness of women, from the biblical myth of Eve 
onwards. (The myth of Eve may be particularly instructive for our purposes, as it is 
she who first insists on clothing to cover the symbolic lack that is central to human 
subjectivity.) Curiously enough, there is no suggestion that women benefit in any way 
from this deceit, nor indeed that men are disadvantaged by it, but nevertheless the 
assumption that there is a degree of agency in it is basis enough for continued 
suspicion of the feminine as inherently untrustworthy.  
 
Montrelay describes this masquerade in terms of the materiality of fashion (it “takes 
shape in this piling up of crazy things, feathers, hats and strange baroque 
constructions which rise up like so many silent insignias”) and observes further that 
“man has always called the feminine defences and masquerade evil.”175 For Lacan, 
the term semblance is key here, and refers to the requirement placed on women to don 
the colours, as it were, of the Other’s desire, the better that they may be, as they are 
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required to be, the phallus. The masquerade serves to demonstrate how the woman’s 
lack (of a penis) leads to her instead becoming the phallus. “Such is the woman 
behind her veil: it is the absence of the penis that makes her the phallus, object of 
desire.”176 Referring to fashion as a paradigm of the veil behind which feminine 
sexuality must operate is a common device amongst critics, and the contribution of 
fashion and bodily adornment to the inherent masquerade that is feminine sexuality is 
well established.177 Adornment is, then, the woman in the symbolic order, because she 
represents lack and lack “is never presented to us other than as a reflection on a 
veil.”178 What has not so far been explored in these debates is the operation of fashion 
and/on the woman within the symbolic and also as a site of interjection by the real, 
and it is this that we will consider next.  
 
Colette Soler has noted that the masquerade, the ability to “make the Other desire,” is 
not a stable process, despite the best efforts of entire industries, such as fashion, 
advertising and the like, to make it so. It is instead set for each person by the 
conditions of their unconscious.179 What is of interest here is that the shifting nature 
of the masquerade may well imply paradigms of femininity that extend beyond its 
“unrepresentability” and offer interpretations that connect the operation of femininity 
across the psychic topography. Thus, where conventional femininity bows to 
patriarchal mythology and is content to live by the masquerade of the master 
discourse, the transgressive femininity of the hysteric opposes these normative 
identificatory processes, searching instead for a signifier for their sexed subjectivity. 
Identifying with lack rather than the ego ideal, the hysteric does not believe in the 
social position prescribed for her. She seeks to lift the veil, so to speak, and to see 
what lies beneath.  
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The Lacanian notion of semblance is not exclusive to women, indeed Lacan refers to 
its occasion in men as “virile display.”180 However, as with all other sexuated 
relations, virile display is not symmetrical to feminine masquerade, because of the 
structurally differentiated requirements attendant upon either having or being the 
phallus, and Lacan has observed further that even virile display itself feminises, by 
demonstrating the rule of the Other’s desire.181 What is important though is that the 
notion of masquerade and display defines modes of sexuated subjectivity that operate 
through these notions and, crucially, defines them as feminine. 
 
In considering the symbolic, there is an important distinction in the deployment of the 
term representation that Lacan sets out in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, when he defines a signifier as “that which represents a subject for 
another signifier.”182 As Mark Bracher points out, the word ‘represent’ here “means 
not ‘to be a representation, depiction or portrayal’ but rather ‘to be the subject’s 
representative, stand-in or avatar’”183 The problem faced by femininity in the 
symbolic then, is the matter of what can function as its ambassador in the realm of the 
symbolic. If knowing is unrepresentable as such, is there a way in which it can it 
nevertheless be heard, seen, effected in some way, and, crucially, acknowledged? For 
our purposes, we must ask to what extent, if any, is fashion woman’s ambassador? 
What follows from Lacan’s account of sexuality is that while the male subject’s desire 
is predicated entirely on fantasy, the woman, with her split desire, is the indictment of 
the myth of a unified subject and so is a disruptor, an agent provocateur, in the 
symbolic.  
 
The premise of this chapter is the relationship between fashion, desire and the subject, 
and interjection of the real into the symbolic that characterises these relationships is of 
particular interest. The constitution of the woman in the symbolic as objet a of male 
fantasy, and the woman’s experience as other/another jouissance, where the former is 
concerned with the order of the symbolic and the second is its interruption through the 
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appearance of the real, is the first conceptual opposition that can be negotiated 
through a reading of couture. The second is the operation of fashion on the surface of 
the body as firstly concealing the lack of human subjectivity but at one and the same 
time turning the entire body into the coupure the marks the focus of desire. The 
paradox here is that the operation of fashion on the surface of the body 
simultaneously fulfils two very different purposes, and gives the body two very 
different meanings, one of which is concerned with what can be articulated, the other 
being concerned precisely with what cannot. It is perhaps the irreconcilable nature of 
these two purposes that make fashion so fascinating and so intractable. Couture is, 
and has been since its inception, a mass of contradictions and impossibilities, dressed 
up as art and commerce and bound to capitalist excess and feminine caprice. It is 
perhaps the divisions and splits of Seminar XX that will go some way to explaining 
the contradictions that are constitutive of couture while, crucially, leaving these 
contradictions intact.               
 
Haute Couture. 
 
Fashion is clothes, of course, but not all clothes are fashion. Where clothes are items 
that cover the body, fashion is items that cover the body but there is more. Fashion, 
like jouissance, is the extra, the supplementary. As I argued in the introduction, it is 
clothing with the input of creative, sometimes radically creative, agency, and nowhere 
is this more apparent than in the irrational, decadent and maligned world of haute 
couture.  
 
The acknowledged father of haute couture is Charles Frederick Worth, an Englishman 
who moved to Paris in 1845 and went on to become the first couturier.184 He set up a 
dressmaking company, Worth et Bobergh, in 1858, and his Maison Worth fashion 
house was established in 1870. What set Worth apart from his contemporaries was 
firstly that he was male rather than female (a scandalous departure from the prevailing 
norms of the time but one which paradoxically served to elevate the status of his 
profession) but more importantly that his working methods were entirely unique for 
the period. Under Worth, for the first time, fashionable women’s wear fell under the 
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direction of one person, one who designed the garments, selected the fabric and 
decorative additions, conducted fittings, and supervised the manufacture of the 
finished item. Such auteurship was previously unheard of, and it was Worth’s 
innovation in this area that make him the prototype for all subsequent couturiers.  
 
Besides his working methods, Worth also contributed several other protocols by 
which couture has come to be defined. Quality of materials, the skill of manufacture 
and hand finishing are amongst the key tenets he set out. He was also concerned very 
much with originality, ensuring that his couture was at the very least made-to-measure 
for each individual client, and for his most important client, Empress Eugenie, one-off 
pieces. Worth was the first dress designer and manufacturer to have his name on a 
label inside the garment, and was a prototype for what today are called brands. Of 
course, exclusivity and expense emanated naturally from these developments. Paris 
came to be the home of haute couture, and almost a century later, in defending the 
French couture tradition against Nazi efforts to move it to Berlin during World War 
Two, Lucien Lelong, president of French couture’s governing body, the Chambre 
Syndicale de la Couture Parisienne, declared of couture that “it is in Paris or it is 
nowhere.”185 Regardless of the geographical location of couture (and there is 
nevertheless a case to be made for Paris as its natural home) there is a stridency in M. 
Lelong’s statement that intimates a manifesto of couture, just as surely as the 
stridency of Breton’s assertions on beauty being convulsive came to be central to 
surrealism’s manifesto. 
 
Once Worth had laying the groundwork for what we know today as haute couture, it 
became a permanent feature of the cultural landscape, reflecting and responding to the 
times in which individual couturiers have operated. Paul Poiret (1879-1944) famously 
dispatched the corset to the realm of the marginal where once fashionable dress had 
been unthinkable without it. Coco Chanel (1883-1971) appropriated the jersey fabric 
of men’s underwear, raised hemlines, and created the iconic “little black dress” that 
has remained a wardrobe staple for generations of women. The intervention of 
worldwide recession in the 1930s and war in Europe and the Far East in the 1940s 
disrupted innovation in many cultural fields, although haute couture was strangely 
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resistant to these events. Dominique Veillon’s Fashion Under The Occupation (2002) 
charts the continuation of the couture industry in Paris during World War 2, and 
despite all manner of material and creative restrictions that the Nazis and the 
circumstance of war put in place, fashion continued a-pace in occupied France, albeit 
in a straitened and unusual situation.186  
 
In 1947 Christian Dior launched what came to be known as the “New Look” and 
couture again enjoyed something of a renaissance. Indeed it was Dior’s New Look 
that inspired the academy to take fashion seriously. The Royal College of Art opened 
its fashion department in 1948 and employed Madge Garland, the former editor of 
British Vogue, to run it. The Picture Post (a popular newspaper of the day) reported 
this innovation, saying “what seemed once a feminine frivolity is now dignified by 
University status.”187 Dior’s New Look is also ineluctably linked to the model of 
femininity set out in the earliest days of couture, with the garments relying on severe 
darts to give a nipped-in waist, and heavy petticoats giving fullness to the skirts. So-
called “foundation garments,” underwear designed to give a particular shape to the 
body, such as “waspies” which held in the waist and stomach, harked back to the 
corsets that Poiret and Chanel had fought so hard to exile from the female wardrobe. 
Dior himself is on record as saying “In December 1946, as a result of war and 
uniforms, women still looked and dressed like Amazons. I designed clothes for 
flower-like women, with rounded shoulders, full, feminine busts and handspan waists 
above enormous spreading skirts.”188 Mme Marguerite, Dior’s head of workroom, 
describes altering a tailor’s dummy to fit Dior’s vision, saying “I even rounded the 
abdomen, as on Greek statues, and there at last was a voluptuous figure to pin the 
muslin shape to, and ready to express the New Look.”189 Dior’s vision, and the 
reinvigoration of couture in the second half of the twentieth century, associated 
couture with a particular model of femininity, one that is resonant with delicacy, 
fragility, physical frailty, and one, moreover, that is seen as a “natural” state for 
women and that has it’s aesthetic roots in classical antiquity. Of course, there is 
nothing “natural” about it. On the contrary, with the restrictive underwear, the 
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padding and the underskirts, and the darts and seams on the garments themselves, the 
New Look imposes on the female body a shape that bears little or no resemblance to 
its “natural” (i.e. unadorned) form.   
 
Couture, and in particular Dior’s New Look, is thought to embody a model of female 
subjectivity that is one of enforced, exaggerated femininity, the uniform of the 
submissive, second-order woman, restricted to the domestic sphere and, in the case of 
actual couture customers, serving to vicariously display their husband’s wealth in the 
manner identified by Thorstein Veblen in his analysis of fashion seventy years 
earlier.190 The Vogue History of 20th Century Fashion, in its coverage of the New 
Look, departs from its usual enthusiasm for the garments and their designers, and 
endeavours to position the New Look in a socio-cultural framework: 
Despite the furore over the profligacy and wastefulness of the New 
Look, it was nevertheless the aesthetic embodiment of women in 
the post-war world [...] Medical experts like John Bowlby and 
Benjamin Spock warned of the dangers of “maternal deprivation” 
and pronounced that the mothers of young children were not free to 
work outside the home. [...] The season was reintroduced in 
England in 1947, with debutantes balls functioning as thinly 
disguised marriage markets, while in America over 50% of female 
university students dropped out in order to support their husband’s 
career. Magazines of the 1950’s compared poorly to pre-war 
publications in terms of their coverage of work and career issues, 
and focussed almost exclusively on fashion, beauty and the home 
[...] After 1949 “career woman” became a pejorative term, denoting 
[in the words of Betty Freidan] a “ball-busting, man-eating harpy, a 
miserable neurotic witch from whom man and child must flee for 
their very life.”191 
 
This view has come to be the popular mythology around Dior’s New Look and its 
derivatives, and the fall-out from all of this can be seen nowhere more clearly than in 
the impotent fury of the iconic, alcoholic Mrs Robinson in the film The Graduate 
(1967). In the film, Mrs Robinson is the Everywoman who was obliged to drop out of 
university when she became pregnant, obediently spent the next eighteen years 
making sacrifices for her husband and her daughter, and was driven slowly mad by 
this curbing of her potential and restriction of her social role that were necessary 
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preconditions of her obedience to cultural norms. The consequence of her 
disobedience, it is intimated, would have been absolute social exclusion, or worse.  
 
However, despite the popularity of this belief, that Dior’s designs slot neatly into an 
overall campaign to get women back in the home, it is, in fact, a myth. Denise Riley, 
in her study of post-war pro-natalism, argues that in fact the connection is in no way 
so clear-cut or straightforward. She has problematised the idea that there was anything 
resembling a unified shift in the years following World War Two that propelled all 
women back to domesticity and maternity. What Riley calls “the dense tangle of 
labour requirements, shifts in state supposition about the family and the care of 
children [and] the nature of terms like popularisation, propaganda, ideology and want 
and need” all serve to confuse rather than clarify any attempt to understand the 
position of European women in the 1940s and 1950s as a unified group.192 Certainly, 
the attitude of the British political establishment to the New Look was one of hostility 
and contempt. Shortages of all manner of goods continued long after the end of the 
war, not least in fabrics and materials, and the response of Stafford Cripps, the 
President of the Board of Trade, to the New Look was unequivocal: “It seems to be 
stupid and irresponsible that time, labour, money and materials should be wasted on 
these imbecilities.”193 Dior’s New Look, with its resonances of the belle époque, was 
the iconic manifestation of something, to be sure, but that something was not a 
collective drive towards motherhood and domesticity. So what was it?  
 
Carolyn Steedman, in her semi-autobiographical account of a working-class post-war 
childhood, suggests “the full skirt that took twenty yards of cloth,” that her mother 
became so wistful thinking about, came to stand for women in the 1950s as a 
paradigm of the possibilities that exist for women who don’t have children, who don’t 
become mothers, and who do some (unspecified) thing else instead. Precisely the 
opposite, in fact, of the sense usually ascribed to it. Steedman never mentions either 
Christian Dior or the New Look. The phrase “the full skirt that took twenty yards of 
cloth” is used instead, signifying the aspirations embodied by the new fashion and its 
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particular cultural importance, rather than either its position in a linear history of 
costume or its posthumously proscribed social meaning.194 Despite Dior’s own 
assertion, that it is possible to be well-dressed at relatively little cost, couture is, and 
for that matter always has been, unabashedly élitist.195 It offers the possibility of a 
femininity beyond the literal, lived experience of the vast majority of women.    
 
Since 1947 the ready-to-wear market has expanded by necessity as couture has lost its 
old clients. Fewer and fewer women had the time for fittings, much less the wealth 
that a couture wardrobe requires, and couture houses increasingly rely on prêt-à-
porter (ready to wear) and so-called “diffusion” lines (ranges of clothing that are 
separate to, and often less expensive than, the main couture collection) as well as 
accessories and perfume, as their main sources of income. The role of couture today is 
to be extreme and extravagant, to generate publicity and provide inspiration and many 
couture creations today are destined for archive or museum collections. This does not 
automatically signify the decline of haute couture, though. There is evidence, in fact, 
that it is holding firm in its centrality to contemporary culture. 
 
Archives and museums host regular sell-out exhibitions the popularity of which is 
testament to the enduring fascination that couture invokes. The famous fashion and 
society photographer Cecil Beaton curated the first fashion exhibition at the Victoria 
and Albert Museum in London, Fashion: An Anthology, held in 1971. The Fine Arts 
Museum of San Francisco hosted New Look To Now: Haute Couture 1947-1987, in 
1987. The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York held an exhibition entitled 
simply Haute Couture, in 1995, and showed garments by Worth, Poiret and Vionnet 
as well as by more contemporary designers. The Hayward Gallery in London showed 
Addressing the Century in 1998. The most recent exhibition of couture has been again 
at the Victoria and Albert Museum, The Golden Age of Couture in 2007, which 
focussed exclusively on the New Look and its peers, including designs by Cristobal 
Balenciaga, Hardy Amies and Sir Norman Hartnell. What is of note in this most 
recent exhibition is that the final items displayed are by John Galliano, the current 
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head of design at Christian Dior, another London-trained couturier working in Paris, 
and whose work is associated with the paradigm of femininity set out by Worth and 
reinvented by Dior. The curators of this exhibition, at least, seem quite content to 
perpetuate the association of couture with a specific model of femininity. 
Nevertheless, there is a question, as the position and nature of couture have changed, 
about how precisely it can reflect or indeed connect to the gendered model upon 
which it is founded.  
 
What the popularity of these exhibitions also tells us is that couture is far more 
resonant as a cultural form than as a business activity, and the shift that has moved 
couture into the museum is an interesting one. Of course, the museum is not the only 
place where one may encounter couture. The bi-annual Fashion Weeks where couture 
houses show their collections, that take place in London, Milan, Paris and New York, 
are more widely reported every year, and in the popular, wide-circulation press as 
much as in fashion magazines. Couture is also prominent on the so-called “red carpet” 
– high profile events such as film premières, awards ceremonies, and the like, 
attended by stars from the film, music and entertainment industries. As with the 
Fashion Weeks, these events are widely publicised and the gowns worn by the women 
who attend them are seen across the world. Typically the men in attendance will wear 
a black tuxedo. Couture is for women, still.  
 
The point is that where couture used to be worn and could be seen, however 
fleetingly, on the street and in everyday life, there has been a change between the 
1950s and now, and couture is more rarefied than ever. Its move into museums, which 
now is where it is generally encountered “first-hand,” as it were, is interesting, 
because it frames couture in an institutional setting that affords it a meaning quite 
different to the meaning it is afforded when it is worn. On the one hand, items in a 
museum are canonical, in the sense that there is assumed to be some knowledge or 
expertise that has gone into the selection of the objects for display. Museums are 
institutions supposed to know, they have a credibility that adds gravitas to anything 
shown in them. They do more than store and display items. They legitimise cultural 
production and articulate cultural values. However, as Griselda Pollock has pointed 
out, “the museum figures in its own discourses on public life and in the imagination.” 
She cites Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1957) and Alan Rudolph’s The Moderns (1981) as 
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examples of the museum as central to thematics of deception, delusion, obsession and 
desire, and suggests that “in historicising the present, the museum creates both 
retrospect and teleology.”196 Pollock’s point is that far from confirming or affirming 
art objects, museums by their very nature problematise them. The consequences for 
couture’s shift into museums are remarkable; its inherent contradictions are left intact, 
but the discourses around it must change in light of its institutional framing. It 
becomes contingent upon discourses of art criticism, rather than of economics. 
 
The question of the role of the museum, whether it is little more than an elaborate 
cultural mausoleum or alternatively an accessible conduit between art and its viewer, 
is an interesting question to ask when considering couture in museums, not least 
because of all the arts couture is the one most intimately connected with the human 
form. Its purpose is to be worn, as I have already said. The effect of it not being worn 
mean that it becomes something else. What is interesting in the positioning of couture 
in museums is that it can offer a paradigm for the position of woman in the symbolic 
order, where couture becomes woman’s ambassador in the symbolic, but only if the 
woman herself is left out of the frame. Couture is not worn when it is displayed in a 
museum. It is hung in glass cases, suspended from wires or pinned to a wall. It is 
occasionally put on a fibreglass mannequin that may or may not have a head, hands or 
other extremities. Thus, the woman is quite literally left out of the frame; her 
existence is intimated by the couture on display, but never fully realised.    
 
The effect on couture of being in a museum is remarkable. Couture items ending up in 
museums is, arguably, little more than a tax break for the original owners, who can 
claim the price of the original article (or the value, if it is donated by the fashion 
house itself) back against their tax bill for the financial year in which the donation is 
made. Even if we set aside this cold pragmatism, there is a sense in which couture is 
changed, somehow, in a museum. Putting it on a fibreglass mannequin or a hanger in 
a case is little more than taxidermy. It is preserved, but it is bereft of anything that 
would give it shape, energy or depth. It becomes a ghostly relic rather than a vibrant 
art form. Couture becomes and remains art in the same way that a garment becomes 
fashion, through its being worn. 
                                                
196 Griselda Pollock and Joyce Zemans, Museums after Modernism: Strategies of 
Engagement (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 3-6. 
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What is striking in any discussion of couture is the extent to which couture is often 
understood only in terms of its own history. An empirical study of costume history in 
the modern epoch will take a linear view, identifying particular practices in relation to 
their predecessors and considering also their influence on subsequent developments, 
all framed in terms of the eras in which they occur.197 Certainly the major exhibitions 
in London, Paris, New York, San Francisco, and the like, that are one of the main 
conduits for the study and appreciation of couture, take this view. There is the sense 
of a timeline that starts with Worth, goes through Poiret and Chanel to Dior and the 
New Look, thence to Givenchy, St Laurent, Lacroix, and that ends, for now, with 
John Galliano. What this historical view, for all its genealogical accuracy, does not 
take into account is the loops, the doubling back, the repetition of couture; it is in fact 
the returns and the repetitions of couture that facilitates an understanding of it that is 
predicated on more than a merely chronological ordering of its best-known 
practitioners, as we will see.  
 
The New Look echoed the spirit of Worth to such a degree that one curator called it 
outright “the last gasp of the belle époque” and wrote: “That women chose to adopt 
these fashions, after very small resistance, to corset themselves and pad their busts 
and rumps as they had not done since the 1900s says far more about the desire for 
change and need to express an aesthetic ideal than it does about the public’s thoughts 
of progress or comfort.”198 The association of couture with the belle époque is 
reiterated by Caroline Evans, who in 2003 described Galliano’s models as “belle 
époque vamps and sirens in their aigrettes and maharajah paste jewellery.”199 
However, where others have, prematurely perhaps, proclaimed the death of haute 
couture, Evans on the other hand has argued that couture is not dead, but in fact lives 
in order to give voice to ghosts from the past:  
Although there is no repetition without difference, nevertheless the 
conditions of post-industrial modernity are haunted by those of 
                                                
197 See Christopher Breward, The Culture of Fashion: A New History of Fashionable 
Dress (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) for an example of this 
approach. 
198 De Pietri, Stephen and Melissa Leventon, New Look to Now: French Haute 
Couture, 1947-1987 (San Francisco: Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco, New 
York: Rizzoli, 1989)  p.29. 
199 Evans, Fashion at the Edge, p.3. 
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industrial modernity, when fashion designers dip into the past for 
their motifs and themes. These traces of the past surface in the 
present like the return of the repressed. Fashion designers call up 
these ghosts of modernity and offer us a paradigm that is different 
from the historians paradigm, remixing fragments of the past into 
something new and contemporary that will continue to resonate 
into the future. They illuminate how we live in the world today and 
what it means to be a modern subject.200 
 
What Evans does not speculate on is what this “paradigm” that is different from the 
“historians paradigm” might be. Nor does she suggest a definition of the modern 
subjectivity whose existence she asserts. I will pick up here where Evans left off. 
 
The Avant Garde. 
 
The term avant garde has circulated in the arts for over a century. Originally it was a 
military term that meant a small advance party of élite soldiers whose purpose was to 
explore new territory and forge a path for those that were to follow, but it has come to 
refer to a particular mode of artistic practice that occurs at numerous points in modern 
art history, from the late nineteenth century onwards. Various art movements, from 
Dada to Conceptual Art, are considered avant garde, but the avant garde is not an art 
movement in and of itself - instead, there are many avant gardes. Avant garde is an 
umbrella term that indicates interventionist artistic practices that engage with and 
differentiates itself from the cultural politics in which it operates. The term avant 
garde also defines art practice in relation to the web of social, political and cultural 
practices that surround all creative processes. There have been debates around the 
avant garde and the so-called neo-avant garde (both of which will be discussed later 
in this section,) and the recurrence of avant garde themes throughout the twentieth 
century has been discussed in terms of being either a flaccid imitation of the 
“original” avant garde or else as a legitimate deployment of avant garde tactics that 
are appropriate for the age in which the art is created.201 The current position is that 
the avant garde is very much alive and well, and exists happily in galleries, public 
spaces (in the work of Banksy and his many imitators), and, as I will show, the 
fashion runways and costume museums where couture is most often seen.     
                                                
200 Evans, Fashion at the Edge, p.9. 
201 See Dietrich Scheunemann, European Avant-Garde: New Perspectives 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000) for an overview of these debates. 
  102 
The notion of the avant garde has inspired critics as much as artists, if not more so. 
Avant garde art demands responses, and there was a need to find ways to articulate 
the experience of viewing the avant garde as well as understanding its position in the 
field. Inevitably, the critical response to the avant garde has been as varied as the 
avant garde itself. In his 1939 essay ‘Avant Garde and Kitsch,’ Clement Greenberg 
sees it in the same dialectical opposition as Matthew Arnold’s distinction between 
“culture” and “anarchy,” with the avant garde as a defence against populism and, in 
its extreme, the national socialism of Hitler and Mussolini.202 The avant garde is, for 
Greenberg, élitist, and quite rightly so. From Greenberg, avant garde is generally 
constituted as one part of a dualism within art,203 although the nature of that dualism 
is difficult to articulate with any degree of certainty. The avant garde has been seen by 
Greenberg and others, notably Rosalind Krauss, as a crisis of originality in art, and 
marks an opposition between the hand-made original and the mass-produced 
object.204 This distinction is problematic to maintain in the face of avant garde 
practices like photomontage and screen-printing, but there is a related point made by 
the idea of the readymade, as much by Emin’s My Bed (1999) as by Duchamp’s 
Fountain (1917) - for the avant garde it is less the object that is or is not art, and 
instead it is the selection and placement of the object that is the hallmark of creativity. 
Above all else, the avant garde consistently questions what art is.   
 
Peter Bürger’s seminal 1974 book Theory of the Avant Garde interprets the avant 
garde as oppositional, but unlike Greenberg he sees it as actively oppositional, rather 
than oppositional by default. Bürger argues convincingly for the avant garde to be 
seen as a political act, one that rejects bourgeois society’s commercialisation of art, 
and indeed rejects the institution of art itself, defining the avant garde as “an attack on 
the autonomous status of art in bourgeois society” and an attempt to “re-integrate art 
                                                
202 See Avant Garde and Kitsch in Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and 
Criticism (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1986).  
203 For the purposes of this chapter, and in the interests of brevity, I am using “art” 
here as a shorthand to denote all of the creative forms, not just visual art, that have 
seen avant garde components appearing in them, including literature, architecture, 
music, dance, and so on. 
204 Rosalind E. Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist 
Myths (Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press, 1985). 
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into the praxis of life.”205 Although Bürger’s account is compelling, his view of what 
works can be considered avant garde has been criticised more recently for being 
limited and excluding those examples that do not fit in with his overall thesis, in 
particular avant garde cinema.206 
  
Gordon Graham defines the avant garde as intentionally novel, radical and subversive 
and tending to generate a negative public reaction.207 Graham has suggested that avant 
garde is radical, as opposed to more reactionary creative modes, and wilfully 
subversive. He points out that the avant garde almost always generates a negative 
response when it is received in public for the first time, and recalls, amongst other 
things, the near-riot that greeted the first performance of Stravinsky’s The Rites of 
Spring (1913.)  
 
The scope afforded to the term avant garde, as we can see from these few examples 
here, is remarkably broad. Greenberg mentions a whole raft of poets and artists from 
Europe and the U.S., from the mid-nineteenth century up to the 1930s. Bürger too 
lists a host of examples, from Dada to Pop Art via the 1932 anti-Nazi photomontages 
of John Heartfield. Graham’s 2005 book covers all of these, and adds the music of 
Stravinsky and John Cale, the architecture of Le Corbusier, the choreography of 
Yvonne Rainer, and the conceptual art of Tracy Emin and Damien Hirst to the mix as 
well. Indeed, by saying that it is “no Procrustean bed,”208 Greenberg seems to suggest 
that the avant garde, rather than being a fixed space into which all manner of creative 
output can fit if it is squeezed or stretched sufficiently, is instead a highly mobile 
concept, one that ranges across all creative disciplines and throughout the modern 
age.  
 
                                                
205 Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
206 Anne Friedberg, Window Shopping: Cinema and the Postmodern (Berkeley; 
Oxford: University of California Press, 1993). 
207 Gordon Graham, Philosophy of the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics (London: 
Routledge, 2005). 
208 Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism, p.10. 
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Hal Foster reminds us that “to pose the question of repetition” in twentieth century 
cultural history is “to pose the question of the neo-avant garde.”209 This question, of 
the recurrence of the avant garde, is noteworthy, as it compels us to consider the issue 
of repetition, recurrence and re-appropriation in art, and suggests a continuity between 
the “original” avant garde of 1910s and 1920s, and its recurrence in various art 
movements subsequently. Foster questions Bürger’s approach, and rejects the 
suggestion implicit in it, “that one theory can comprehend the avant garde, that all its 
projects can be subsumed under the project to destroy the false autonomy of 
bourgeois art.”210 Instead there is the argument, advanced by Foster as well as by 
Dietrich Scheunemann, that the avant garde is an ongoing, if discontinuous, project – 
although, as Scheunemann points out, “the semblance of the autonomy of the artwork, 
however, has vanished forever.”211 For Scheunemann, the avant garde must be 
understood in terms of its repetitions and its doubling back. He points out, for 
instance, that Pop Art was a reaction against Abstract Expressionism, but that reaction 
is itself a repeat of Dada’s revolt against the Expressionist movement forty years 
earlier, and that the relation between techniques and technology combine and advance 
art practice to a point where art is continuous. However, precisely because of this 
repetition and doubling, the works are inevitably relational. The idea of the autonomy 
of an art work, questioned by the avant garde continuously, has finally, according to 
Scheunemann, ceased to be. 
 
What is it, then, to be “avant garde”? Although this question remains resolutely 
unanswered, there are aspects of the avant garde that have been identified by almost 
all of its critics, even though they may not necessarily agree on the conclusions that 
can be drawn from these aspects. Avant garde questions the status of art, and asks 
what an art object is, or can be. This question is posed in a number of ways, but 
predominantly through the technique of the ready-made, where the object is less 
relevant that the fact that it has been selected and exhibited in a particular way. Avant 
garde also acknowledges the impossibility of originality, even as it creates original 
works, and we see this in photomontage, and in the repetitious screen prints of Andy 
                                                
209 Hal Foster, The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century 
(Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press, 1996), p. 1. 
210 Foster, The Return of the Real, p. 8. 
211 Avant-Garde/Neo-Avant-Garde, ed. by Dietrich Scheunemann (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2005) p. 44. 
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Warhol. Avant garde is élitist rather than populist. Avant garde has a relationship with 
the past as much as with the future, a relationship embodied in the critical term “neo-
avant-garde.” On top of all of this, there is an argument that follows from the 
postmodern insistence on the fragmentary nature of culture, put forward by John Tagg 
in 1986, that “any adequate cultural intervention [and the avant garde is seen here as 
interventionist] must be collective – as collective as advertising or television or 
architecture – as collective as the accumulated skills, the layers of habit, the practices 
and codes, production values, rituals of procedure, technical rules of thumb, 
professionalised knowledges, distinctions of rank, and so on, which make up the 
institutional base.”212 This understanding of collectivity is precisely what underpinned 
Lucien Lelong’s assertion that “couture is in Paris or it is nowhere” – from a purely 
pragmatic point of view, Paris was home to the supporting trades and industries, the 
seamstresses, the ribbon makers, the furriers and so on, that support couture and 
indeed make couture possible. Couture, in could be said, is just such an avant garde 
collective cultural intervention, but by accident rather than design.  
 
Of course, much of the general avant garde criticism can be applied to haute couture 
too. Its outlandish creations are blasted for their unwearability, to which couture 
responds with a wilful refusal of any diktats around what can or cannot be considered 
“fashion,” in an identical manner to the way in which the avant garde provokes the 
question “but is it art” from those who think that this is still the question to ask. In that 
sense, couture is as cheerfully élitist as any avant garde art. To appreciate couture, as 
well as to appreciate avant garde art, one must know the questions to ask of it.  With 
its constant repetitions and doubling back, couture follows the avant garde, and is 
almost avant garde avant la lettre. Just as Caroline Evans has identified the way in 
which couture threads its own history into its contemporary existence, making the 
voices of its ghosts articulate the experience of the here and now, so the avant garde, 
with its re-appropriation of lost practices and its constant articulation and re-
articulation of practice and images, rejects any notion of a linear history at precisely 
the same time as it relies on it. When seen in this light, the assertion of Anna Wintour, 
the current editor of American Vogue, that “haute couture is the avant garde today,” is 
                                                
212 John Tagg, 'Postmodernism and the Born-Again Avant-Garde’, Block, 11 (1986) 
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all the more credible.213 Couture is the avant garde of fashion, and is arguably as 
central to the avant garde generally as other avant garde work in visual art, literature, 
architecture or performance. 
 
Lacan’s account of sexuality and sexuation is of particular relevance to the avant 
garde, in that the instances where the avant garde concerns itself with eroticism and 
desire seem to reflect the model set out by Lacan in Seminar XX. Indeed it could be 
said that in the same way that couture is avant garde, the avant garde definition of 
sexuality is Lacanian, avant la lettre. The notion of avant garde historicity, in which 
repetition and looping back are the model for the present’s relationship with the past 
rather than any notion of linear progress, is particularly helpful in connecting these 
non-linear but nevertheless related issues, as I discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
Avant garde insights into sexuality are set out in many different examples of avant 
garde work. Marcel Duchamp’s Bride Laid Bare by her Bachelors, Even (1912) 
(sometimes called Large Glass) is a case in point. In this piece two large rectangles of 
clear glass are sandwiched together and divided horizontally. In the top half in the 
bride, isolated, untouchable and off-centre. Below her are the Bachelors, who have no 
way of reaching the object of their desire, she remains entirely unattainable. Here, 
Duchamp’s debunking of romantic love in a pictorial account of the impossibility of 
consummation, is effectively an artistic rendering of the Lacanian topography of 
sexuated subjectivities as they occur within the frame of the symbolic. 
 
We see resonances of Seminar XX in the writing of the avant garde poet and 
playwright Antonin Artaud, too. Artaud objects to sexuality “in its present form”, 
criticising it as a historical derivative and a symbolic construct and presupposing 
another, mythical, sexuality that corresponds with the unknowable feminine in 
Lacan’s work. He sees, too, sexual relations themselves as little more than conformity 
to an ideology predicated on the denial of lack.214 Artaud appears to understand 
sexuality and desire in ways that prefigure their presentation in diagrammatic form in 
                                                
213 Anna Wintour, cited in Gavin Wadell, How Fashion Works: Couture, Ready-to-
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Seminar XX.  In a recent essay, the critic Lorenzo Chiesa has pointed out parallels 
between Artaud’s concept of alienation and Lacan’s concept of separation, saying, 
“Alienation is both sexual and linguistic. It concerns both desire and meaning [...] 
Artaud would agree with Lacan that the unconscious that is structured like a language 
lies outside; thus he [Artaud] writes: ‘In my unconscious it is others that I hear 
speaking.’”215 The relationship between language and desire, the conscious and the 
unconscious, and the Symbolic and the Real, is understood in literary terms by Artaud 
in ways that resonate with the psychoanalytic concerns of Lacan. 
 
As I will illustrate, avant garde fashion, that is to say couture, re-presents the avant 
garde understanding of sexuality as Lacanian, but what is of particular interest in 
couture is its departure from previous avant garde, proto-Lacanian theories of 
sexuality. Duchamp, Artaud et al discuss sexuated subjectivities in their work but do 
not, for whatever reason, incorporate the feminine position. They articulate Lacanian 
sexuation from the position of male sexuated subjects. The articulation of the 
feminine in the avant garde comes in couture, not art, and even then it appears in spite 
of the creators of the works being male sexuated subjects. This could be explained in 
terms of the gendering of cultural forms, as I have discussed earlier. Arguably it is 
fashion’s inherent femininity, independent of its creators, that allows the entry of the 
feminine into avant garde practice. In addition, it is worth remembering that sexed 
subjectivities occur at the level of the psyche and the fact of couture creators being 
male does not preclude their access to the feminine, a point that underpins the reading 
of Leigh Bowery in chapter three.  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, couture can be seen to intersect with the two points 
of Lacanian theory around which this chapter is based largely through a negotiation of 
avant garde historicity. The jouissance of the other is articulated in the avant garde by 
virtue of the avant garde’s wilful disruptiveness. The hostility that greets avant garde 
art is evidence, arguably, of the challenge it presents, in Lacanian terms, to the 
symbolic order. The avant garde can be seen as the interjection of the real, a rupture 
to the usual order of things that highlights precisely the instability of that order. It can 
be seen as the artistic and aesthetic articulation of jouissance.  
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Secondly, the duality of couture, the way in which it embodies both positions of 
feminine sexuated subjectivity with woman as objet a and as the unspeakable 
alienated subject, relies on avant garde historicity for its cogency and structural 
coherence. It is the repetition, the looping, the doubling back, that make it possible for 
couture to embody two entirely oppositional suppositions at the same time, without 
either of them cancelling the other out. The process of repetition creates a duality, 
because the repetition is not simply the same thing twice. When couture repeats, the 
original and the replication retain their distinct identities, so that both are visible 
within the same garment, and the meaning, the significance, of both, are retained. For 
instance, Christian Dior did not replicate the designs of Charles Worth, but there were 
enough similarities between his designs and Worth’s for the theme of the belle époque 
to be seen in his work, while it simultaneously retained the originality that earned it 
the New Look moniker. Similarly, John Galliano’s references to previous dress are 
not simply a replication of old designs, but instead allow for references from the past 
to be visible within a new context. Thus, what Lacan orders through the use of 
mathemes and charts, the avant garde orders through literature, art and couture. 
Curiously, perhaps, it is the inherent disorderliness of desire and subjectivity that 
makes both Lacanian psychoanalysis and avant garde art so remarkably radical.  
 
John Galliano, Alexander McQueen. 
 
John Galliano (1960- ) graduated from Central St Martins School of Art in London 
with a first class honours degree in fashion in 1984, with a collection inspired by the 
French Revolution called "Les Incroyables" that received positive reviews and was 
bought in its entirety and sold in the London fashion boutique Browns. He moved to 
Paris in the early 1990s, and in 1995 was made head designer at LVMH’s company 
Givenchy. Two years later he was promoted, and moved to Christian Dior, and 
became head designer there in 1997. He was awarded British Designer of the Year in 
1987, 1994 and 1995 and in 1997, when he shared the award with Alexander 
McQueen, his successor at Givenchy. In 2001 he was awarded a C.B.E. in the 
Queen’s Birthday Honours List. 
 
Alexander McQueen  (1969- ) trained as a tailor after leaving school, and spent time 
working in Milan for the designer Romeo Gigli. He returned to London and studied 
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for a Master of Arts in Fashion Design at Central St Martins College, graduating in 
1992. He succeeded John Galliano as head designer at Givenchy in 1996, but his 
tenure was marked by controversy and hostility towards his employers, and his 
contract was eventually terminated in 2001. He set up his own company in 1999 and 
in 2000 he created a conflict of interest by selling a controlling stake to Givenchy’s 
rivals, Gucci, while continuing to work for both companies. He has won the British 
designer of the year award three times between 1996 and 2003, and in 2000 was 
awarded the C.B.E., as well as being named International Designer of the Year at the 
Council of Fashion Designer Awards. 
 
The work of these designers that is best suited to our enquiry here is that produced 
between 1996 and 2002, as this is the point at which they were in closest step with 
one another, and also the point at which their work was at its most avant garde. The 
nature of couture means that the creative output is inevitably very high, two 
collections per year of up to a hundred garments, far higher than the volume of work 
of a visual artist in the same time scale for instance, or a writer, and it is necessary to 
be precise in terms of items under considerations, in the interests of brevity apart from 
anything else.  
 
McQueen and Galliano are of particular significance to any investigation of 
contemporary couture for a number of reasons. They are both highly acclaimed 
designers and in a sense set the benchmark against which their peers and competitors 
are assessed. Their careers have more or less followed the same trajectory at more or 
less the same time. Both are English couturiers who, like Charles Worth, left London 
to work from Paris. Both produce work that pointedly interrogates the very notion of 
femininity, and in this regard Galliano in particular is widely acknowledged by critics, 
fashion editors and museum curators alike to be the heir apparent to the couture 
tradition started by Worth, and rearticulated by Dior. More importantly, though, both 
of them are notorious for producing a particular type of couture, couture that could be 
said to be avant garde. Their creations have invoked approbation and applause in 
equal measure, and both have produced work that have raised the question “but is it 
fashion?” McQueen and Galliano are so closely intertwined, in terms of both their 
work and their career, that it is impossible to discuss one without reference to the 
other. They represent, for want of a better expression, two sides of the same coin, and 
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where they explore similar thematics, such as femininity, history, and so on, they do 
so in oppositional ways, as I will show.  
 
As discussed earlier there are two key contradictions from Seminar XX that are to be 
discussed in this chapter in order to illuminate some of the paradoxes and 
obfuscations of couture as avant garde fashion. They are, firstly, the conflict between 
woman as source of male fantasy and objet a, and her experience as other/another 
jouissance, and secondly, the duality of fashion that sees it concealing lack at the 
same time as it turns the body into the cut that marks the focus of desire. Both 
considerations will be shared between the work of Galliano and McQueen, as both are 
equally well suited to the discussion, and a more detailed dialogue between avant 
garde couture and psychoanalysis will be facilitated by an investigation of both their 
work. Galliano in particular, I will argue, offers an allegory of the constitution of 
woman as objet a, the object of desire for man. That his work appears in museums as 
much as it is worn would indicate that his particular form of couture acts as woman’s 
ambassador in the symbolic order. Simultaneously though, with its references to the 
femmes fatales Salomés and Judiths of the fin-de-siecle it also alludes to the corporeal 
jouissance of the other, to a particularly feminine sexuality that is rapacious and 
destructive. It offers a duality of both the symbolic order and the interjection of the 
real embodied, in every sense of the word, in couture fashion. Galliano, far more than 
other designers, plunders cultural and sartorial history for inspiration for his own 
work. In doing so he self-consciously creates a relationship with the past that allows 
its ghosts a voice in the present. This historicity that we see at work in Galliano’s 
collections is rather more than mere playfulness or postmodern intertextuality. It is 
instead a paradigm of the avant garde. McQueen also offers a duality, but his is 
concerned with the operation of fashion on the surface of the body, and the way in 
which it at once conceals the lack at the heart of human subjectivity, and concurrently 
turns the body into the coupure, the gap, that marks the aim of desire. McQueen’s 
work is the manifestation of the paradox at the heart of couture, whereby the body is 
awarded two contradictory meanings, and the operation of couture on the body is 
concerned with both what is articulable and what is not. Arguably, the success of 
these two couturiers emanates from their ability to maintain impossibilities and 
irreconcilable contradictions in their work, precisely the impossibilities and 
contradictions upon which not just couture but human desire itself is founded. Where 
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they differ is the extent to which they obey (Galliano) or resist (McQueen) the 
structural logic of sexuation and desire, particularly as it pertains to the feminine. 
 
Galliano. 
 
The first Galliano creation I intend to consider comes from the Galliano’s 
Autumn/Winter 2004-5 collection, and is one of three that were recently displayed at 
the Golden Age of Couture exhibition at the Victoria and Albert museum in London 
in 2007. As I have discussed, this exhibition accepted without question the model of 
femininity set out by Dior, and indeed by Charles Worth before him, and suggested 
that Galliano was the heir to this creative legacy. Certainly, the dress in question has 
resonances of both the New Look and the belle époque. It is elaborate and restrictive 
in equal measure, with strategically placed embroidery to emphasise and visually 
enlarge the breasts, ruches on the hips to add width whilst also making the already 
restricted waist appear smaller, and a floor-length tapering skirt that is tight to the 
knees before flaring out to a fishtail and that will almost certainly restrict physical 
motion. The overall effect is a burlesque of the female body that emphasises a 
presumed naturalness that is in fact nothing of the sort. This “naturalness” is in the 
same mould as the “naturalness” of Dior’s New Look, in that it artificially emphasises 
the physical aspects of a woman’s body that are different to a man (hips, breasts, etc) 
in order to suggest that difference is both inevitable and anatomically defined. The 
cloak is absolutely enormous, and is a cartoon of exclusivity and wealth as well as a 
parody of the trailing garments worn by English monarchs on state occasions, replete 
with ermine trim, and sleeves so large they will render movement of the arms almost 
impossible. Indeed, the model’s hands are so dwarfed by the sleeves of the cloak that 
seem more a part of the dress than her body, an effect that is only enhanced by their 
being painted the same shade of orange as the embroidery on the dress itself.  
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John Galliano, Autumn/Winter 2004-5. 
 
The garment follows the couture tradition, exemplified by Worth and Dior in 
particular, of imposing itself on the female body. It quite literally fashions the 
physical form of woman, and in doing so constitutes itself as the visual manifestation 
of her femininity.  
 
The woman herself does not exist. She is revealed only through the garment that 
shapes and articulates her – and by shaping and articulating her in a simulated 
approximation of a naturalness that is actually entirely artificial, the garment 
intercedes in her subjectivity. By interceding in her subjectivity it presupposes a 
subjective limitation or failure of some sort. She is lacking, incomplete, according to 
this garment which instead represents her as a gap to be filled or, more accurately, 
covered. She then becomes, in Lacanian terms, objet a, the cause of desire. That this 
garment was selected, from a field of hundreds, for display in the prestigious halls of 
the Victoria and Albert Museum can be seen as evidence of the success with which it 
articulates femininity within the symbolic order. It acts as woman’s ambassador, but 
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in such a way that the woman herself is left behind. The constitution of woman as 
objet a takes place through the re-inscription of her body whose original form is 
deleted and replaced by couture creations. The paradox of couture is that it can enact 
both impossibilities of the feminine at once - the experience of an/other jouissance 
and the constitution of woman as objet a are in no way mutually exclusive, which 
may be despite their asymmetry, or may instead be because of it.    
 
The excessiveness of this particular creation - and it is excessive, in terms of the sheer 
volume of fabric used, and used explicitly, the opulence of the fabric and its 
embellishments, and its clear acknowledgement of untold wealth and power in its 
regal, monarchical allusions - offers a paradigm of the symbolic understanding of 
excess. More importantly though, it is also an excess (an Other excess) that is 
contingent upon the female body for its realisation. It can only come into being 
through being worn. It’s shape, its materiality, would not exist without the wearer. On 
the hanger it would look like an amorphous mass. Although it is on the one hand a 
very literal, materialist notion of excess, it can also be read as the corporeal 
expression of the feminine jouissance that challenges the symbolic understanding of 
excess by virtue of its corporeality, and it is the garment’s reliance on the female body 
for its realisation that makes this challenge possible. It is not a challenge that occurs 
in the museum display, but rather when the garment is in the act of being displayed on 
a woman’s body. It is instead this corporeal display, taking place literally on the 
woman’s body, that allows us to see the excessiveness of the gown, and that 
implicates the gown as an instance of jouissance.  
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John Galliano, Susie Sphinx collection, Autumn/Winter 1997-8.  
 
The second Galliano creation under consideration here is from his Susie Sphinx 
collection, Autumn/Winter 1997-8 (above). The dress would be a straightforward 
cocktail dress, were it not for the fact that it is cut so low that the breasts are exposed, 
making it unwearable under any usual set of social circumstances. Breasts are 
habitually covered, not exposed. Underneath the dress, and made to go with it, is a 
painted flesh-coloured net body-stocking that covers the entire body but which makes 
the body look tattooed rather than clothed. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
effect of tattoos is to eroticise and destabilise the human body to a degree that is quite 
deviant, and there is a suggestion in this creation that couture’s interface with the 
body has the potential to be as deviant and as erotic as tattoos. The painting on the 
body-stocking is of delicate Art Nouveau-style floral designs in pinks, reds and gold, 
although there is also the top hat wearing head of a Victorian gentleman clearly 
visible on the upper right arm, and above that there is skull, also in a top hat.  Caroline 
Evans has pointed out the similarities between the painted body-stocking worn under 
this gown, and the painted body of Gustave Moreau’s Dancing Salome (1876), and 
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has argued that there is a correlation between the avant garde painting of the fin de 
siecle and Galliano’s work.216   
 
The paradigm, identified by Evans as not a historian’s paradigm, is, I suggest, a 
paradigm of the avant garde and its articulation of a form of the past in the 
contemporary. It is this avant garde disregard for linear time and historical 
progression that facilitates couture’s erotic ambivalence to the symbolic order in 
which it inevitably operates, and allows for the disruptive entry of the real. Couture’s 
continual incorporation of history into the present is experienced as a disorienting 
visual ventriloquism, with voices from the past thrown at random into a contemporary 
discursive milieu that, whatever it may say to the contrary, in fact relies on 
disruptions in order to understand its own assumed stability. As the top hat-wearing 
historical gentleman and skull suggest, they are the visual ghosts of the past inscribed 
on the body by couture in order to articulate the experience of contemporary feminine 
sexuation as disorder and excess. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
216 Evans, Fashion at the Edge, p. 124. 
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John Galliano, Autumn/Winter 1998-9. 
 
These themes also appear in Galliano’s Autumn/Winter 1998-9 collection, that 
featured elaborate cocktail dresses, feathered head-dresses and vertiginous stiletto 
heels that evoke the decadence of the Weimar Republic and hedonistic nights at the 
Cabaret Voltaire. The green dress from this collection (above), is metallic, translucent 
and embellished, and designed paradoxically to expose the body it ostensibly covers. 
Indeed it could be said that it is actually the exposure that is being displayed by the 
model, rather than the dress itself. This sense of exposure is exacerbated by the rents 
in the fishnet tights worn under the dress, with fishnet tights themselves being at the 
best of times little more than an orderly mass of holes. The combined effect of these 
exposures, the fishnets and their legitimate and illegitimate holes, as well as the 
translucency of the dress fabric and the cut of the dress itself, is to confuse the very 
purpose of clothing itself as a means of covering the lack at the centre of human 
subjectivity – a purpose, it could be said, that was described in the Judeo-Christian 
myth of creation and that has been central to the understandings of the purpose of 
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clothing.217 Here, couture takes it upon itself to subvert that myth even as it ostensibly 
adheres to it. It is at once a veiling and an unveiling of the body, and the positing of a 
corporeal discontinuity that flags up the contrivance of the perceived eroticism of 
woman-clothed. By its discontinuity, this garment acts as a marker of the delimitation 
of the body and the location of the constitution of eroticism as being on the surface of 
the body, at the same time as it acts to cover the body and act as its interlocutor.  
 
The green dress, like much of Galliano’s work, is a prime example of the paradox of 
couture, of its capacity to embody two opposing suppositions at once without either of 
them cancelling the other out. More than this, though, it demonstrates this chapter’s 
defining principle of fashion, that fashion is “more than,” that fashion is clothes, and 
an addition, that fashion is in fact excess. What form the excess of fashion takes 
varies, but in the case of Galliano, and Dior before him, it is male fantasies around 
objet a. A Galliano gown will constitute a woman as objet a, as I have shown, but it 
does more than that. By acting as the female body’s interlocutor, it also creates the 
male fantasy of feminine jouissance, by articulating the feminine in ways that are 
easily accessible and understood within the terms of the symbolic. Galliano’s 
response to the Freudian question was will das Weib? (what do women want?) is one 
that is marked at best a fundamental misunderstanding of women and at worst 
misogyny. Even his biographer Colin McDowell, who writes enthusiastically about 
the man and his work, has commented:  
Bringing echoes of hookers, geishas, hostesses in opium dens [...] 
John, we are told, loves women, but it is not easy to avoid the 
thought that, within that love lurks a fear which must be laid to rest 
with pastiche, or, even more compelling, the suspicion that it is a 
love so intense it also encompasses a degree of hatred.218  
 
There is the suggestion implicit in this Galliano gown that feminine sexuality is 
accessible and available, that it is dependent, moreover, on the desiring male subject 
for its realisation. This negation of the woman is the inevitable outcome of structural 
                                                
217 Both J.C. Flügel and Edmund Bergler cite modesty and the trauma of castration, as 
a main purpose of dress, while Cavallaro and Warwick have suggested that clothing 
conceals lack in the Lacanian sense of the word. The historian Christopher Breward 
has also highlighted the role that modesty and concealment have played throughout 
the history of dress, in Christopher Breward, The Culture of Fashion: A New History 
of Fashionable Dress (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).  
218 Colin McDowell, Galliano (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997) p. 117. 
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obedience to the symbolic, and obedience to which Galliano appears to 
unquestioningly adhere. Unfortunately for Galliano, though, the feminine cannot only 
ever be, in Lacanian terms, objet a. Despite his best efforts, conscious or otherwise, 
corporeality and feminine jouissance inevitably interject, in ways that disrupt the 
straightforward projection of masculine desire, and the asymmetric impossibility of 
sexual relations is maintained.    
  
McQueen. 
 
If John Galliano’s work is the acme of “establishment” couture, and appears in 
museum exhibitions as evidence of its cultural legitimacy, Alexander McQueen’s 
work, quite conspicuously, is not. McQueen is in this regard the antithesis of 
Galliano. His work is unequivocal in its disruptive potential. It speaks of an 
unspeakable cruelty, and a sexuality that is both horrific and terrifying.  
 
 
McQueen, Eshu, Autumn/Winter 2000-01 
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The first example of McQueen’s work I will consider comes from his Eshu collection, 
Autumn/Winter 2000-2001, that was inspired by the Yoruba tribespeople of West 
Africa. What is interesting about this creation is its explicit savagery. In the example 
shown here, the earrings are over-sized and tribal in appearance, but what is 
particularly striking are the spikes pressing against the model’s lips and holding open 
her mouth, which are open to a number of interpretations. Firstly they are reminiscent 
of the bodily distortions created by the body ornamentation of non-western tribal 
peoples that inspired this collection, although clearly they are too impractical to have 
any direct design antecedents from this area. They are also more than a little surgical 
in appearance, although one can imagine a patient protesting vigorously at being 
made to wear such a contraption. More importantly, there is also a hint of the metal 
frames used in so-called BDSM sexual practices, that hold the wearer’s mouth open 
and function as a very effective gag, preventing any sort of utterance.219 By staging 
the artificially enforced impossibility of speech in a high profile fashion show, I 
suggest that McQueen is foregrounding the impossibility of articulating femininity in 
the symbolic. It is difficult to say if McQueen is doing this deliberately or not, but in 
an interview in 1996 he talked about his sister having been a target of domestic 
violence, which may translate into a personal interest in the position of femininity in 
the symbolic that may then be manifested in his creative output, whether consciously 
or otherwise.220   
 
The woman quite literally cannot speak for herself. Her dress is her envoy and must 
speak for her. Where with Galliano this process positions the woman as objet a, with 
McQueen, I suggest, it is a form of protest and resistance to such positioning. 
Galliano duplicitously affords the wearers of his garments at least the illusion that 
they can speak. McQueen is rather more honest. He proposes that they cannot speak 
and this muteness is rendered unequivocally on the surface of the body, on the mouth, 
to be precise, with the brutal spikes through the model’s lips. What’s more, objet a 
does not generally snarl threateningly, in the way that the spikes are compelling their 
wearer to here. She is instead an all together more acquiescent figure.   
                                                
219 BDSM is a hybrid acronym that refers to a range of erotic practices based on 
power exchange, including Bondage, Domination, Submission, Sadism and 
Masochism.  
220 Marion Hume, ‘Scissorhands,’ Harpers and Queen, August 1996, p. 82. 
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What is also of note when we consider the lip spikes in this image is the negotiations 
of erotogeneity that they represent. They draw attention to one of the body’s margins 
or borders; they indicate in clear visual terms the cut, the coupure (in this case the 
mouth) that provokes desire by making the body erotic. Curiously though, piercing 
the flesh, as these spikes appear to, creates a new coupure which augments the 
original, indeed which may supersede the original by instituting as a cut, a gap, the 
very bodily feature by which the subject is recognised, the face. 
 
McQueen’s design philosophy, then, couldn’t be more different from Galliano’s. 
Where Galliano wants men to desire women-clothed (in his gowns) McQueen wants 
women in his designs to invoke fear, to be “so fabulous you wouldn’t dare lay a hand 
on her.”221 Why not? What is this untouchable fabulousness? It is, I suggest, the 
castration threat, the slipping of the veil of femininity that is couture to reveal the 
terrifying maw of castration.  
 
The stylist Isabella Blow, who was McQueen’s first patron, once said of his work: 
What attracted me to Alexander was the way he takes ideas from 
the past and sabotages them with his cut to make them thoroughly 
new and in the context of today. It is the complexity and severity of 
his approach to cut that makes him so modern. He is like a Peeping 
Tom in the way he slits and stabs at the fabric to explore all the 
erogenous zones of the body.222     
 
While she is clearly using cut in its more usual sense, to mean the skilful way in 
which the cloth has been cut from its roll to make the pieces that are stitched together 
to make the garment, her use of the term is, I think, significant. There is an evident 
connection that can be made between the cut in its practical sense, and the way in 
which the garments that are created by the cut can be interpreted in its psychoanalytic 
sense. What’s more, Blow also invokes the historicity that is characteristic of avant 
garde couture, but here, and in contrast to Galliano’s literalist representations of the 
past, McQueen uses this historicism as an erotic device. He eroticise history by 
sabotaging it, by making incisions into the very fabric of couture’s history, the history 
                                                
221 Hume, ‘Scissorhands,’ p.82.  
222 Isabella Blow, in Sarajane Hoare, ‘God Save McQueen,’ Harpers Bazaar (USA), 
June 1996.  
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that is articulated in and through new designs, and in doing so reveals the impossible 
female body that couture has, historically, disguised.    
 
The yellow clay covering the model’s face and hair and the fur collar compound this, 
and suggest a primitivism that will readily offer an affront to any notion of civilised 
dress. Where fashion is usually expected to “oblige”, in some way, McQueen instead 
chooses to show how it can also resist normative social mores by referencing a history 
that is not concerned with the inexorable rise and rise of civilisation, but which 
instead addresses the destructiveness that that civilisation has wrought during its 
supposed rise. With its resonances of the violence of European colonialism, this 
collection raises themes that McQueen has been preoccupied with in other collections, 
most notably Highland Rape (Autumn/Winter 1995-96) which was his first show 
under the auspices of the British Fashion Council at London Fashion Week. The title 
of the collection, Highland Rape is not concerned with rape as a sex crime but instead 
the rape of Scotland by England during the seventeenth century, and, like Eshu with 
its (post)colonial concerns, speaks of the aggressivity at the very heart of the human 
condition.    
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McQueen, The Hunger, Spring/Summer 1996. 
 
The second McQueen creation considered here comes from the Spring/Summer 1996 
collection, entitled The Hunger. The red satin pencil skirt and the grey, impeccably 
tailored jacket, offer a normative version of fashionable dress that is immediately 
subverted by the Perspex breastplate underneath. The brown marks that are visible on 
the breastplate are in fact worms sandwiched between it and the flesh it covers. They 
look like internal organs, like the intestines of the wearer, but are also indicative of 
the desecration of the body in the grave. The worms will in time consume the body 
they currently ornament, and suggest the impermanence of corporeal materiality. The 
body may interject, as it is doing here, by making a visual appearance through the cut 
of the sorts of clothes more usually associated with covering it. The body may 
interrupt and disrupt, but it will never establish any permanency for itself. This 
impossibility of material corporeality is, precisely, corporeal jouissance, an other 
jouissance that, cast in the shape of the woman’s body, utters the unspeakable 
difference of the feminine.  
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In The Return of the Real (1996) Hal Foster argues that in contemporary avant garde 
art the “truth”, such as it is, resides in trauma and the abject. He reasons that there is 
disillusionment with earlier artistic strategies and with ideas about the subject, and 
that these artistic concerns combine with wider social despair over disease and death, 
poverty, crime, and so on, to effectively breach the social contract, a breach that 
manifests itself in a mortified subjectivity: “if there is a subject of history for the cult 
of abjection at all, it is ... the corpse.”223 We can see this avant garde breaching of the 
social contract in the implied deathliness of McQueen’s designs. What is of particular 
concern is the implication that the interjection of woman in the symbolic, and 
interjection facilitated by these couture creations, is seen by McQueen as an 
ultimately destructive interjection, one in which the interjector will figuratively but 
nevertheless inevitably die. The impossibility of woman remains intact, despite the 
best efforts of McQueen (and indeed couture in general) to create a space for her. 
What makes McQueen different to other couturiers is that he figures this impossibility 
into his creations, rather than pretending that it doesn’t exist and constituting the 
woman as objet a instead. 
 
The maintenance of the impossibility of woman in the symbolic in McQueen’s work 
could very easily be seen as an assault on the figure of woman. I would suggest that 
this is not the case. Perpetuating woman as objet a, as Galliano does, is repression of 
the most tedious and ubiquitous kind. McQueen is of a very different order, and 
contrarily, by using couture to represent the structural impossibility of the feminine in 
the symbolic McQueen is embodying in his work the theoretical point made by 
Jacqueline Rose, discussed earlier, that the jouissance of the other is “where 
‘otherness’ in sexuality utters its most forceful complaint.”224 McQueen’s work is not 
an assault on woman, as is commonly thought.225 On the contrary, by facilitating a 
display of the feminine as something other than a veiled nothing, he provides a site of 
resistance in which the disruptive potential of feminine jouissance can make its 
appearance. That this resistance is doomed to fail as a consequence of the psychic 
structuring of sexuated difference and divergences of desire is hardly his fault. It is 
                                                
223 Foster, The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century, p. 166. 
224 Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision, p.76. 
225 See ‘Review', Women's Wear Daily, 14th March 1995, p.10 and Marion Hume, 
‘McQueen’s Theatre of Cruelty’, The Independent, 21st October 1993, p. 29 for 
examples of accusations of misogyny directed at McQueen and his work. 
  124 
not in McQueen’s power (or anyone else’s for that matter) to make these structures 
crumble. What he does do, which is what makes him such a radical creative figure, is 
to offer feminine resistance to such structuring, within the terms that are available. 
Any other sort of challenge would fall outside of the structure and be little more than 
psychosis. McQueen avoids this and instead renders possible that which is usually 
impossible – a presentation of feminine resistance in the symbolic.    
 
The third and final creation this chapter will look at comes from the La Poupée 
collection, Spring/Summer 1997. Here, a square metal frame is attached by manacles 
to the model’s upper arms and thighs, and despite the stillness of the image (an 
inevitable drawback of working with photographs) one can clearly imagine the 
jerkiness and the artificiality of movement that the piece will provoke in the wearer. 
She will move like a doll being “walked” along the floor by a child’s hands. In a 
sense, it is no different to the artificiality of movement provoked by other, more 
pedestrian, items, like stiletto heeled shoes, capes, and so on. What this piece does 
though is foreground the artificiality. Where one could reasonably be expected to 
learn how to walk in high heels, or to find coping strategies for the restrictions placed 
on the arms by a cape, if one wished to wear these items, the likelihood of finding a 
coping strategy for the wearing of this metal frame is somewhere between slim and 
non-existent. One will never learn to walk in a natural-looking way while manacled to 
a metal square.  
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McQueen, La Poupée, Spring/Summer 1997. 
 
What is exceptional about this creation in couture terms is that it frames rather than 
covers the body. Like the clear Perspex breastplate in the previous image, the body 
appears in the gap, the gap that is created by the garments themselves. The chain mail 
dress that makes up the other aspect of this image is itself a series of gaps, and in this 
regard it can be seen to address many of same concerns as the Galliano green dress 
from Autumn/Winter 1998-9. Where it departs from Galliano, though is in the cruelty 
invoked by the exposure of the body through the design. McQueen here is staging a 
brutality of feminine experience, one in which the usual constitution of woman as 
objet a by couture is in fact framed by a violent corporeality that threatens the very 
structure of this constitution. Here the violence of castration is writ large, and on the 
body too, by clothing that more usually veils, covers, screens off. The gap between 
the body and clothing, and the body and the self, is usually denied by couture, with its 
taxonomy of completeness, but it is exploited in creative terms by the avant garde. It 
is not unique to McQueen, although arguably he is its most high profile exponent in 
fashion design. We also see it, memorably, in the work of the French performance 
  126 
artist Orlan. Writing about this brutality invoked by the gap in Orlan’s work, Parveen 
Adams has suggested:  
The emptying out of the place of the object collapses the distinction 
between inside and outside, a distinction which is a regime. A 
mask, in the very associations which it calls up, suggests a face 
behind the mask. What it does not imply is what is relevant here – 
a gap. Her transsexualism with its implants is not concerned to 
move from one sex to another sex, but to transform the confident 
existence of one sex, the imaginary completion of the body image, 
towards the gap in representation which disfigures sexual 
difference. It doesn’t deny it; rather it shows the copresence of the 
phallic and the castrated that the ‘real’ world insists are exclusive 
of each other. This belongs not to psychosis but to artistic 
labour.226 (my italics) 
 
This framing of the conflict of co-existence of the phallic and the castrated that exists 
in the contradiction of femininity is McQueen’s visual reiteration of Lacan’s “there’s 
no such thing as a sexual relation.”227 It is the representation in couture terms of the 
asymmetry of desire, and the contradictions and the contradictions and splits of 
feminine sexuation. 
                                                
226 Parveen Adams, writing in Orlan and Duncan McCorquodale, Orlan: Ceci Est 
Mon Corps, Ceci Est Mon Logiciel: This Is My Body, This Is My Software (London: 
Black Dog, 1996, p.68. 
227 Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, p.71. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Queering Fashion, Dressing Transgression 
 
This chapter will investigate the ways in which psychoanalysis has been queered, and 
new accounts of non-normative sexuality have been produced. Its focus will be the 
legendary character Leigh Bowery (1961-1993) whose life and work in fashion, 
performance and art was as unique as it was provocative. Despite Bowery’s 
distinctive and inimitable oeuvre, though, the London gallery owner Anthony 
D’Offay once described him as a “shiny mirror [that] allowed you to see yourself in 
this strange shape that he took.”228 However vulgar, or grotesque, or obscene his work 
was, and however distasteful or dislikeable he may have been, Bowery appeared to 
manifest a profound human commonality, something that was recognisable to all his 
audiences, and that resonates posthumously when his work is viewed today. 
Psychoanalysis queered will demonstrate what that commonality is, and why it is that 
Leigh Bowery’s output is as relevant and as important today as it ever was.      
 
The previous chapter offered a reading of Lacan that foregrounded a normative 
heterosexuality as it is represented in and manifested through fashion. However, there 
is no reason to suppose that this normative heterosexuality is the only model of 
sexuality considered possible in a psychoanalytic account. On the contrary, Freud’s 
position on sexuality is quite clear: “all human beings are capable of making a 
homosexual object choice and have in fact made one in their unconscious.”229 In fact, 
psychoanalysis has very little to say directly on the subject of homosexuality, not 
because of heteronormative presumptions, but because in terms of the unconscious 
the familiar categories of sexual orientation make very little sense. These categories, 
hetero-, homo- and bi-sexual, are based on the popular assumption that sexual 
orientation emanates from who one chooses to have sexual relations with, and 
whether that choice is “natural” or “culturally constructed.” Psychoanalysis, with its 
emphasis on the unconscious, is not especially concerned with such terms.  
 
 
 
                                                
228 Anthony D’Offay, interviewed for Tilley, Leigh Bowery, p. 216. 
229 Freud, A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays on Sexuality, and Other Works, p. 145. 
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Queering Lacan. 
 
Freud considered sexuality throughout his career, although his key findings are in the 
‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’ from 1905. Here, Freud makes the radical 
discovery that the sexual drive, which is to say the desire for sexual satisfaction, and 
sexual aim, how that desire is met, are distinct from one another. Prior to this 
discovery, sexologists like Kraft-Ebing had assumed that sexual drive and sexual aim 
were one and the same thing that operated together under the umbrella term of sexual 
instinct. Freud’s innovation challenged the notions of homosexuality that stem from 
this by pointing out that same sex object choice does not indicate some sort of warped 
or misguided sexual drive, but rather that it is merely a common variation of sexual 
development. In arguing for the separateness of drive and aim (they are, in his words, 
merely “soldered together”230), Freud is quite clear that there nothing pathological 
about “inversion” (his word for what is now referred to as homosexuality). Indeed, he 
says categorically: “Inversion is found in people who exhibit no serious deviations 
from the normal. It is similarly found in people whose efficiency is unimpaired and 
who are indeed distinguished by specially high intellectual development and ethical 
culture.”231 Regarding the cause of homosexuality, Freud argues that it is the 
developments that occur prior to the Oedipus complex that inspire non-normative 
sexualities of all types: “Sexual aberration in adults – perversion, fetishism, inversion 
- ... will reveal a fixation in childhood.”232 Here we see that homosexuality is not a 
matter of a man’s love and/or desire for another man, but is instead a response to the 
castration threat of childhood sexuality that is embodied in woman’s lack. The 
Oedipus complex is never resolved, but instead becomes embedded in the 
unconscious, from which it directs non-normative sexuality in adult life. 
 
In spite of this radicalism there is nevertheless the sense that Freud holds a model of 
“normal” sexuality, against which all other forms are measured. His legacy regarding 
homosexuality seems in particular to embody some tensions and contradictions. A.I. 
Davidson writes, in his study of the ‘Three Essays’: “Even if Freud’s conclusions in 
effect overturn the conceptual apparatus of perversion, it is well-known that he did 
                                                
230 Freud, A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays on Sexuality, and Other Works, p. 138. 
231 Freud, A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays on Sexuality, and Other Works, p. 140. 
232 Freud, An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, p. 180. 
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not embrace these conclusions unambiguously or unhesitatingly”, while Kenneth 
Lewes has identified the difficulties with Freud’s theory as being “a clear and 
coherent theory of its [homosexuality’s] etiology and dynamics, and a somewhat 
confused and equivocal understanding of the relationship of homosexuality and 
‘normal’ functioning and behaviour.”233  
 
Freud reached the limits of his thinking on homosexuality when he considered a case 
of homosexuality in a woman. He seems to suggest here that sexuality is as much a 
matter of the drives as it is object choice emanating from the consequences of Oedipal 
irresolution, and refers difficulties back to a biological imperative:  
It is not for psychoanalysis to solve the problem of homosexuality. 
It must rest content with discovering the psychical mechanisms that 
resulted in determination of the object choice, and with tracing the 
paths leading from them to the instinctual basis of the disposition. 
There its work ends and it leaves the rest to biological research.234   
 
This recourse to biology has been criticised by Mandy Merck as being contradictory, 
given his rejection of the biological model earlier in the essay, and consistent only 
with his overly elaborate efforts to theorise a sexual aetiology.235  
 
For Lacan, though, the boundary of psychical operation is not where Freud appears to 
leave it, on the border of psychoanalysis and biology, but instead at the interface 
between the symbolic, the imaginary and the real. In this chapter we will consider a 
psychoanalytic account of non-normative sexualities, and where previously my 
arguments have been predicated on the relation between the feminine and the 
masculine and the social categories of woman and man, here we will subvert these 
assumptions. 
 
Lacan follows Freudian orthodoxy regarding homosexuality inasmuch as he sees it as 
being constituted at the level of the unconscious, and his suggestion that sexuality is 
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concerned with the occupation by the subject of a particular sexed subjectivity 
emanates from his commitment to Freud’s thought. Lacan argues that the subject’s 
relation to the phallus does not presuppose heterosexuality: “Everyone knows there 
are phallic women, and that the phallic function doesn’t stop men being 
homosexuals.”236 It is worth reiterating here the point discussed at length in the 
previous chapter: In neither Freud nor Lacan is there the assumption that there is any 
direct or automatic correlation between the social category of man or woman and the 
operation of their desire. In developing Freud’s conceptualisation of sexuality, Lacan 
argues, qua Freud, that the human subject is not sexuated on account of their anatomy 
or their biology. On the contrary, the occupation of the subject positions of masculine 
and feminine takes place at the level of the psyche. Again, it is the tripartite 
structuring of psychic life that has proved to be the effective conceptual resource here. 
Lacan’s account of the orders of the symbolic, the imaginary and the real allows for 
the figuring of sexuality as a set of structural possibilities, taking one step further 
Freud’s suggestion that sexuality is anything but a natural or a biological 
phenomenon.  
 
Freud himself identified several instances where even heterosexuality can be 
considered abnormal. He discussed two such instances in a pair of essays, ‘A Special 
Type of Choice of Object Made by Men’ (1910) and ‘On The Universal Tendency to 
Debasement in the Sphere of Love’ (1912). In the first essay, Freud identifies one of 
the ways in which masculine desire is misdirected when a man has, as a child, had an 
unusually strong attachment to his mother and this affects his relations with women in 
adult life. In this instance the man is capable of having romantic relations only with 
women who are already attached and/or whose sexual integrity is in some way 
questionable. He suggests that “the characteristic features of our type – its conditions 
for loving and its behaviour in love – do in fact arise from the psychical constellation 
connected with the mother.”237 In the second essay, where the misdirection of 
masculine desire manifests itself in impotence, the problem is different but the cause 
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is the same: “an incestuous fixation on mother [...] that has never been 
surmounted.”238 
 
What is of note in both of these essays is the instability of masculine desire, even 
when it is framed within supposedly “normal” heterosexuality. Masculine sexuality, 
heterosexual or otherwise, is not the model of fixity it supposes itself to be, but in fact 
has the potential to be just as unstable as feminine sexuality. It is seemingly easy to 
knock it off course, as it were, to give it an unusual or abnormal aim, and, crucially, 
when it is knocked off course it is by way of the man’s primary relation with woman, 
which is to say his mother. Psychoanalysis has from the outset acknowledged that it is 
possible, even within heterosexuality, for man to have a misdirected relation with 
woman, and Lacan’s thinking on homosexuality reflects this. 
 
Lacan’s main reference to homosexuality comes in his most famous discussion of 
sexuality generally, Seminar XX. Here he refers to hommosexuelle, a pun on homme 
(man) and sexuelle (the feminine form of the word sexual). In some recent French 
dictionaries homosexuelle is a synonym for lesbian.239 Whatever the etymology of the 
word homosexuelle, it is clear from his wordplay that conflates man and the feminine 
sexual that Lacan sees homosexuality not as same sex desire between men but as an 
attestation to an extreme love of the feminine. For Lacan, a homosexual 
(hommosexuelle) is a man who occupies a feminine-sexuated subject position and 
who loves women differently, indeed who loves rather than desires. Lacan suggests 
that the hommosexuelle is a man who loves Woman as an ideal, and who is defined by 
both this ideal love and (Lacan departs from Freud here) the wish to keep this ideal 
distinct from sex. Where Lacan has argued that Woman does not exist, the 
hommosexuelle nevertheless believes that in fact she does.240 The hommosexuelle 
retains the belief of Woman as Ideal and idealises woman by refusing in his 
unconscious to acknowledge her representation of lack. This idealisation is 
maintained through a refusal of desire for woman. Unlike heterosexual man who is 
quite happy to seek phallic jouissance from woman, the hommosexuelle believes that 
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such jouissance is impossible to attain from the ideal without destroying the ideal. 
Where the heterosexual man confuses woman with Woman, and concedes her only 
insofar as she is differentiated from soul and so “defamed,” (or “debased,” as Freud 
would have it) which is to say in this instance without a “good” (i.e. viable within the 
symbolic) name, the hommosexuelle manifests a “pure” love, as distinct from 
desire.241  
The hommosexuelle is portrayed by Lacan as seeking the soul of the other in love. In 
the same way that he uses wordplay in order to connect the masculine subject to 
feminine sexuality, and creates the word hommosexuelle in order to express his 
thoughts in this area, Lacan also plays with the words âme (soul) and aime (love) in 
order to conjugate the verb he creates, to soul, which identifies the nature of Love and 
its difference from desire. When spoken, this verb “to soul” sounds, in French like “to 
love”: j’âme, tu âmes, il âme, and so on.242 The hommosexuelle is not concerned with 
desire or phallic jouissance in the way that a heterosexual man is, but rather finding a 
lost Other. Lacan goes so far as to suggest that the soul itself is derived from that 
which is hommosexuelle: 
The soul’s existence can thus be thrown into question – that’s the 
right term with which to ask whether it’s not an effect of love. In 
effect, as long as the soul souloves the soul sex is not involved. Sex 
does not count here. The elaboration from which the soul results is 
‘hommosexuelle” as is perfectly legible in history.243  
 
It should be said here that Lacan does not use the word soul in its theological sense. 
He is referring instead to the point outside of sex (for which Lacan coined the 
neologism horsexe) where love and the subject’s interiority meet:244 
What can that soul be that they soulove in their partner who is 
nevertheless homo to the hilt, from which they can’t get away? 
That can only, in effect, lead them to this final term – and its not 
for nothing that I call it as I do – [...] hysteria, namely to play the 
part of the man, as I have said, being thus hommosexuelle or 
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beyond sex themselves – it being henceforth difficult for them not 
to sense the impasse that consists in the fact that they love each 
other as the same in the Other, for indeed there is no need to know 
the Other to be there.245      
 
Lacan, then, seems to suggest that both the hommosexuelle and the hysteric constitute 
the soul as being an effect of love within sexual fantasy. There is a clear distinction 
between love and desire, a distinction that is the basis of Lacan’s thoughts on 
homosexuality in Seminar XX, but which in fact stems from a much earlier essay, 
‘The Youth of Gide, or the Letter and Desire’ (1958.) Here Lacan discusses the writer 
André Gide, whose unconsummated marriage to his cousin Madeleine was a 
testament to his love for and his absolute idealisation of Woman, but who remained 
homosexual throughout his life. In this essay, Lacan argues that the hommosexuelle’s 
love for the Woman is constituted in language and thus in the symbolic, and it is this 
that leads to the sexuation of the male subject as feminine and thus desiring as a 
woman rather than heterosexually desiring woman (or at least woman as objet a) from 
the masculine position. He describes this process as it happens with Gide when he 
says:  
As he tells us, one evening was for him his rendezvous with fate, 
the illumination of his night, and his engagement in vows – vows in 
the name of which he was to make his cousin Madeleine Rondeaux 
his wife and which initiated for him what he maintained right up 
until the end to have been his only love [...] It thus seems here that 
the subject finds himself transformed into a woman as desiring. 
Potiphar hides behind Pasiphaë, whom he tells us he becomes, 
bellowing when opening himself up to be penetrated by nature, just 
as the model of his aunt can be divined where Delay points to it, 
behind the ‘mimodrama’ of his childhood hysteria.246 
 
There is an authenticity to this process that, Lacan cautions, psychoanalysts ignore at 
their peril. What he calls their “chimerical belief in oblative/genital relations” may 
cause them to mistakenly assume that hommosexuelle love is flawed or problematic, 
when in fact it is central to the psychic processes that constitute human subjectivity, 
however destructive those processes might ultimately be: “And if psychoanalysts 
were capable of understanding what their master said about the death instinct, they 
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would be able to recognise that self-realisation can be bound up with the wish to end 
one’s life.”247  
 
It is worth noting, too, that there is nothing one can do about the desire through which 
self-realisation occurs. It cannot be reined in or controlled. It is its own master and 
operates in and through the subject, making a mockery of any notion of free will. The 
mode of desire that emanates from this love is of a very different order to love as it is 
defined within the normal heterosexual matrix, and can be seen as the manifestation 
of the real in the symbolic, the interruption of language that severs the subject from 
themselves:  
The privilege of a desire that lays siege to the subject cannot 
become obsolete unless this particular turn in the labyrinth, where 
the fire of an encounter has etched his coat of arms, has been taken 
a hundred times. Of course, the cipher of this encounter is not 
simply a print, but a hieroglyph, and may be transferred from one 
text to another. But all the metaphors in the world cannot exhaust 
its meaning, which is not to have any, since it is the mark of the 
iron with which death brands the flesh when the Word has 
disentangled flesh from love.248 
 
In this essay, as indeed in ‘A Love Letter,’ Lacan seems to differentiate between a 
desire for jouissance, which comes under the rubric of desire as such, and love. There 
is the implication here that love is concerned with language and its failure, whereas 
desire is concerned with jouissance, but also that it is impossible to disentangle love 
and desire. The network of relations, between love and desire, language and 
jouissance, has been constituted in much subsequent neo-Lacanian writing on 
homosexuality as simultaneously transcendent and destructive, as we will see. 
 
Desire, Jouissance and The Hommosexuelle. 
 
Strictly speaking, in Lacanian thought there is no such thing as homosexual desire, as 
desire is not “for” anything in particular (in this case a same-sex object) but is instead 
its own cause and effect. Desire only becomes hetero- or homo-sexual a posteriori, 
according to how its operation is manifested in actual experience. In the remarkable 
1972 polemic by Guy Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire, the point is made that 
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homosexuality is an expression of a form of desire that is about much more than 
same-sex coupling: 
If the homosexual image contains a complex knot of dread and 
desire, if the homosexual phantasy is more obscene than any other 
and at the same time more exciting, if it is impossible to appear 
anywhere as a self-confessed homosexual without upsetting 
families, causing children to be dragged out of the way and 
arousing mixed feelings of horror and desire, then the reason must 
be that for twentieth-century westerners there is a close connection 
between desire and homosexuality. Homosexuality expresses 
something – some aspect of desire – that appears nowhere else, and 
that something is not merely the accomplishment of the sexual act 
with a person of the same sex.249 
 
What, then, is this something else that homosexuality expresses? For Tim Dean, 
homosexuality expresses, indirectly and in popular form, desire’s disquietening 
disregard for gender and for persons. For Leo Bersani, it is the heterosexual fear that 
homosexual men are experiencing a privileged happiness that, despites its supposed 
normativised “superiority”, heterosexuality can never access. For Ellie Sullivan, 
homosexuality confronts heterosexuality with the sexual non-rapport and highlights 
the sexual lie upon which heterosexuality is founded.250 While all of these positions 
offer insights into models of queer subjectivity, they are not concerned particularly 
with an analysis of the ways in which their ideas can be manifested in visual and 
material culture. Thus in this chapter I will argue that, with reference to fashion, what 
homosexuality expresses is in fact another manifestation of jouissance that disrupts 
and brings disorder to the symbolic.  
 
As we have seen, fashion represents femininity in all of its forms, as the objet a of 
male fantasy and as the disruption of feminine jouissance, often embodying both of 
these contradictory positions at one and the same time. There is no case to be made 
for the presentation of subjectivity that fashion embodies ever being masculine. As 
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Lacan himself says, even virile display seems feminine.251 There is, then, the question 
of what it is about the hommosexuelle that may constitute a particular instance of 
feminine jouissance. Kaja Silverman has argued that the moments when the male 
subject embraces the castration, alterity and specularity that are more usually 
associated with the feminine, are central here. She suggests that there are:  
unexpected pleasures and possibilities that await the male subject 
when he renegotiates his relation to the Law of Language – when 
he accedes to his castration, his specularity and the profound 
“otherness” of his “self” by embracing desires and identifications 
which are in excess of the positive Oedipus complex. After even a 
partial glimpse of those pleasures and psychic possibilities, who 
would still opt for the straight and narrow path of conventional 
masculinity?252 
 
For Silverman, then, it is when the male subject encounters his corporeality and his 
otherness, that she says are usually denied in conventional masculinity, that the 
feminine makes its appearance. 
 
It is possible that the jouissance of the homosexuelle is feminine jouissance, however 
there is also the case to be made for it being an instance of transgressive jouissance. 
Hocquenghem suggests that desire is “dehumanised”, by which he means not that it is 
in some way outside of or beyond the human subject, but rather that should be 
understood in the broader sense of the philosophical tradition of anti-humanism which 
argues that man is not his own master but is instead subject to language, or social 
systems, or indeed his own unconscious. Thus he argues that “homosexual desire is 
neither on the side of death nor of life. It is the killer of civilised egos.”253 Desire, for 
Hocquenghem, is not a matter of conscious choice or of social obedience or 
disobedience. Instead it is a profound interruption of these things. In a sense this 
anticipates Leo Bersani’s argument in ‘Is The Rectum A Grave?’ which concludes 
that “male homosexuality advertises the risk of the sexual itself as the risk of self-
dismissal, of losing sight of the self, and in doing so it proposes and dangerously 
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represents jouissance as a mode of ascesis.”254 Both can be seen to be following the 
point made by Lacan in ‘The Youth of Gide, or The Letter and Desire,’ regarding the 
proximity of the death drive and the obliteration of the subject to that subject’s self-
realisation.  
 
There is a sense, in both Bersani and Hocquenghem, that what is at stake here is the 
obsolescence of a particular understanding of masculine subjectivity or selfhood. If 
we transpose their arguments into specifically Lacanian terms the case is made that 
homosexual desire in somehow dangerous or disruptive because it is not concerned 
with an effort to compensate for lack through the attainment of phallic jouissance, as 
is the case for desire in heterosexual men. It may be that it is more closely aligned 
with the excess of feminine jouissance, an alignment that is implicit in Bersani’s use 
of the word “ascesis”, which evokes precisely Lacan’s point regarding feminine 
jouissance as evidence that “God has not yet made his exit.” The point is not a 
theological one per se, but rather that jouissance is not of this world, which is to say it 
is not of the symbolic order, but rather of another order entirely, that of the real.255 
However, despite the implicit alignment with feminine jouissance, the negation of the 
self that Bersani identifies intimates that this is also, or instead, an instance of the 
jouissance of transgression, as we will see.  
 
Jouissance is the internal obstacle to the subject’s well being, insofar as it is never 
satisfied. The striving for the attainment of jouissance is a striving for an impossible 
goal, which means of course perpetual dissatisfaction. Civilisation cannot allow 
jouissance in its original state, it would be far too disruptive, and so it obliges a 
diluted version of the same that fails to satisfy. This, in essence, is the paradox of 
jouissance: that its permissible forms give the appearance of satisfaction when in fact 
they cause deep dissatisfaction, but this is the only way in which the subject can 
experience jouissance in a way that is sanctionable within the symbolic order. 
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In Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan devotes a session to what he 
calls ‘The Jouissance of Transgression.’ Transgression here means the violation of 
supposedly inalienable social laws, laws that underpin the very structure of the social 
world and whose transgression is an affront to or even an assault on the social world 
itself. Perversely, though, social laws derive their authority from the subject’s own 
inner aggressivity:  
Yet don’t you recognise there what we refer to in the most routine 
way each time we see a subject retreat from his own jouissance? 
What are we drawing attention to? To the unconscious aggression 
that jouissance contains to the frightening core of the destrudo, 
which we constantly find ourselves confronting in our analytic 
experience. 
 
Whether or not this view is ratified in the name of some pre-
conceived view of nature, it is nevertheless true that at the heart of 
everything Freud taught, one finds the following: the energy of the 
so-called superego derives from the aggression that the subject 
turns back upon himself.256  
 
 
For Lacan, then, the notion that injunctions towards certain modes of behaviour are 
generated externally to the subject and imposed upon them is problematic. He 
suggests that there is, if not a complicity then certainly a reciprocity, between law and 
those subject to the law.  
 
Jouissance is the supposed benefit one gets from both transgression of law and the 
inevitable conflict with the self that arises concurrently to such transgression, but this 
jouissance is ambivalent; it is ecstatic and destructive at one and the same time, and it 
is not without its consequences. Indeed, for Lacan it is “the moment when one 
perceives their consequences” that usually acts to prevent us committing transgressive 
acts, and so enjoying transgressive jouissance.257  The consequences Lacan is talking 
about here are nothing less than the dissolution of the self. He suggests that it is 
identification with the other that stops the subject from following a transgressive path; 
when recognition of the other occurs, an awareness of the consequences of a 
particular course of action comes into play and the subject is (usually) inspired to 
desist. Lacan cites the Marquis de Sade as one who goes beyond the limit of 
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recognition rather than turning back, and so represents the possibilities of the 
jouissance of transgression. It is the failure or the refusal to recognise oneself, and 
ones own inherent aggressivity, in the other, that represents the “going beyond” that 
Lacan identifies in de Sade’s work. The recognition of the other and of oneself in the 
other is the prime mechanism by which subjectivity is constituted, and to refuse to do 
so is to acknowledge the emptiness of subjectivity itself: 
What in French at least serves to designate the notion of the self or 
same (même), then, is this interior or emptiness, and I don’t know 
if it belongs to me or to nobody. 
 
That’s what the use of my sophism signifies; it reminds me that my 
neighbour possesses all the evil Freud speaks about, but it is no 
different from the evil I retreat from in myself. To love him, to love 
him as myself, is necessarily to move towards some cruelty. His or 
mine?, you will object. But haven’t I just explained to you that 
nothing indicates that they are distinct? It seems rather that they are 
the same, on condition that those limits which oblige me to posit 
myself opposite the other as my fellow man are crossed.258 
 
Leo Bersani argued from this that the jouissance of the hommosexuelle is in fact the 
jouissance of transgression.259 The negation of the self that is central to queer 
jouissance, as argued by Bersani, or even the suggestion of such negation, is 
profoundly transgressive because it ecstatically breaches the boundaries of the self, at 
the same time as it destroys the very limits of sociality. The visibility afforded to gay 
men by the AIDS epidemic has promoted the fear of homosexuality to the level of 
terrifying display, by showing on billboards and mainstream news channels, “the 
spectacle of men dying from [...] the suicidal ecstasy of taking their sex like a 
woman” and the notion of a community as cohesive and self-perpetuating is blown 
apart by the literal connection of sex and death.260 There is “nothing in common” 
Lacan writes, “between the satisfaction a jouissance affords its original state and that 
which it gives in the indirect or sublimated forms that civilisation obliges it to 
assume.”261  It may well be, then, that the satisfaction derived from queer jouissance 
is so far removed from what is usually permissible as to represent a disjuncture with 
it. Instead, what is suggested is a disruptive and challenging interjection of the real. 
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This idea, that sexuality pertains to the real, has been argued comprehensively 
elsewhere, by Joan Copjec, who uses Kant’s antinomies of reason to make her case, 
and by Tim Dean, who argues that sexuality is better understood in terms of its failure 
in discourse and images (symbolic and imaginary) rather than in its constitution in 
these frames.262 Copjec makes the case for sex belonging to the order of the real by 
arguing that sex is not some fluid, contingent entity, but rather that it: “does not 
budge, and it is not heterosexist to say so.”263  The heterosexist definition of sex relies 
on a symbolic relationality between the sexes, whereas the psychoanalytic definition 
of sex locates it in the real and so relationality is impossible. Sex “does not budge” 
because it is not reliant on any complementariness. It exists in and of itself. She also 
anticipates Dean’s point regarding sex manifesting itself in the failure of language, 
rather than language itself, when she argues that: “when we speak of languages failure 
with respect to sex, we speak not of its falling short of a prediscursive object, but of 
its falling into contradiction with itself. [...] Sex, then, is the impossibility of 
completed meaning, not (as Butler’s historicist/deconstructionist argument would 
have it) a meaning that is incomplete, unstable. Or, the point that sex is the structural 
incompleteness of language, not that sex itself is incomplete.”264 Copjec here is 
referring to Judith Butler’s thinking on matters of sex that were put forward in Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990) and Bodies That Matter: On 
the Discursive Limits Of "Sex" (1993), that I address later in this chapter. 
 
Tim Dean’s project is a queer reading of Lacan, one which recuperates 
psychoanalysis and puts it to a political purpose by demonstrating its efficacy within 
the field of queer theory, a field that has historically, quite understandably perhaps, 
had an aversion to psychoanalysis.265 Dean sees the Lacanian real as “always 
relational, oppositional in a subversive sense, rather than substantive.” He argues that 
it is the “de-essentialising, despecifying abstractness” that makes the real a 
conceptually useful tool in understanding sexuality, and specifically queer sexuality. 
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It is precisely the unutterability of the real that makes it resonant to debates around 
sex.  Dean argues that sex belongs to the order of the real because sex is encountered 
initially, in childhood sexuality, as “alien, unmasterable, unassimilable to its [the 
child’s] fledgling ego, and hence is ultimately traumatic.” Thus sexuality belongs to 
the order of the real because “the real – like trauma – is what resists assimilation to 
any imaginary or symbolic universe.”266 
 
These arguments are compelling and problematic in equal measure. Sexuality does 
not merely concern the unutterable real of the subject, but also pertains to the 
operation of their desire in relation to objects as well as how their sexuated subject 
position is constituted, and there are aspects of sexuation that almost certainly occur 
at the level of the symbolic, rather than the real: objet a, for instance, which I argued 
in the previous chapter functions as woman’s ambassador in the symbolic, is an 
instance where sex is not concerned with the real. The concept of the phallus, which 
defines sexed subjectivity according to the subject’s relation to it, also belongs very 
firmly in the symbolic. Nevertheless, sexuality is not entirely of the symbolic, and 
while it may not be entirely of the real, as Copjec and Dean suggest, it is nevertheless 
helpful to consider the real as the location of the aspects pertaining to sex that are in 
some way “problematic” in terms of their relation to the symbolic, in particular 
jouissance, in all its forms.  
 
Performance. 
 
Of all the arts, performance is striking for its immediacy. While there are a seemingly 
infinite number of variants that come under the umbrella of “performance,” from 
plays to opera to ballet to West End musicals to performance art, they all share one 
feature that makes them performance: They can only exist in the moment in which 
they occur. If a performance is recorded, broadcast or transcribed, it ceases to be 
performance and becomes instead the medium in which it is set, a video-tape, a 
television show, a script. Where the performance is repeated, it is never an actual 
repeat of the same performance, but an individuated instance of recurrence. No two 
performances are ever identical. It is these features of performance that make it 
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deeply resistant to any participation in the circulation of images that is a hallmark of 
contemporary media-centric representation economies, and in many regards 
performance is something of an anomaly in the field of creative practice.  
 
Although not discussing performance per se, Freud himself wrote extensively on 
plays and issues arising from spectatorship, from Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex as the basis 
for a fundamental developmental truth about the human psyche, to Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet as a dramatic paradigm of psychic processes. In ‘Psychopathic Characters on 
The Stage’ (1905) Freud discusses the purpose of theatre in terms of the audience’s 
relationship to it, arguing that the audience enter into some sort of collusion with the 
hero of the piece in order to live out their own internal conflicts. The audience can 
identify with the psychic conflicts in the hero’s mind and either enjoy the jouissance 
(as Lacan would have it) of his successes, or gain some sort of masochistic 
satisfaction from his failures. However, it is the art of the dramatist that makes this 
possible. If the play addresses impulses that are both conscious and repressed, 
according to Freud, the spectator needs to be neurotic in order to enjoy it, that is, 
someone likely to derive pleasure rather than aversion from the revelatory nature of 
the repressed material. For drama to “work”, which is to say for it to engage the 
“normal” rather than the neurotic spectator, the dramatist must artfully lower 
spectatorial resistance to the repressed material and in doing so facilitate an 
identification by the audience with the characters.267  
 
A key development in the relationship between theatre and psychoanalysis comes in 
André Green’s 1979 book, The Tragic Effect: The Oedipus Complex in Tragedy. 
Here, Green suggests that one can recognise “in all the products of mankind the traces 
of the conflicts of the unconscious.”268 In particular, he argues that theatrical 
performance occupies a mediatory space between the viewer and the social world, 
facilitating what he calls the “displacements of sublimation” that commute neuroses 
into theatrical pleasure. For Green, as for Freud, theatre contributes towards an 
“assuaging of unsatisfied or unsatisfiable desires” by providing a “yield of pleasure 
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from deeper psychical sources,” a partial discharge that springs from the exchange 
between revealment and the threat of further repression.”269  
 
There is the question, though, as to how much this holds for what has come to be 
called performance, as distinct from theatre, a branch of art that runs from the 
surrealist performance pieces of Artaud through to the so-called “happenings” of the 
1960s and thence to transgressive near-contemporary performance art such as Orlan 
(discussed in the previous chapter) and Leigh Bowery (to be discussed here.) In these 
instances the threat presented by repressed material is not diverted, and the effect is 
altogether more unsettling. Patrick Campbell has discussed these “transgressive” 
performance instances in what he calls “formulaic Freudian terms,” suggesting that 
bloody, visceral performance events can be seen as an attempt to unsettle the 
spectator’s psyche, to break down the divide between the superego and the id, 
between socially and culturally imposed patterns of behaviour and the drives of the 
libido.270  However, efforts to enact the psychic condition are deeply problematic. 
Gunther Berghaus reminds us that there are often consequences to such efforts, and 
cites the Viennese Actionists who, in the late 1960s, found themselves “in permanent 
conflict with state power” as a result of their performance-based activities.271 
Certainly the Operation Spanner case in the UK in 1987, in which a videotape of 
privately committed, consensual, homosexual, sadomasochistic sex acts ended up in 
the hands of the police and resulted in criminal convictions against the participants, 
suggests similarly that transgressive performances, even for a private audience, will 
invoke the opprobrium of the law upon the performers involved. The final appeal 
against convictions in this case was rejected by the European Court of Human Rights 
in 1997.  Kaja Silverman has demonstrated the extent to which our entire social 
reality depends on the maintenance of the illusion of the equation of the penis and the 
phallus.272 The damage inflicted to penises in the Operation Spanner video can be 
seen, in light of Silverman’s arguments, as a profound transgression of the social law 
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that sustains the illusory connection of penis-as-phallus, and the judicial response to 
the participants in the video is as aggressive in the defence of this law as the act that 
was filmed being committed was in breaching it. 
 
Of course, we must then ask why they do it? Why do performers in instances such as 
these actively seek to disturb their audience? They refuse the plaudits, ovations and 
awards that are presumed to be the usual motivation for those who work within the 
performing arts, preferring instead to cause nausea, outrage and distress in one degree 
or another, and those audience members who enjoy the performances are supposed to 
be as deviant as the performers themselves. I suggest that Lacan’s arguments 
regarding jouissance of transgression may well provide an interpretive strategy that 
will facilitate an understanding of these performances that extends beyond the usual 
terms of “shocking art.” 
 
Performativity. 
 
The continuum between life and art, or, more particularly, between the artist as 
subject in their own right and as creative producer, is the basis of Gavin Butt’s 
analysis of the lesser-known post-war American painter, Larry Rivers. Butt starts his 
review of Rivers with a reading of a photograph of Rivers in a magazine, which 
showed him in a variety of roles (saxophonist, sculptor, nightclub host) in front of his 
painting of a number of human faces, all shown as different, but sharing the 
commonality of montage. The corollary between the many talents of the artist and the 
multiple fragmentary images of people in his paintings is made in this photograph. 
This leads Butt to argue that there is in fact little division between the artist as subject 
and artist as creator, and that the two segue into one another to such an extent that 
they are indivisible. By drawing attention to “the aporetic tensions between the way 
Rivers is and the way Rivers acts” Butts suggests that it is performative enactments 
that make both the artist and the art. There is no difference between “self “and “work” 
here. Instead, they are “continuous with the performative being of Larry Rivers, who 
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can no more stop posing than he can stop being an artist since the very ‘being” of his 
artistic self is the posing.”273  
 
This argument is clearly derivative of Judith Butler’s profoundly influential 1990 
publication Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.  In this volume 
Butler cites drag acts as indicative of the impossibility of a core gender identity, 
saying that these very specialised performers and performances mock “both the 
expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender identity.”274 Drag, for 
Butler, is a paradigm of the failure of gender in real life, which illustrates in 
parodying gender how gender is itself a parody. Drag shows the emptiness of the 
original it ostensibly copies. What is of particular note in Butler’s thesis is her use of 
the term “performative.” Following from her analysis of drag, she argues that: 
Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of 
agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity 
tenuously constituted in time and space through a stylised 
repetition of acts. The effect of gender is produced through the 
stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the 
mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements and styles of 
various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self. 
This formulation moves the conception of gender off the ground of 
a substantial model of identity to one that requires a concept of 
gender as a constituted social temporality. Significantly, if gender 
is instituted through acts which are internally discontinuous, then 
the appearance of substance is precisely that, a constructed 
identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social 
audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to 
perform in the mode of belief.275 
 
While there is little with which we would wish to argue in Butler’s efforts to 
denaturalise gender and at the same time remove it from any notion of substantive 
social truth, her thesis is problematic for a number of reasons. Tim Dean, for instance, 
highlights the way in which her account of the body evacuates both desire and the 
subject from sexuality, while Joan Copjec argues for the necessity of the real and its 
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irreducibility to either materiality, language or social structure.276 What is necessary is 
a consideration of her understanding of gender as performative, as this idea has 
considerable currency and weight in contemporary feminism, queer theory and 
performance analysis, and its relevance, or not, to this chapter.  
 
The first issue is the conflation of performance with performative. Butler derives the 
latter from the former, although there is no direct or automatic connection between 
the two. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made for their being entirely separate 
entities. Performance is entirely and knowingly artificial, and there is a clear 
disjuncture between the performance and the performer doing the performance. The 
performer, at the end of the performance, takes off their costume and make-up and 
goes home. Even in the more radical instances of performance art, such as Orlan or 
Leigh Bowery, there is no suggestion that the performance is an artistic articulation of 
the artist themselves. Rather, these artists use performance conceptually, to question 
the very notion of selfhood or subjectivity itself. These performances are more 
concerned with the audience than they are with the artist. What is more, these 
performances take place within certain charmed enclosures, environments in which 
performance is possible, or indeed expected – art galleries, theatres, nightclubs, in 
major international cities. These performances are very much an urban cultural form, 
and it is therefore reasonable to suppose that if these performances were to take place 
outside of the charmed enclosures in which they are permissible, the performer may 
well be subject to hostility and opposition, as the Coober Pedy scene in the 1996 film 
The Adventures of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert suggests. Here, a drag queen from 
Sydney (played by Guy Pearce) goes out in full drag in a small mining community in 
the Australian outback, and is violently assaulted by several men of the town as a 
consequence. His performative parody of gender is very badly received by a group of 
miners, who have their own very clear ideas about gender.  
 
To extrapolate from the idea of a particular mode of performance that directly 
addresses questions of gender, to the claim that that the knowing artificiality of 
performance is something fundamental or common to all people in all circumstances, 
is a connection that is, in my view, untenable. Quite apart from anything else it 
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disregards any suggestion of the psychic processes by which gender is constituted, 
and that I have discussed at length throughout this thesis. Also, to commute 
performance to performativity, i.e. “repetitive and stylised acts,” posits a model of the 
subject that does not account for the many and complex psychic and social processes 
which shape and influence the subject and their interactions. While Butler is quite 
right to suggest that there is no core gender identity, and that there is no direct 
connection between what we understand as gender identity and any anatomical or 
biological distinction of the categories of man and woman, to understand gender in 
terms of a performativity that is derivative of performance instead is problematic. 
Gender to my mind is not “instituted in an exterior space through a stylised repetition 
of acts”277 but is instead constituted at the level of the unconscious, which has little or 
nothing to do with either anatomy or social mores. It is in fact all about the subject. 
Without the subject there is no gender, normativised or otherwise, and we can say that 
without suggesting that gender is in some way a “core” to the subject themselves.  
 
In fairness to Butler, she addressed many of the concerns that arose following the 
publication of Gender Trouble in her next book, Bodies That Matter (1993).278 Here 
she seeks to address the materiality of the body, something that was conspicuous by 
its absence in Gender Trouble. Unfortunately this book follows Gender Trouble in 
that although she mentions various psychoanalytic concepts they do not underpin her 
arguments in any meaningful way; for instance, in the chapter ‘Arguing With The 
Real’ she actually argues with Zizek and his take on the real, rather than the concept 
of the real itself. She is also particularly concerned with the ways in which the sexed 
subject is constituted in relation to their own body, and again does not make any 
reference to the psychic processes that are in psychoanalytic terms essential to any 
consideration of sex.  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, then, the way in which Leigh Bowery’s life and work 
reflects on the concept of sexual desire and sexuated subjectivity will be central. We 
will not be speculating on the man himself, nor will we consider him as paradigmatic 
of a human commonality. If there is a continuum between the man and his work, such 
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as the one suggested by Gavin Butt in his analysis of Larry Rivers (above) it will be 
considered in terms of the articulation of particular psychic processes and phenomena, 
and not as a voluntarist continuum between performance and subjectivity of the kind 
suggested by Butler and her followers. Where the word performativity is used in this 
chapter, it will be used in the sense of art criticism, and not in the Butlerian sense.  
 
In art criticism, the term performativity has been used to describe the process by 
which external influences become a part of the subject’s own thoughts. This is, in 
fact, how Peggy Phelan uses the term when she says: 
The interaction between the art object and the spectator is, 
essentially, performative – and therefore resistant to the claims of 
validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction. 
While the art historian of painting must ask if the reproduction is 
accurate and clear, Calle [the artist under discussion] asks where 
seeing and memory forget the object itself and enter the subject’s 
own set of personal meanings and associations.279  
 
Here, Phelan is making the case for the dynamic and active exchange that is the 
viewer’s encounter with an artwork, suggesting that it is a process of on-going 
engagement rather than a static and temporal encounter. 
 
Art, Language, Performance. 
 
In linguistics, the notion of a performative utterance embodies much the same 
dynamism as the performative exchange of art criticism. The utterance is an 
undertaking to do something, a commitment, and is an action in and of itself: “I 
promise,” “I beg,” and so on. The linguist and philosopher J.L. Austin first identified 
performative utterances and defined them as speech acts which neither describe nor 
report, but instead are actions in and of themselves, and he cites “I name this ship 
Queen Elizabeth” and “I give and bequeath my watch to my brother” as examples.280 
Forms of speech, then, are allied with performance in terms of their immediacy and 
their unrepeatability, and we see that the notion of performativity is connected more 
generally to an active and processual mode of operation that suggests an interaction 
                                                
279 Phelan, Unmarked, p. 147. 
280 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (London: Oxford University Press, 
1962), p. 5. 
  149 
between subject and language that is untraceable beyond the instant in which it 
occurs.  
 
In his influential paper ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic 
Disturbance’ (1956), Roman Jakobson cited the two tropes of metaphor and 
metonymy as being fundamental to language. He identified two types of aphasia (loss 
of language skills and cognition due to illness or injury): similarity disorder, related to 
errors of metonymy, such as saying knife when they meant fork, and contiguity 
disorder where the sufferer has a problem combining words and uses, for instance, 
magnifier for microscope.281 From this Jakobson argued that metaphor and 
metonymy, or selection and combination, are the two basic axes of language. 
Metaphor is the vertical axis, based on selection, substitution and similarity, and 
metonymy is the horizontal axis of combination, context and contiguity.   
 
When Lacan famously declared, “the unconscious is structured like a language” he 
made clear the structural connections between the subject and the order in which they 
operate, which is, of course, the symbolic order, the world of language. The tropes of 
language are evident in the operation of the unconscious, for Lacan, and are denoted 
in the concepts of metaphor and metonymy. In ‘The Instance of the Letter in the 
Unconscious’ he sets out how language, and so by definition the symbolic order, fails, 
in the first instance, and the mechanisms it has in place to circumvent that failure.  
 
Taking Saussurian linguistics as a starting point, he argues that the signifier and the 
signified are not separate entities, but instead are integral to one another. He tells an 
anecdote about two children in a train carriage, sitting opposite each other by the 
window. One looks out at a station and exclaims, “look, we’re at ladies!” to which the 
other responds “imbecile! Can’t you see we’re at gentlemen?”282 The point here is 
that the signifier is arbitrary, relational and contingent, and it is the signifier that 
demonstrates the impossibility of meaning. For Lacan language fails through its 
inability to express the unknowability of the unconscious. There is, for Lacan, always 
something missing in the arbitrary distinctions that language sets in place. 
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For Lacan, as for Jakobson, metaphor and metonymy are central to the operation of 
language. Put simply, metonymy is where one word is substituted for another directly. 
For instance, one might say “plastic” when one means “credit card”, or “Whitehall” 
when one means the British government, “a Renoir” for “a painting by Renoir”, and 
so on. Metonymy relies on relationships and connections that have a conceptual basis, 
rather than a direct or literal one. Metaphor is based instead of a similarity in spite of 
surface difference, whereby the substituted word has some connection in meaning 
with its substitute – such as “the school of hard knocks” referring to life experience. 
Metaphor is reproductive in the sense that it erases difference and produces 
similarities, while metonymy can be seen as associative and maintains arbitrariness. 
In using these terms, Lacan’s point is that metaphor makes the unsayable sayable, it is 
the means by which we circumvent the failure of language, where metonymy by 
contrast ensures that the unsayable remains precisely that, but its unsayability is 
accented rather than hidden, as it is under metaphor. Thus he argues that:  
We see that metaphor is situated at the precise point at which 
meaning is produced in non-meaning – that is at the passage which, 
as Freud discovered, when crossed in the opposite direction, gives 
rise to the word that is ‘the word’ par excellence in French, the 
word that has no other patronage there than the signifier esprit – 
and which it becomes palpable that in deriding the signifier, man 
defies his very destiny.  
 
But to return to metonymy now, what does man find in it, if it must 
be more than the power to skirt the obstacles of social censure? 
Doesn’t this form, which gives the oppressed truth its field, 
manifest a certain servitude that is inherent in its presentation?283 
 
The linguistic devices of metaphor and metonymy are linked to the operation of the 
unconscious by their connection with Freud’s terms of condensation and 
displacement. Condensation is allied with metaphor by virtue of what it makes 
possible to articulate, and displacement is allied to metonymy because it is “the 
unconscious’ best means by which to foil censorship.”284 Crucially, though, Lacan 
argues that while metaphor is the means of analysis itself (“metaphor’s two-stage 
mechanism is the very mechanism by which symptoms, in the analytic sense, are 
determined”) metonymy avoids analysis and is instead the manifestation in language 
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(and so the symbolic) of desire.285 The elision between signifiers that metonymy 
operates is a disregard for the bar between signifier and signified that facilitates 
precisely the order and structure of language. Because of their position in 
foregrounding the unsayable, metonymic processes suggest, in psychoanalytic terms, 
the possibility of jouissance, with all the disruption that that entails: “For the 
symptom is a metaphor, whether one likes to admit it or nor, just as desire is 
metonymy, even if man scoffs at the idea.”286 Thus, Lacan’s account of linguistic 
process, specifically through the dual axes of language, brings us back to the idea of  
a voice and a radical disruption at the heart of representation.   
 
Performance As Metonymy. 
 
It is here that we can return to the temporality of performance set out at the start of 
this chapter. In her illuminating essay ‘The Ontology of Performance: Representation 
Without Reproduction,’ Peggy Phelan links performance to the dissolution of the 
subject when she argues: “Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity 
proposed here, becomes itself through its disappearance”287 There is a sense 
suggested by Phelan in which the disappearing act that performance conducts in order 
to bring itself into being is a paradigm of human subjectivity itself, and what we are 
identifying with when we watch a performance is in fact an acknowledgement of the 
tenuousness of our very selves.  
 
Phelan has taken Lacan’s idea of metaphor and metonymy, whereby metonymy is one 
of the chief structuring devices of language, one that belongs to the axis of 
displacement and that offers the possibility of a potentially infinite deferral of 
meaning, and used it as an interpretive framework by which performance can be 
understood. By linking metonymy to the body in particular, Phelan suggests a model 
of desire arising in performance that we can understand in terms of interminable, 
impossible, desire, subjectivity and jouissance, and adds, as I will show, a new 
dimension to these terms that references a specific model of the staging of desire. The 
body in performance is a metonym of subjective presence, but the performer 
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themselves disappears, and represents something else, something integral to the 
performance, such as movement, sound, character or art.  She argues that 
“performance uses the performers body to pose a question about the inability to 
secure the relation between subjectivity and the body per se; performance uses the 
body to frame the lack of Being promised by and through the body – that which 
cannot appear without a supplement.”288 This is particularly the case when the body in 
question is feminine. The act of making it visible not only requires a supplement, an 
addition of some sort, it is this addition that becomes the object of the spectators gaze, 
“in much the same way the supplement functions to secure and displace the fixed 
meaning of the (floating) signifier. Just as her body remains unseen ‘in itself as it 
really is,’ so too does the sign fail to produce the referent.”289 It is my contention here, 
as in the previous chapter, that the addition, the supplement that renders the feminine 
body visible, is its ornamentation by dress. 
 
The metonymic relationship between the performer and the performance elides 
straightforward interpretation, and is, for Phelan, an active resistance to metaphor, 
particularly the metaphor, as she sees it, of gender. She argues, moreover, that 
performance is by definition feminine, in the same way that Lacan has suggested that 
even masculine “virile display” is somehow feminine as I mentioned earlier. Phelan 
also argues that if femininity is, as Lacan suggested in Seminar XX, that which cannot 
be said, metonymy is one of the devices by which the feminine can appear.290 
Performance, then, by virtue of its metonymic features, can be seen as a legitimised 
space in which the feminine can be articulated. By the same token though, in resisting 
the reduction of two into one that is the operation of metaphor, performance can also 
be seen to engage or indeed enact something in excess of linguistic structure, which is 
to say the real. The displacement of metonymy marks the body as loss and thereby 
figures the representation of desire. Phelan has suggested that this feature of 
performance involves a complex process of recognition and misrecognition: “the 
drama of misrecognition (twins, actors within characters enacting other characters, 
doubles, crimes, secrets, etc) which sometimes produces the recognition of the desire 
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to be seen by (and within) the other. Thus for the spectator the performance spectacle 
is itself a projection of the scenario in which their own desire takes place.”291    
 
We can conclude from this that when what the feminine signifies in the symbolic - 
lack, loss, castration, jouissance – is manifested in performance, performance 
functions for the audience as a site of interjection of the real. In the spectacle of 
performance art, particularly the brutal forms under discussion in this chapter, the 
performer, or at least their body, is posited “as a metonymy for the apparently non-
reciprocal experience of pain” which calls upon the audience to “do the impossible” 
and witness the intrusion of death into the presence of the “live.”292 It will follow, 
then, that performance also has the potential to invoke precisely the transgressive 
jouissance that engenders (and is engendered by) nothing less than the dissolution of 
the self. This was identified by Hocquenghem and Bersani (and indeed Lacan) as 
crucial to male homosexuality, as we saw earlier in this chapter, and I suggest that 
performance is a particular moment in art where these issues and themes can be seen 
to coalesce.  
 
Leigh Bowery. 
 
Leigh Bowery (1961-1994) has been variously described as a club promoter, dancer, 
performance artist, fashion designer, queer activist, and artist’s muse. He was all of 
these things, but even, or especially, considered together they fail to sum up the iconic 
figure that was Leigh Bowery. An out and practising homosexual who died of an 
AIDS-related illness, his life was devoted to creative practice in all its forms, and his 
bizarre trademark costumes (he never, ever dressed “normally”) presented an 
equivocal erotic visuality that far transcends any notion of drag. His performances 
relied on the scatological (enemas were a regular feature) and the corporeal (he 
famously “gave birth” to his wife, Nicola, who had been hidden under his costume 
during the show) but curiously he is perhaps remembered best for the Lucien Freud 
paintings of him, a series of nude studies.  
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Let us, then, consider each of these aspects of Leigh Bowery in turn: his costumes, his 
performances, and his portraits, as they are the key features of his creative life, which 
began in 1980 when he moved to London at the age of 19 and continued until about 
eight weeks before his death on 31st December 1994. It should be noted that his 
influence and notoriety grew exponentially following a landmark performance at the 
Anthony D’Offay Gallery in London in October 1988. In this, Bowery performed 
behind a two-way mirror. All he could see was his own reflection, but beyond that the 
audience sat and watched. These performances were remarkable in that they 
combined all elements of Bowery’s creative work in one instance – costume, 
performance and art. They took place every night for a week, he wore a different 
costume each time, and they brought Bowery to the attention of the British painter 
Lucien Freud, for whom he would later sit. More importantly though, they also, 
arguably, reinstated the centrality of performance art to creative practice and lifted the 
genre out of the hiatus it had been in since its heyday of the late 1960s and early 
1970s.293 The work discussed in this chapter, then, is from 1988 – 1994. There is a 
chronology of Bowery’s life and work set out in Fergus Greer’s 2002 book Leigh 
Bowery: Looks although it should be noted that each aspect was concurrent rather 
than consecutive.294 His performance art, his collaborations, his role as muse, and his 
outrageous costumes, were part and parcel of the life of Leigh Bowery rather than 
discreet projects that were started and completed; the man, his life and his work are 
inseparable.  
 
Leigh Bowery and The Presentation of Self.  
 
Bowery’s costumes changed on an almost daily basis, but there are two features that 
come up repeatedly in them that can be linked together thematically. Importantly 
these features are the ones by which individuals are recognised as either male or 
female in the social world.  
 
Firstly there is the artificial creation of perceived gender-specific physical 
characteristics; Bowery was a corpulent figure who would tape his chest fat together 
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to give the appearance of breasts. He would also often obscure his male genitalia and 
on occasion wear a merkin (a pubic wig) to give the impression, if not the authentic 
appearance, of female genitalia. He relied purely on the most sacrosanct and 
culturally loaded corporeal signifiers of sexed subjectivity, breasts and genitals, as 
signifiers of femininity. In doing so, he questioned (and obliged his viewers to 
question) the assumed integrity of the sexed body. The second identifier by which the 
social world usually recognizes people is the face. Bowery’s head would often be 
covered completely by an enormous pompom, or else partially obscured with a mask, 
and/or a hat or headdress, and/or make-up. Occasionally he would make use of the 
piercings in each of his cheeks to affix a perspex ring in front of his mouth, giving 
himself the appearance of a blow-up doll. His head and facial features were inevitably 
disguised in some way, and the disguise was almost always gender-neutral. He never 
made himself look feminine, or “like a woman,” or an approximation of a woman, as 
drag queens and transvestites do. On the contrary, he went out of his way to make his 
facial features as unrecognisable as possible.  
 
In terms of the costumes themselves, Bowery would wear anything that suited the 
purpose of a particular look, including skirts, body-stockings and catsuits, so-called 
“bumster” trousers (which is to say trousers that expose the buttocks, for which he 
was once nearly arrested and which were later taken up by Alexander McQueen), and 
high-heeled and/or platform-soled boots and shoes. Importantly, although all of these 
items are more usually associated with women (except perhaps bumster trousers, 
which conspicuously failed to become popular), when they were worn by Bowery, 
there was no suggestion that they might be considered “women’s clothing.” There 
was nothing transvestic or drag about Bowery. He was never just a man in woman’s 
clothing, he was never a female impersonator. Bowery is of a very different order all 
together. His costuming argues that femininity and masculinity have little if anything 
to do with the body, and his efforts at the corporeal manifestations of masculinity and 
femininity fall far short of manifesting either of them to any degree of satisfaction. 
This failure was in fact a deliberate creative strategy, as we can see from a diary entry 
that he wrote as far back as 1981:  
I believe that fashion (where all the girls have blue eyes, blonde 
blow-waved hair and a size 10 figure, and all the men have clear 
skin, a moustache, short blow-waved hair, a masculine physique 
and appearance) STINKS. I think that there should be no main 
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rules for behaviour and appearance. Therefore I want to look as 
best I can through my means of individuality and expressiveness. 
[...] Firstly, being opposite to established images and trends 
Secondly we are creating not mimicing [sic] – another constant. 
And thirdly and very importantly we (and this is one of my 
strongest beliefs) batter down the stereotype sex male-female roles 
and use anything to achieve an effect, and constantly encroach on 
sacredly classified MENS OR WOMENS territory. This in one of 
my principle ideas and this motivates my appearance and most 
friendships.295  
 
Bowery uses costume to suggest the instability of both the masculine and the 
feminine. The Lacanian idea from Seminar XX that “nothing can be said of Woman” 
is Bowery’s point exactly, with the addition that although the masculine has an 
assumed stability in language, the hommosexuelle evidences the potential failure of 
masculinity just as surely as it evidences the failure of Woman.  
 
I argued in the previous chapter that fashion is at its most radical when it is a 
manifestation of feminine jouissance. John Galliano is on record as saying that “when 
a man sees a woman in my dress, I want him to think ‘I have to fuck her’” while 
Alexander McQueen produces garments that make men look at the woman and think 
“I wouldn’t dare!” These two design philosophies are paradigmatic of the different 
ways in which the feminine relates to the masculine in the Symbolic, as objet a, which 
offers the potential for both merely phallic jouissance and the disruptive, anarchic 
feminine jouissance There is a sense in which Leigh Bowery pre-empts the this 
debate, as it is played out in Galliano’s and McQueen’s collections, although his 
interest in the feminine is qualitively different from that of couture, as we will see. In 
particular, Bowery uses fashion to resist the structural logic of sexuation and desire, 
especially as it pertains to the feminine. He uses dress in two ways; firstly to articulate 
the hommosexuelle and the occupation of a feminine subject position by a biological 
male and so disrupt masculinity and heteronormativity, and secondly to introduce the 
impossibility of feminine jouissance, and, more importantly, the disorder of 
transgressive jouissance, into the symbolic. 
 
                                                
295 Leigh Bowery, diary entry, 28th January 1981, reproduced in Take a Bowery: The 
Art and (Larger Than) Life of Leigh Bowery (Sydney: Museum of Contemporary Art, 
2004) pp. 165-167. 
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The question of performance arises at this point, and the extent to which Bowery’s 
use of costumes can be considered performance. I suggest that although they might 
not be deemed performance in the usual theatrical or artistic sense of the word, 
Bowery’s creative output here can be talked about in the same terms as performance 
for several reasons. They take place, for the most part, in environments where 
performance is anticipated, and that are at one remove at least from domestic or 
working environments; in this instance they occur in nightclubs in central London, 
where unusual and non-normative characterisation of the self is encouraged, and that 
are quite literally several thousand miles away from Bowery’s small home town of 
Sunshine, Australia. There is an immediacy to the garments that suggests that once 
they are removed from the wearer they become, in the words of one magazine editor, 
“a wardrobe of wilted relics.”296 In this regard we can see that fashion and 
performance share the feature of immediacy, they can only exist in the moment. There 
is the sense that in wearing these costumes in nightclubs, and also at other events like 
the various Gay Pride marches and festivals he attended in the UK and abroad, he is 
presenting an artistic piece of work to an audience. There is also the sense that other 
attendees are, however informally, Bowery’s audience. In viewing pictures of these 
costumes after his death, particularly pictures of them as they were worn in actual 
situations (as opposed to a photo shoot, for instance) we begin to get a sense of the 
position of being in an audience of Leigh Bowery’s, or indeed of having an audience 
with Leigh Bowery, and in the triptych I discuss below we see quite clearly one 
audience member engaging directly with Bowery’s performance.   
 
By virtue of their having an on-going quality with no distinct start or end Bowery’s 
performances fit in with the definition of performativity set out by Phelan (discussed 
above) which suggests that an encounter between viewer and art is an on-going 
process of engagement and a dynamic and active exchange. Bowery and his costumes 
were sufficiently well-known for him to be invited to these clubs as a guest of honour, 
or to be employed as the host and public face of the club as was the case with the 
Taboo nightclub with which he was most famously associated, on the grounds that his 
presence would add value or credibility of some sort to the night. All of this can be 
seen as indicative of his creative perpetuity – arguably even the club opening hours 
                                                
296 Mariuccia Casadio, in her introduction to Greer, Leigh Bowery: Looks.  
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did not impinge upon the artistic position generated by his costumes, which clearly 
extended well beyond the club nights themselves.     
 
More importantly for our purposes though, Phelan’s idea that the body in performance 
is metonymic will be helpful in interpreting the many aspects of Bowery’s work. The 
body in performance, her argument goes, is a metonym, but for some aspect of the 
performance (a character, for instance, or movement or sound, or art), rather than the 
performer themselves. The performer’s subjective presence is lost, thus suggesting the 
disjuncture between the body and subjectivity. Moreover the body itself can only 
appear in performance through an addition of some other aspect or element, it can 
never appear in its own right. 
 
This raises two questions regarding Bowery’s club performances that we are 
discussing here. Firstly, if Bowery’s body is functioning metonymically in the 
performance for some aspect of the performance (and not for Bowery himself), what 
is it that his body is standing metonymically for?  Secondly, if the body can only 
appear in performance through an addition or supplement, what is that addition or 
supplement that makes the body appear here, if indeed it can be said to appear at all? 
The body in these performances, I propose, stands for the lack that is at the heart of 
subjectivity and that is obscured by dress. This lack is what is central to Bowery’s 
performance, it is this lack that he is articulating through his costumes, and it is this 
lack that his body stands for metonymically in his performances. And what is the 
addition that enables the body to appear? I suggest it is the addition of costume. The 
costumes, then, serve a double and contradictory purpose – they allow the metonymic 
function of the body in performance, and they also allow the body to elide this 
metonymy and appear in its own right. This radical and contradictory dualism is what 
makes Bowery such a unique and iconic phenomenon. 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that it is the feminine body that stands for lack and 
must be covered, and that couture is an essential aspect of the veil that is femininity. 
What we see with Bowery is that the hommosexuelle, because of his sexuated subject 
position, is able to allow the masculine body to stand for lack too. The adoption of 
seemingly feminine corporeal characteristics in conjunction with the maintenance of 
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the masculine aspects of the body suggests also that masculinity is not as secure as it 
might wish to be.    
 
What we see coalescing around the figure of Leigh Bowery are instances of 
hommosexuelle transgression that can be understood in terms of both psychoanalysis 
and performance. The artwork that is Leigh Bowery can be seen as performance art 
that is enacting a performative manifestation of transgressive jouissance and that is 
contingent upon a negation of the self. Performance ceases to exist immediately it 
comes into being. It must do this in order to be performance. If Bowery constitutes his 
subjectivity as performance art, which, uniquely, he did, this means that Bowery is 
enacting in his own life/art the very dissolution of the subject. His performances 
suggest the obsolescence of the subject, and specifically the masculine subject. The 
fact that Bowery’s performances self-consciously engage with visual signifiers of the 
feminine merely augment this, by demonstrating the inherent instability of 
masculinity, and gender more generally, in the symbolic. Central to any 
understanding of Leigh Bowery is the idea that he not only transgresses social mores 
but, more importantly, that he rides roughshod over the underpinnings of sociality 
itself. 
 
When masculine subjectivity is rendered obsolete, as it is by Bowery, questions of 
meaning arise. It is an instance of metonymy not least because although the failure of 
the masculine is unthinkable in the symbolic, the masculine is in fact on much shakier 
ground than it realises. Metonymic slippage in both performance and language is, 
then, a way of circumventing the ego, the censorship that would have us believe that 
masculinity is more fixed and stable than is in fact the case. Bowery’s costumes are 
just such a metonymic slippage, precisely because they foreground the problems with 
masculinity that are habitually repressed.  
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Leigh Bowery, 1991. 
 
The first picture is of Bowery and his long-term companion and later wife, Nicola 
Bateman, at the club Kinky Gerlinky in Leicester Square in 1991. Despite Bowery’s 
homosexuality he appears nevertheless to have enjoyed receiving female love and 
devotion, and Nicola Bateman was one of several women who fulfilled this role in 
Bowery’s life. Bowery’s friend and biographer, Sue Tilley, described their 
relationship in these terms: “However horrible Leigh was to Nicola he loved the way 
she loved him. He liked the way she would cuddle him and stroke him, because of his 
strange sex life in public toilets he missed out on those things so Nicola fulfilled that 
part of his life for him. He wanted to keep her happy so that she would continue to 
look after him [...] He dreaded the thought of Nicola going off with someone else so 
eventually he decided to marry her.”297 In this picture her supporting role in the on-
going artwork that was Leigh Bowery is evident, and nowhere more so than in the 
                                                
297 Tilley, Leigh Bowery, pp. 90-92. 
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juxtaposition of her outfit and his. However outrageously dressed she may seem, she 
is positively demure when compared to Bowery himself. 
 
What we see in this picture is how Bowery utterly transforms the notion of feminine 
subjectivity as being in some way particular to woman. On the face of it at least part 
of this costume comes straight from a standard women’s wardrobe. The coral 
coloured pencil skirt and elbow length gloves are the acme of elegance and would not 
look out of place on a Hitchcock heroine. The rest of the outfit, however, is doing 
something rather different. The pompom head framed by a quadruple height collar 
and the beach-ball pregnancy bump positioned abnormally high, balanced, in fact, on 
Bowery’s own belly, suggest that this is much more than mere clothing. The contrast 
between normative and non-normative garments draws attention to the normativising 
facet of fashion and how the assumption that it is a visual correlation between the 
female and the feminine is in fact misplaced. Bowery is demonstrating that the 
feminine has no direct or automatic correlation to the female and that he, a male, may 
quite feasibly occupy a feminine position just as well as any woman. The wilful 
bizarreness of the costume argues that fashion is entirely artificial. By making the 
outfit simultaneously so familiar and so grotesquely strange, Bowery is arguing that 
all dress is significatory simulation and that the assumptions around sexuated 
subjectivity that are predicated on dress are, by extension, entirely misplaced. 
 
Despite the idea that the hommosexuelle believes that the Woman does exist, Bowery 
seems also to engage with Lacan’s point, that she cannot appear in the symbolic and 
that fashion is her ambassador. He uses dress here to inscribe on his own body the 
impossibility of woman; he seems to be saying, “if I can be a woman, anyone can,” 
or, alternatively “look, woman doesn’t exist, she is merely what we make her out of, 
or into.” If femininity is constituted in cultural terms through dress, what Bowery is 
saying here is precisely that the feminine is inarticulable except through dress, and 
moreover look how easy it is to tell lies, to make up stories, to “dress up” the “truth”, 
if indeed there is a “truth” of femininity at all. 
 
The faux pregnancy bump in the first picture and the faux beasts and merkin in the 
second both confront any suggestion of corporeal integrity. The body can very easily 
be contorted, distorted, to the point where these manipulations remove the idea of the 
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body having any boundary at all. In demonstrating the impossibility of corporeal 
integrity in the ways that he does, through his costumes, we can assume that Bowery 
must have suffered no small degree of discomfort or even real pain. He will have had 
virtually no vision in the first picture, in both cases eating, drinking and even 
speaking will have been difficult, and in the second picture urination will have been 
impossible. This will have lasted for up to ten or twelve hours. While fashion has 
always expected women to suffer at least a little (as anyone who has ever worn a 
corset or a pair of high heeled shoes will attest) it is unusual for a man to embrace 
such extreme discomfort in the pursuit of sartorial exploration. For Bowery to 
undertake the physical endurance his costumes require attests to a transcendence or 
ascesis that comes from negating physical pain in the pursuit of a higher purpose. 
Bowery suffered for his art in the same way that saints and mystics suffered for their 
spiritual enlightenment, and both are indicative of the otherworldliness of feminine 
jouissance. He is acknowledging in sartorial terms the pain and discomfort that is the 
feminine in the symbolic, and the arduousness that is being a woman. Where he is 
saying “if I can be a woman, anyone can,” there is also the assumption that very few 
men would take up the challenge set down by Bowery and willingly put themselves in 
that position, even though it may well be perfectly feasible to do so.   
 
Leigh Bowery, 1990 
 
 
The second picture is from 1990 and was taken at a club called Cambodia, again in 
London. Here we see Bowery presenting a similar challenge to the one in the previous 
picture, but this time to masculinity. The outfit in its entirety included a floor-length 
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pink ruffled tulle cape, but that was jettisoned upon arrival at the club, leaving the 
gold tasselled brassiere, the merkin and the cloche hat we see in the picture.  His use 
of a merkin and his hiding of his own genitals is a performed embodiment of the 
castration threat that defines masculine subjectivity. The castration threat is a 
precondition of masculine subjectivity (the masculine subject cannot enter the 
symbolic unless they have acknowledged and submitted to symbolic castration) and is 
embodied by women. By demonstrating that threat in such a public manner, he 
undermines men’s inexplicable enthusiasm for their own penises, firstly, but more 
importantly he enacts the psychic process by which man comes into being, and 
demonstrates the artificiality of the masculine position. Notably, he is not attempting 
to “pass” as a woman. His body, despite its distortions, remains resolutely male, but it 
is a male body that has breasts and lacks a penis. He is revealing here, both literally 
and figuratively, that the corporeal signifiers that we associate with sexed subjectivity 
are in fact misleading, and that sexed subjectivity has little if anything to do with the 
visual characteristics of the body.   
 
Given the extent to which the masculine position is privileged within patriarchal 
terms, to demonstrate its artificiality is a radical and courageous act. Drag queens play 
the game. They maintain the veil of femininity that disguises the fundamental lack 
(i.e. castration) at the heart of human subjectivity. As I discussed in the previous 
chapter, it has been argued, by Michelle Montrelay and others, that femininity is a 
veil, that there is in fact nothing behind the masquerade other than the impossibility of 
the feminine. Leigh Bowery lifts that veil, and in doing so instigates an instance of 
disruption, where the real can appear within the symbolic from which it is usually 
excluded. When this happens, we realise precisely how unstable meaning is. The 
anarchic volatility of hommosexuelle sexuality suggests the possibility of a jouissance 
that is both destructive and transcendent.  
 
Leigh Bowery and Performance Art. 
 
Besides his costumed nightclub appearances, Leigh Bowery was active in the field of 
performance art, and worked both collaboratively and independently throughout his 
career. He performed with the Michael Clark Dance Company, and in films by the 
New York filmmaker Charles Atlas. He performed solo, in the Anthony D’Offay 
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Gallery in London and in department store windows in Tokyo. He formed his own 
performance groups, the most successful of which was Minty. In all of these he 
incorporated his use of costume as integral to the performance itself, and they all 
formalised the protest he registered through his use of costumes in everyday life. 
 
In his collaborative work he developed themes from his costumes, discussed above, 
and the solo performances likewise were extensions of the effect of costumes that he 
explored so successfully at the London nightclub Taboo and elsewhere. It was 
arguably with his last group, Minty, though, that Bowery consolidated the concerns 
that preoccupied him in his creative output, and developed new ideas and responses to 
these concerns. As with his costumes there were two key recurring motifs that were 
used in his performances with Minty, and it is these that I would like to consider here. 
These motifs are enemas, he would give himself an enema on stage, and enacted 
childbirth, where he “gave birth” to his wife Nicola who had been hiding, upside 
down in a sling, underneath his costume. 
 
We should be quite clear: Bowery’s performances were brutal, visceral, gruesome, at 
best tasteless, at worst horrific. Even looking at pictures, long after the event has 
passed, one may well be struck by the desire to avert ones eyes. One may well cringe 
at the idea of a performer expelling an enema over the front row of an audience, but 
one is truly repulsed by seeing it. The horror of childbirth (exploited so successfully 
by the director Ridley Scott in the film Alien (1979)) is similarly taboo, and fit for 
public consumption only in factual documentaries and educational DVDs.298 It is not 
habitually employed as an enacted artistic strategy. One can only speculate on the 
experience of seeing these performances in real life.  
 
What Bowery is engaging with in his exploitation of corporeal taboos is what Julia 
Kristeva has identified as the abject. The abject is that which nauseates and repulses 
for no logical reason. Despite its manifest materiality it is not an object in the 
psychoanalytic sense because it is not other to the subject. It is instead an aspect of 
                                                
298 In Alien, one of the film’s characters, played by John Hurt, is attacked by an alien 
that attached itself to his face and, we later find out, impregnated him with alien eggs. 
He is taken back to the space ship where he “gives birth” to an alien that bursts out of 
his chest. 
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every subject’s psychic life that is oppositional to the portion of psychic life known as 
the superego. Kristeva uses the example of the skin on a cup of warm milk to describe 
the operation of the abject on the subject:  
Along with the sight-clouding, the dizziness, nausea makes me 
balk at that milk cream, separates me from my mother and father 
who proffer it. “I” want none of that element, sign of their desire; 
“I” do not want to listen, “I” do not assimilate it, “I” expel it. But 
since the food is not an “other” for “me”, who am only in their 
desire, I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself. That detail, 
perhaps an insignificant one, but one that they ferret out, 
emphasise, evaluate, that trifle turns me inside out, guts sprawling; 
it is thus that they see that “I” am in the process of becoming an 
other at the expense of my own death. During that course in which 
“I” become, I give birth to myself amid the violence of sobs, of 
vomit. Mute protest of the symptom, shattering violence of a 
convulsion that, to be sure, is inscribed in the symbolic system, but 
in which, without either wanting or being able to become integrated 
in order to answer it, it reacts, it abreacts. It abjects.299 
 
The abject is not a metaphor. It does not signify. Instead it shows directly, “as in true 
theatre [...] what I permanently thrust aside in order to live.”300 The abject functions 
metonymically and is an integral part of the subject’s psyche. The cadaver is the 
ultimate form of abjection, but faeces, blood, pus, vomit, urine, also abject. To abject 
is to expel, and leakages of faeces, vomit and the like serve to confound the ordering 
of bodily interior and exterior; but abjection also marks the boundary of corporeal 
life, in that it is a reminder of death not as a concept but as the end of subjectivity. 
Kristeva defines abjection in the following terms: “It is thus not lack of cleanliness or 
health that causes abjection, but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not 
respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite. [...] 
Abjection [...] is immoral, sinister, scheming, and shady: a terror that dissembles, a 
hatred that smiles, a passion that uses the body for barter instead of inflaming it, a 
debtor who sells you up, a friend who stabs you....”301    
 
 
 
                                                
299 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon S. 
Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 3. 
300 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 3. 
301 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 4. 
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Leigh Bowery, Enema, 1992 
 
 
There is no critical commentary that directly addresses Bowery’s penchant for on-
stage enemas or the birth scene, although both of these aspects of his performance art 
are amply recorded in photographs from the time. That said, his performances have 
generally been identified as symptomatic of a creative shift that saw queer performers 
from the UK, the US and Australia championing a much more assertive performance 
style, “eschewing the stereotypes that narrowly defined queer performance as a man 
in a frock doing torch songs badly.”302 It may well be that the AIDS crisis of the late 
1980s and early 1990s precipitated a more challenging and a more political creative 
response from queer-identified performers. Leo Bersani has made the point in light of 
the AIDS epidemic that homosexual corporeality is a site of dissolution of 
subjectivity, and that AIDS highlights the way in which subjective annihilation is 
                                                
302 Take a Bowery, p. 21. 
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integral to homosexual sex.303 This insight is reflected in instances of queer 
performance of the time, in particular in Bowery and his work.  
 
Bowery himself was diagnosed as HIV+ in 1988, although he kept this from all his 
friends and family bar one (his biographer Sue Tilley) until he was admitted to 
Middlesex Hospital in December 1994, just before he died. It may well be that his 
recurring use of scatological motifs do more than offend or nauseate an audience, and 
in fact foreground a troubled queer corporeality that is under attack from a malevolent 
force (i.e. the HIV virus) within.  
 
An enema is a medical procedure to assist in clearing blockages in the colon caused 
by constipation. Latterly it has also come to be recognised as having some sort of 
erotic potential and is a feature of BDSM sexual practices.304 Moreover, it marks the 
site of entry into the body of the HIV virus, through the practice of anal sex. Susan 
Sontag’s seminal 1989 essay ‘AIDS and Its Metaphors’ discussed at length the ways 
in which the metaphors constituted discursively around the illness framed its 
meaning, but Bowery, by performing rather than writing, causes his body to stand 
metonymically for the actual and unspeakable lived experience of one with a terminal 
illness.305 For Bowery it has no meaning as such, or at least not one that can be 
articulated. Instead it is a subjective experience of living on the boundary of death. In 
performing an enema he is performing the specific incidences of a particular mode of 
queer subjectivity, that of a gay man with AIDS.     
 
The anus is central to queer eroticism, and, importantly for our purposes, is one of the 
parts of the body identified by Lacan as having erotic potential by way of its 
functioning as a slit, an opening. Lacan suggests that the body is the site where 
erotogeneity is negotiated, specifically the perimeter of the body, in places of 
corporeal discontinuity: 
                                                
303 Leo Bersani ‘Is The Rectum A Grave?’ in Crimp, (ed.) Aids: Cultural Analysis, 
Cultural Activism, p. 222. 
304 BDSM is a compound acronym that denotes a range of related sexual practices, 
specifically Bondage and Discipline, Domination and Submission, Sadism and 
Masochism. 
305 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor; Aids and Its Metaphors (London: Penguin, 
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The very delimitation of the “erogenous zone” that the drive 
isolates from the function’s metabolism ... is the result of a cut that 
takes advantage of the anatomical characteristics of a margin or 
border: the lips, “the enclosure of the teeth,” the rim of the anus, 
the penile groove, the vagina, and the slit formed by the eyelids, 
not to mention the hollow of the ear. ... Let us note that this 
characteristic of the cut is no less obviously prevalent in the object 
describes by analytic theory: the mammilla, the feces, the phallus 
(as imaginary object) and the urinary flow. (An unthinkable list 
unless we add, as I do, the phoneme, the gaze, the voice ... and the 
nothing.) For isn’t it plain to see that the characteristics of being 
partial, rightly emphasised in objects, is applicable not because 
these objects are part of a total object, which the body is assumed 
to be, but because they only partially represent the function that 
produces them?306  
 
It is, as I have already suggested, what marks the cut, rather than the cut itself, that 
denotes the focus of desire. Moreover, the list of items given by Lacan as being sites 
of the erotic can be characteristics as well as physical entities. In the previous chapter 
I suggested that fashion is one of the ways in which the erotic potential of the rim is 
emphasised. Here I would like to suggest that Bowery’s enemas perform the same 
function, and in doing so make two crucial points. Firstly, they draw attention to the 
particular rim of the body that is the anus, and as such are highly erotic. But their 
eroticism is not the safe, heteronormative, reproductive eroticism that facilitates an 
acceptable level of merely phallic jouissance. They disrupt entirely the supposition 
that desire and jouissance are to be found in the bringing together of the neatly 
polarised masculine and feminine. They suggest instead a masculinity that is far from 
stabilised in one poled and relational position, and intimate instead a masculine 
eroticism that is predicated on the impossibility of masculinity. Secondly, following 
from this challenge to symbolic masculinity, Bowery’s performed enemas then offer 
the potential for transgressive jouissance; they are shocking because they transcend 
the point where most people would turn back, they go beyond what is sanctionable, 
what we can countenance. They are the performance of hommosexuelle jouissance, 
which is an enactment of the interjection of the unspeakable real and as such are 
profoundly transgressive.  
 
The water that is pumped into the colon in an enema inevitably contains faeces when 
it is expelled from the body. It is then a facilitator of abjection, and when it is done in 
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public, as Bowery did, as opposed to clinical environment of a hospital or the privacy 
of the boudoir or dungeon, the impact is quite remarkable. The performance of 
abjection fulfils two functions: the breaching of the categories of interior and exterior 
and the impossibility of corporeal integrity, and the enacting of the psychic 
boundaries between life and death that the subject operates along in order to be a 
subject. Bowery abjects in order to assert his lived subjectivity. To do so consciously, 
and willfully, almost celebratorily when one ought to be ashamed, nauseated and 
repulsed by it, represents a radical challenge to the usual order of things. We can 
speculate that this may well be why his last performances, a residency at Madame 
JoJo’s nightclub in Soho in November 1994, brought him to the attention of the local 
licensing authorities, who banned his appearances and obliged the nightclub to cancel 
the run. 
 
The second motif that Bowery deployed is the infamous “birth scene” where Nicola 
Bateman would hang upside down in a sling under his costume, naked save for a skull 
cap covering her hair and covered in red body paint. He would sing the Beatles’ All 
You Need is Love, and at the end of the song Bowery would lie on a table and “give 
birth” to her. The visual effect of this was enhanced by Bowery wearing tights with a 
hole in the crotch that Nicola tore her way through. As with the enemas, it was a 
visceral and shocking performance.  
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Leigh Bowery, Birth, 1992 
 
 
The idea that a man could give birth is the stuff of horror. The example of the film 
Alien that I mentioned earlier is an instance of this horror, and is a cinematic 
representation of masculine fear of childbirth, representative, as it is, of the uniquely 
feminine trauma that brought men into being in the first place. Childbirth is terrifying 
to men because it reminds them that they owe their material existence to that which is 
entirely alien and unknowable to them, indeed that their material existence is the last 
word in abjection and closer to death than they may wish consciously to 
acknowledge.307 Bowery chose to perform this dread taboo, and to aestheticise its 
unknowable horror.   
 
In enacting a birth on stage, Bowery was making several claims. The first is a 
repeated statement of a claim that he has made through his use of costumes and that 
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has been discussed already here; that the occupation of a feminine position is not 
dependent on being a woman in any anatomical or biological sense. Where previously 
Bowery had used fashion to demonstrate how the feminine in the symbolic is not 
contingent upon a biological woman, here he is referring to a particular corporeal 
experience of femininity. In this regard Bowery is preempting the debates that arose 
in April 2008 when an American transgendered man, Thomas Beatie, became 
pregnant, having kept his uterus in his post-operative life as he wanted to have 
children.308 The point made both by him and by Bowery fourteen years earlier is that 
pregnancy and childbirth are, incredibly perhaps, not the exclusive preserve of 
women. It is instead an aspect of the feminine that is contingent upon a mode of 
psychically constituted subjectivity, although admittedly it is rare indeed for anyone 
other women than to accede to the state.    
 
The second claim made by the birth scene is one that pertains to abjection and 
jouissance. If abjection confuses the boundaries of corporeality, then giving birth is 
the ultimate acknowledgement of this confusion: this is a point well made by Julia 
Kristeva in her essay ‘Sabat Mater’ in which she juxtaposes the myth of maternalism 
with the visceral, bloody, traumatic process of actually becoming a mother.309 There 
is one body within another, and that body can only become a subject through its own 
abjection. The fact that women can and do die in childbirth is a reminder of the 
position of the mother as a marginal figure, one who owes her position as mother to 
her encounter at the brink of life (or death) itself. The jouissance of the mother is 
inextricably bound to this encounter. By enacting this process on stage, Bowery is 
contravening notions of sexuated subjectivity in the symbolic, by doing the one thing 
that men cannot do, indeed ought to be terrified at the very idea of. He is also, and 
perhaps more importantly, facilitating an interjection of the transgressive jouissance 
that marks a site where the real makes itself felt. 
 
It was, though, his penultimate performance, in June 1994, six months before he died, 
that is particularly illuminating, in that it consolidated many of the themes that had 
                                                
308 This was widely reported in press and television media in the UK and the US. See, 
for instance, Haroon Sidique, ‘Pregnant Man Goes On Oprah Winfrey Show, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/04/usa> [Accessed 3rd September 2008]. 
309 The Kristeva Reader, ed. by Toril Moi (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), pp. 160-185. 
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been developed in other works. Called The Laugh of No. 12, it took place at an open-
air arts event in Fort Asperen in the Netherlands, and featured Bowery as the Hanged 
Man (the twelfth card in the Tarot deck) with Richard Torry on electric guitar 
providing musical accompaniment, and Nicola Bateman Bowery dressed in an 
elaborate tutu and bodice spraying air freshener over the crowd. Bowery himself was 
naked save for black stockings that stopped at the top of his thighs and black make-up 
covering his face and head. His penis and nipples were adorned with wooden clothes 
pegs, and he was suspended upside down by his ankles. He recited some spoken 
word, and then smashed through a sheet of plate glass that was placed directly in front 
of him (although this was a visual effect, as the glass was smashed by an electronic 
charge immediately prior to Bowery making contact with it.) 
 
 
The Laugh of No. 12, 1994 
 
Besides the very obvious reading, that Bowery was symbolising the breaking of the 
invisible barriers that circumscribe our lives, there is another case that can be built 
around this performance. It could be said that it represents the limits of performance 
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and of subjectivity. The shattering glass is a shattering of the frame in which the 
performance takes place, enacting in real time the obsolescence of performance that 
makes it performance. The liberal spraying of air freshener is an exploitation of the 
sense of smell as something at once corporeal and intangible, and the incorporation of 
music, that most sublime of art forms, reinforces the elusiveness that is the hallmark 
of both viewing and participating in performance. In a sense, this performance was a 
self-referential performance of performance itself.  
 
More importantly though, Bowery’s body was foregrounded throughout, the 
discomfort and the attendant transcendence that was a feature of his costumes 
reappearing here in the clamping of the penis and in the cuts made by the shards of 
flying glass. His body stands metonymically here for two things: performance itself 
and the way in which it comes into being through its disappearance, and for the 
dissolution of subjectivity with which the viewer identifies when they watch a 
performance. In The Laugh of No. 12 Bowery is occupying a liminal state, one that 
reaches the boundary of life itself, and suggests a negation of the self that is 
transcendent and transgressive. As one critic puts it: 
Bowery was his body. He knew that, as he also undoubtedly knew 
that he would die when his body died. But with his way of life 
Bowery demonstrated that the body means transformation, a 
continuous passing from one state to another, and that fear of that 
passing can be overcome. So he swayed unflinchingly through the 
glass as the Hanged Man, laughing at the next card in the deck; no. 
13, the card of destruction, change and renewal, otherwise known 
as death.310 
 
Kristeva uses the notion of the abject in her analysis of the French writer Céline, and 
suggests that the invocation of horror that is the product of artistic engagement with 
the abject is far from being a marginal activity, but in fact “represents the ultimate 
coding of our crises, of our most intimate and most serious apocalypses.”311 It may 
well be easy enough to dismiss Bowery as a counter-cultural provocateur who sought 
to shock and offend in the pursuit of empty self-promotion, or else as a media 
doyenne, one of the self-appointed arbiters of cool that circle around a small London-
centric social scene that enjoys a vastly over-inflated sense of its own self-importance. 
                                                
310 Anna Tilroe, trans. by Nancy Forest-Flier, in Take a Bowery, p. 128. 
311 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 208. 
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Indeed, this perception, one might speculate, may well explain the lack of serious and 
sustained critical engagement with Bowery’s work thus far. I would suggest, 
however, that when his preoccupation with the scatological and the corporeal is 
framed within the concept of the abject it moves from a marginal position to one that 
resonates to the very core of the human experience. Fashion and art become 
instigators in the disruption of the very essence of subjectivity, and what we see in 
Bowery is a unique instance of transgression that queers not just sexuality but 
existence itself. 
 
Leigh Bowery as Nude. 
 
From 1989 to 1994 Leigh Bowery sat for the British painter Lucien Freud, and was 
the subject of some of this artist’s most well-known work. Their relationship was such 
that when Bowery died, it was Freud who paid for his body to be returned to his 
native Australia for burial. Freud’s portraits of Bowery, nudes painted in the 
figurative style, hang in major galleries around the world, or else change hands 
between private collectors at auction for vast sums of money. The nature of these 
paintings, the fact that they are for the most part oil on canvas, means that they have a 
material longevity that far exceeds Bowery’s performances, which were over in a 
matter of hours if not minutes and which were temporal by their very nature. This 
must then beg the question of how these enduring representations of his corporeality 
interact with his exuberantly clothed and ephemeral performances. 
 
What is interesting about these paintings is that they depart entirely from the male 
nude of classical and neo-classical art, where the body is firm and muscular, beautiful 
and desirable, and a visual representation of the dominance of masculine virility. The 
portraits of Bowery do not in any way idealise him, and what eroticism there is in the 
paintings is of a very different order to the prescriptive, repressed homoeroticism that 
one usually sees in a male nude. Bowery has described how aware he was of his 
difference from classical male nudes, saying that his entirely shaved body, his 
piercings, the marks left on his torso by the tape that creates his breasts that looked 
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like the scars from a whipping, his excessive weight, made him feel “self-conscious 
and embarrassed – distant from regular nudes.”312  
 
The artist and critic Gary Carsley has endeavoured to relate Freud’s Bowery paintings 
to the rest of Bowery’s work by speculating on the effect Bowery’s work for Freud 
must have had on him. He suggests a relationship between fashion, subjectivity and 
corporeality that has already been explored at length in the previous chapter, and 
brings together the material skills of tailoring and the shaping of the body through 
dress:  
Sitting naked for hours must have given Bowery occasion to reflect 
upon his own mortality, and having shed his usual outer layer of 
sequins and embroidery he must have begun to consider 
possibilities for generating new works on and around his own 
unique form. Throwing off the ‘crutch of makeup and costume’ 
that had made him famous may have provided the catalyst to 
reappraise his approach to his own body. Shortly after he began to 
pose for Freud, the process of radicalising the relationship and 
scale of parts of the body to each other began. Bowery seemed to 
be bringing techniques developed from years of tailoring to the 
devising of new patterns to be sewn into the flesh.313  
 
While it is difficult to say for certain what effect sitting for Freud had on Bowery, it is 
possible to conjecture on the nature of these paintings when considered in the context 
of Bowery’s legacy. They are yet another aspect of his creative persona, and it will be 
productive to consider them in the context of his output as a whole.  
 
Certainly, Freud himself has articulated his interest in Bowery in the sorts of terms 
that Bowery himself may well have used to talk about dress. Lucien Freud has given 
only a few interviews during his career, however he did consent to be interviewed by 
Bowery for a catalogue that accompanied an exhibition of his work. In this interview, 
Bowery asked him why it was that “the pictures of naked women are always of 
straight women, while the pictures of naked men are always of gay men.” Freud 
replied “I’m drawn to women by nature and queers because of their courage.”314 
                                                
312 Leigh Bowery, ‘On Lucien Freud’, Modern Painters, 6:3 (1993), 123-125, p. 125. 
313 Gary Carsley, in Take a Bowery, p. 96. 
314 See Angus Cook and Lucien Freud, Lucien Freud, Recent Drawings and Etchings: 
Including an Interview with the Artist by Leigh Bowery and an Essay by Angus Cook 
(New York: Matthew Marks Gallery, 1993), p. 3. 
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Freud seems to be suggesting here that there is something about these female and 
queer subjects, as subjects of his paintings, beyond their actual physical selves that 
inspires him and that he endeavours to render visually by painting them as nudes. 
Very early in his career, Freud talked about the relationship between life and art in his 
paintings, arguing that the paintings stand metonymically for the subject they 
represent:  
Painters who use life itself as their subject matter, working with the 
object in front of them or constantly in mind, do so in order to 
translate life into art almost literally, as it were. [...] It is this very 
knowledge of life which can give art complete independence from 
life, an independence that is necessary because the picture, in order 
to move us, must never merely remind us of life but must acquire a 
life of its own.315  
 
It may well be the case, then, that the fact that Bowery is unclothed in these paintings 
is in a sense irrelevant, that his nakedness does not make him a nude in the usual art-
criticism sense of the word. It could in fact be argued that Freud is interested, like 
Bowery, in manifesting the feminine in all its guises, and that they both use art in its 
broadest sense as their vehicle of choice; Freud chooses painting, Bowery chooses 
performance and fashion. 
 
For this reason, the first picture we will consider is of Bowery, dressed, standing next 
to his portrait in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York in 1993. Both the 
portrait on the wall and the subject itself standing next to it in real time and space are 
works of art in their own right. The gallery visitors are looking at both with equal 
measures of curiosity and, perhaps, desire. Certainly they maintain a safe distance. It 
is as if the foot-high floor wires one finds in galleries that remind one not to get too 
close to the works are in front of Bowery himself as well as his portrait.  
 
 
 
                                                
315 Lucien Freud, ‘Some Thoughts On Painting’, Encounter, 3:1 (1954), 23-24, p. 24 
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 Leigh Bowery, 1993 
 
What is intriguing about this picture is that despite the manifold differences between 
Bowery as he appears in “real life,” costumed, with his body contorted and his face 
and head covered, and the supposed “truth” of the nude portrait of him as he is 
“naturally,” it is abundantly clear that they are one and the same person. The fact that 
the body concerned is male is, paradoxically, irrelevant, as both instances are a clear 
rejection of the masculine. Bowery’s costumes quite clearly reject normative 
sexuation, and Freud’s painting queers (in a manner of speaking) the notion of male 
corporeality that is usually represented by male nudes. The effect of this is to 
confound any notion of the sexed subjectivity (embodied by Bowery in his life and 
work or represented by Freud in his paintings) as being fixed or stable. It suggests 
instead that one of the ways that sexual difference is constituted is in instances of 
radical creativity. This creativity can take the form of art, or fashion, but the outcome 
is the same: both femininity and masculinity are constituted in and through a site of 
disorder and as an invocation of the real.  
 
The painting itself is an unusual representation of Bowery in that it presents his body 
as entirely unmodified. The colours are subdued shades of grey and brown and 
Bowery is seen from behind, naked and vulnerable, a far cry from the photographic 
portraits of his costumed form taken by Annie Leibovitz and Nick Knight. His 
  178 
mountainous, fleshly body has bulk, certainly, but he is no threat. It appears that, in 
Freud’s estimation at least, he is more than just the shocking provocative creature that 
stalked the nightclubs and cabarets of London, Tokyo and New York. Nevertheless, 
Freud’s paintings of Bowery do not mark a complete disjuncture between the man, his 
appearance and his performances. Instead, I suggest, they can be seen as a 
continuation of the artwork that is Leigh Bowery and follow Freud’s assertion (above) 
that art does not imitate life but instead is a life, and has a life of its own. 
 
By using his body as the site of artistic creation, both in terms of costuming and in 
terms of his corporeal, scatological performances, Bowery was both the subject and 
the object of art in terms of his own artistic practice. He problematised distinctions of 
art and life, male and female, masculine and feminine, and in doing so queered the 
psychic operation of sexuality in the visual field. In sitting for Freud, with his belief 
that artworks have a life of their own, Bowery continued his commitment to his 
position as both the subject and object of art, and his body remains as central to this 
process as always. As a nude artist’s model, he moved from the realm of street style 
and youth culture into the more rarefied and historically located world of fine art, but 
because the artist was Lucien Freud, and because Bowery’s practice was predicated 
on corporeality, the act of sitting for a portrait, and the resultant portraits themselves, 
are a fitting continuation of Bowery’s work outside of Freud’s studio. 
 
  
Leigh Bowery by Lucien Freud, 1992 
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The continuity is evident, as I have argued, in the photograph of Bowery and his 
portrait at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. However, it is also evident 
in the portrait itself, when it is taken as a chapter in the visual biography of Leigh 
Bowery that has been bequeathed to us in the years following his death. It is a 
different approach to the questions raised by his costumes, in that life, art and the 
body are presented second-hand, as it were, in the form of a portrait; but if we 
consider the act of modelling for an artist as much an act as a nightclub appearance, 
then the finished product (and I say this with all due respect to Lucien Freud) 
becomes secondary to the act of sitting, in the same way that the photographs we have 
of his nightclub appearances and cabaret performances are secondary to the 
appearances and performances themselves. These a posteriori representations are all 
we have to go on when Bowery has been dead for fifteen years at the time of writing, 
and are the only options available to us if we wish to consider the life and work of this 
remarkable man
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Chapter Four. 
 
Fashion, Text, Symptom. 
 
  
The conceptual designer Hussein Chalayan brought up the issue of language in the 
show for his Autumn/Winter 1998/99 collection, Panoramic, when he left on each 
chair a slip of paper printed with the final words of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”316 What 
is interesting about the use of this quote in the context of a fashion show is that it 
provokes the question of what fashion can actually articulate. What is it that fashion 
can and cannot say, and if there is a silence, because something cannot be spoken 
about and so must be “passed over”, does that mean it does not exist at all, or is 
merely inarticulable? If it is the latter, can we perhaps theorise what we must pass 
over in silence as an interjection of the Lacanian real, or is it,  as I will argue in this 
final chapter, something that might be grasped through Lacan’s notion of the 
sinthome, that which is beyond meaning? If we follow Lacan in identifying the 
sinthome as concerning itself with unreadable literary language, then when we treat 
fashion as language is it what we cannot understand about it that evidences the 
sinthome?    
 
In its framing of fashion within psychoanalytic discourse my thesis so far has, in its 
structure as much as anything else, followed Lacan’s theoretical developments 
chronologically and has addressed the two matrixes of psychoanalytic thought, 
identification and desire. In my final chapter I will concern myself with the final 
developments of Lacanian theory and its departure from identification and desire, the 
concept of le sinthome from Seminar XXIII (1975-76) 
 
Psychoanalysis and the Symptom. 
 
In spite of its commitment to the investigative principles of scientific study, 
psychoanalysis has always been equally concerned with the creative, the literary, the 
aesthetic. It is well known that Freud found the paradigm of human sexual 
development in the Greek tragedy of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, for instance, and his 
                                                
316 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by D. F. Pears, and 
B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1974), p. 74. 
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work on Hamlet and Leonardo da Vinci demonstrate clearly his reading of 
psychoanalytic principles in artistic practice.  
 
Hamlet in particular has proved to be particularly attractive to psychoanalysts and 
literary critics alike. Ernest Jones’ Hamlet and Oedipus (1949) follows Freud’s 
Oedipal theory and suggests that Hamlet is unable to avenge his father’s death because 
he unconsciously identifies with his father’s killer, and wishes that he had been the 
one to kill his father and marry his mother, rather than his uncle, Claudius. Jones’ 
argument is problematic, though, in that it treats Hamlet as a real person, rather than a 
dramatic character. Unfortunately for Jones, Hamlet in fact had no childhood, and is 
not likely to lie on any couch and discuss his condition with an analyst. In this sense, 
Jones was one of the first critics to demonstrate the limits of literally applied 
psychoanalysis to circumstances beyond the clinic.  
 
More recently, Arthur Kirsch has suggested that Hamlet is indicative less of an 
unresolved Oedipus complex and more of melancholia, while Frederick Werther has 
argued that Hamlet’s antipathy towards his mother suggests he is under the sway of 
what Werther calls an “Orestes complex” rather than the Oedipal dilemma. N. 
Freidman and R.M. Jones take a different view, and have suggested that the Oedipal 
dilemma, even if it is active in Hamlet, is of less significance than the fact that 
something is indeed rotten in the state of Denmark. The psychosocial dynamic of 
spying, intrigue and corruption, they say, make it impossible for any of the younger 
characters (Hamlet and Ophelia most notably) to have any sort of stability.317 Lacan’s 
own reading of Hamlet is particular to his approach to psychoanalysis. He argues that 
the play is an exploration of the transition from the imaginary to the symbolic, and that 
Hamlet himself is living with an incomplete entry into the symbolic and a problematic 
negotiation of the Oedipus complex. The “return” of Hamlet’s father is in fact a 
“return of the repressed,” and the sadistic fantasy to annihilate the father reflects itself 
back onto Hamlet, whose punishment for having this fantasy is his neurotic condition. 
                                                
317 See Arthur Kirsch, The Passions of Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes (Charlottesville, 
Va., London: University Press of Virginia, 1990), and Wertham, F ‘The Matricidal 
Impulse’ and N. Friedman and R. M. Jones ‘On the Mutuality of The Oedipus 
Complex: Notes on the Hamlet Case’, both in The Design Within: Psychoanalytic 
Approaches to Shakespeare, ed. by Melvyn Donald Faber (New York: Science 
House, 1970).  
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Ophelia represents for Lacan the devaluation of the love object; in the symbolic the 
object of desire is always already lost, and Ophelia regains value for Hamlet when she 
is literally lost to him. While Ophelia represents the other, Claudius represents the 
phallus as a symbol of unattainable power, but Hamlet’s trauma emanates from the 
phallus on this occasion being entirely out of place.318  
 
As these readings of Hamlet show, it is no coincidence that for all its success in the 
clinic, psychoanalysis has served equally well as an interpretive discourse around art 
and literature. In this chapter I will consider fashion as a mode of artistic production 
that has a connection to psychic processes but this time at a remove from either 
identification or desire, on which I have focussed thus far, and instead consider it in 
light of the Lacanian sinthome, a symptom that is severed from the unconscious and 
acts as its own, not as a signifier but as an independent sign. 
 
Lacan, like Freud, made free use of examples from art and literature to illustrate his 
theories and ideas, but he was quite clear regarding the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and art, specifically that the former should not be “applied” in any 
direct, literal sense to the latter. His concern was that the interpretive possibilities of 
psychoanalysis should not be diluted by a disregard for genuine and integral 
differences between different creative products and forms, and was of the firmly-held 
belief that “psychoanalysis can only be applied, in the proper sense of the term, as 
treatment and thus to a subject who speaks and listens”319 This concern underpinned 
much of Lacan’s reading of paintings, (Holbeins’s The Ambassadors,) sculpture, 
(Bernini’s St Theresa,) plays, (Hamlet, as discussed above) and reached its apogee in 
one of the last seminars of his career, Seminar XXIII, Le Sinthome, in his reading of 
the novels of James Joyce. Throughout, he sees art as paradigmatic of psychoanalysis, 
and uses each to illuminate the other.  
 
Lacan’s view, that psychoanalysis ought not, indeed cannot, be applied to anything 
other than a speaking subject in a clinical setting, has inspired some remarkable 
                                                
318 Jacques Lacan, ‘Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet’ in Literature 
and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise, ed. by Shoshana Felman 
(Baltimore, Maryland, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).  
319 Lacan The Écrits, p. 630.  
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developments in terms of the engagements between psychoanalysis and art.  In 1963 
Freidman and Jones highlighted “the complex relations of poet and theorist” as being 
a promising area of investigation.320 However it was not until the 1970s that this area 
of investigation was explored to any meaningful degree, most notably in Shoshana 
Felman’s ‘Turning the Screw of Interpretation,’ her influential reading of Henry 
James’ 1898 novella The Turn of the Screw. In this essay she point to the ties that 
bind psychoanalysis to artistic practice, arguing “in the same way that psychoanalysis 
points to the unconscious of literature, literature in its turn, is the unconscious of 
psychoanalysis” and asking how the relationship between literature and 
psychoanalysis “might begin to be articulated – otherwise” that is to say, as readings 
of each other.321 She points out that by putting psychoanalysis and literature on an 
equal footing, rather than just using the former to interpret the latter, the potential for 
equally illuminating insights into both will arise. Reading otherwise, as Felman puts 
it, rejects even the slightest intimation of applied psychoanalysis, replacing it with the 
“radically different notion of implication: bringing analytical questions to bear upon 
literary questions involving psychoanalysis in the scene of literary analysis, the 
interpreters role here would be […] to act as a go-between, to generate implications 
between literature and psychoanalysis, to explore, bring to light and articulate the 
various indirect ways in which the two domains do indeed implicate eachother, each 
one finding itself enlightened, informed, but also affected, displaced, by the other.”322  
 
More recently, John Lechte has suggested, in light of Freud’s reading of Jensen’s 
Gradiva that “Even with the most clinical of intentions, through the notion of 
repression, and thence displacement, Freud cannot fail to reveal to us how writing 
(fiction) and psychoanalysis, or writing and subjectivity, have a similar structure. 
Therefore, although Freud’s interpretive aspirations and preferred literary genre may, 
in particular studies, have limited him, it is not so clear that the conceptual arsenal of 
psychoanalysis is equally limiting.”323 From Felman, and from Lechte, we can see 
that there are indeed clear parallels between art and literature, and psychoanalysis, 
                                                
320 N. Friedman and R. M. Jones “On the Mutuality of The Oedipus Complex: Notes 
on the Hamlet Case”, in Faber (ed.) The Design Within, p. 59.  
321 Felman, ed., Literature and Psychoanalysis, p. 10.  
322 Felman, ed., Literature and Psychoanalysis, pp. 8-9. 
323 Writing and Psychoanalysis: A Reader ed. by John Lechte (London: Arnold, 
1996), p. 4. 
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that lend themselves to simultaneous readings of both. It is this approach, rather than 
applied psychoanalysis, that this chapter will follow. 
 
Freud, Sublimation and The Symptom. 
 
Freud made the point early in his writing, and reiterated it subsequently, that for 
psychoanalysis symptoms are indications of the developmental processes that have 
taken place in the unconscious going, in some way, awry. In the ‘Three Essays,’ for 
instance he suggested that “symptoms represent a substitute for impulses the source of 
whose strength is derived from the sexual instinct” and later, in ‘The Ego And The Id,’ 
he reiterated the point when he wrote, “thus the symptoms were a substitute for 
forbidden satisfactions and the illness seemed to correspond to an incomplete 
subjugation of the immoral side of human beings.”324 The essential idea is that 
incomplete repression leads to neurotic or hysteric symptoms. What is of note is that, 
as Laplanche points out, symptoms are intrinsic aspects of the unconscious and so are 
not intended for communication, not least because although the unconscious may 
“speak” through symptoms, it does not aim to communicate through these 
symptoms.325 What is read from symptoms comes through an act of interpretation 
rather than an act of mere reception, and an engagement with symptoms is by 
definition an active intervention in their circulation. 
 
The idea that a work of art or the output of a creative endeavour is a product of 
unconscious actions was first put forward by Freud in ‘Fragments of An Analysis of a 
Case of Hysteria’ (1901). He suggested here that in human sexual development aims 
could be redirected from an “inappropriate” sexual direction to a non-sexual, creative 
one, and argued that: “They are a development of germs all of which are contained in 
undifferentiated sexual disposition of a child, and which, by being suppressed or by 
being diverted to higher, a-sexual aims – by being ‘sublimated’ – are destined to 
provide the energy for a great number of our cultural achievements”326 
 
                                                
324 Freud, A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays on Sexuality, and Other Works, p. 282 
and Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, and Other Works, trans. by James Strachey, 
Anna Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1961) p. 40. 
325 Jean Laplanche, The Unconscious and the Id (London: Rebus, 1999), pp. 102-3. 
326 Freud, A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays on Sexuality, and Other Works, p. 50 
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Following from this initial pronouncement, the case for sublimation was made 
throughout Freud’s work. It was seen in the case of Little Hans, for instance, who 
showed signs of sublimation when he developed an interest in listening to and playing 
music at the same time as his anxieties became apparent. More generally it was cited 
as beneficial to both the individual and to society, and essential to the constitution of 
civilisation itself.327 What is clear throughout is that for Freud, art is produced by the 
transformation of a sexual aim into a non-sexual one. Sex, it is safe to say, is 
something difficult for both the individual and for society, and Freud suggests that it is 
made manageable by its diversion to “higher” purposes. The status of both art and sex 
are maintained in and through sublimation. It is through sublimation, Freud further 
suggests, that works of art can be read as, amongst other things, symptoms of their 
creator’s unconscious. Sublimation is his explanation for the creative impulse that 
appears in some individuals but not all, and it was arguably the theory of sublimation 
that allowed Freud to apply psychoanalysis to art in the first place. 
 
By the 1920s Freud had expanded the concept to refer not just to the 
transmogrification of a deviant sexual aim into a non-sexual, artistic direction, but 
instead as a process by which the id is managed and controlled by the ego so that the 
ego may more easily and safely function within the social frame. It came to refer to a 
universal developmental process as well as the motivation for the creation of works of 
art.328 
 
Because of this lack of specificity, the theory of sublimation is awkward. Freud does 
not link sublimation to the category of the sublime, for instance, and it is not clear 
exactly how sexuality can be translated into the more “elevated” activities of artistic or 
intellectual pursuits. In ‘Beyond The Pleasure Principle’ (1920) confusion around the 
precise mechanisms of sublimation becomes apparent. The diversity of sexual object 
and sexual aim is acknowledged, as is their mobility. They can remain separate or they 
                                                
327 Sigmund Freud, Two Case Histories - 'Little Hans' and the 'Rat Man', trans. by 
James Strachey, Anna Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), p. 138.n: Sigmund 
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can merge; when they both combine sublimation can take place and the sexual is 
transformed into a “higher social or ethical valuation” although Freud concedes that 
“these different features do not as yet combine to form an integral feature.”329 What is 
also difficult is the way in which sublimation genders the symptom. Freud does not 
believe that women sublimate, and so they develop pathologies like hysteria, where 
men do sublimate their symptoms, thus avoiding psychic illness and producing great 
works of art instead. It is not easy to accept this model, as it gives a polarised either/or 
dichotomy of artistic production from which women are routinely excluded; and given 
the number of women artists who produce great works but who also appear to suffer 
from some sort of mental distress (Sylvia Plath, Tracy Emin and Amy Winehouse are 
just three that spring immediately to mind) it may be safe to suggest that either women 
do sublimate, or that sublimation is not the only way by which art is created, if indeed 
it is how art is created at all.  
 
While some critics have made the case for feminine sublimation, others have 
suggested that feminine creativity emanates from a different process all together, and 
that sublimation is not necessarily the most appropriate explanation for it. Melanie 
Klein, for instance, sees the artistic impulse in women not as sublimation but as an 
expression of the anxiety generated by the female equivalent of castration anxiety, the 
sadistic desire to destroy the mother. Klein sees this sadistic desire as a source of 
distress for the female child and, using the artist Ruth Kjär as a case study, illustrates 
how the female artist uses art as a means of making reparation to her mother and 
herself for this distress.330 An alternative view comes from the French psychoanalyst 
Christiane Olivier, for instance, who has argued that girls sublimate, but only during 
the period of latency. Once puberty occurs they are encouraged to concern themselves 
with “the cult of body-as-attraction and maternity as aim,” and so lose interest in 
creativity through sublimation331. The problem with this, of course, is that it assumes 
sublimation is a choice, something one can either do, or give up if something else 
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more interesting comes along, and because of this voluntarism and her lack of regard 
for the unconscious, Olivier’s argument is less than convincing.  
 
Rather more compelling is the work of the French feminist psychoanalysts whose 
work reflects on literature rather than exclusively clinical practice, particularly Luce 
Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. Irigaray argues that women’s writing came not from 
sublimated desires but instead from a sexuated specificity that disavows the phallus 
and that posits woman as subject in her own right, beyond the phallic/castrated 
dichotomy that would position her as other of the masculine one. Thus she writes:  
what a feminine syntax might be is not simple nor easy to state, 
because in that ‘syntax’ there would be no longer either subject or 
object, ‘oneness’ would no longer be privileged, there would no 
longer be proper meanings, proper names, ‘proper’ attributes […] 
Instead that syntax would invoke nearness, proximity, but in such 
an extreme form that it would preclude any distinction of identities, 
any establishment of ownership, thus any form of appropriation.332     
 
Julia Kristeva’s now-famous doctoral thesis became her first book, Revolution in 
Poetic Language (published in part in English in 1984). In this she makes the claim 
that there are two orders in language, the symbolic, which is the post-oedipal language 
of the Father, the phallus and the Law and so is inherently masculine, and the semiotic, 
which contains the last vestiges of the pre-oedipal, maternal world. The semiotic, for 
Kristeva, is a more primal, pre-linguistic mode of language, and is associated with the 
body and the drives, while the symbolic requires these to be ordered into intelligible, 
rational forms. She describes the semiotic as preceding “the establishment of the sign” 
and argues that “the semiotic process can be accurately elucidated only within a theory 
of the subject that […] opens up within the subject this other scene of pre-symbolic 
functions.”333   The symbolic, by contrast, “is a social effect of the relation to the 
other, established through the objective constraints of the biological (including sexual) 
differences and concrete historical family structures.”334 Both forms co-exist, with the 
semiotic mode of language inextricably entwined with the symbolic. For Kristeva the 
disruptive potential of the feminine, which she understands, in distinction to Irigaray, 
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as maternal, is as inherent in language as the more masculine order and operation.335 A 
branch of literary criticism has followed the French feminist criticism that has been 
explored by, amongst others, Toril Moi and Margaret Whitford.336  
 
From these many detours and departures, we can see that sublimation, the first 
psychoanalytic theory regarding the operation of creativity, has been superseded by 
other approaches, and it is one of these, the sinthome, that will be explored here. The 
conception of sublimation is not without its flaws, and in their consideration of the 
concept, Laplanche and Pontalis went so far as to say that “the lack of a coherent 
theory of sublimation remains one of the lacunae in psychoanalytic thought.”337 
Nevertheless, the aspect of sublimation that can be redeemed from the preceeding 
discussion is that it connects artistic production both to the internal world of the 
psyche and the external world of aesthetics. Sublimation, I suggest, attests to the 
impossibility of isolating the subject from civilisation, as Freud would have it, or the 
social order in which they must function.  
 
The point has been made by Francette Pacteau that all too often, in the examples from 
the art world and case studies that Freud provides as evidence of sublimation we see 
the sublimating artist preoccupying himself with the body as sexual object. She 
suggests that the process of sublimation is in fact an intellectualisation of desire, and 
argues that “the mathematization of the ‘well-proportioned body’ offers a privileged 
instance of sublimation. The material body dissolves into the abstractions or 
mathematical equivalences. In the play of intellectual faculties the artist becomes 
disembodied, and the depicted body surrenders to the angular regularity of grids of 
measurement.”338 If sublimation suggests that art is, broadly speaking, a symptom of 
the artist’s psychic past, in Pacteau’s refinement of the concept the production of art is 
held to be sublimation in action, (the act of painting is “the mise-en-scène of 
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sublimation,” as she puts it) but it is the content of the art that is more noteworthy.339 
In her view, the symptom is the object of that psychic past manifesting itself once 
again in art, and it is the subject of art that is in fact the symptom – and frequently the 
symptom that we see in art is, by Pacteau’s reckoning, woman.   
 
The notion of woman’s body as man’s symptom is a relatively common theoretical 
approach, and is central to Cixous and Clément’s The Newly Born Woman (1986), a 
central text in French feminism. Here, Cixous and Clément conduct a review of 
history and mythology, and argue that throughout history woman’s body has always 
been posited, either rightly or wrongly, as the location of hysteric symptoms. The so-
called witches persecuted by the Inquisition were repositories for the evil men saw in 
the world, for instance. The tarantella, an orgiastic dance from Southern Italy, is 
undertaken by women who have been bitten by an (imaginary) spider and developed 
symptoms akin to hysteria. This dance, which takes place over a twenty-four hour 
period or more, is the physical working through and resolution of symptoms which, 
upon completion, permits the woman social legitimation in the form of marriage. The 
modern-day entertainment of the cinema is, in their view, merely an 
institutionalisation of hysteria. In their view it is inherent in and intrinsic to woman to 
be symptom.340 Crucially, though, this is not an obstacle to feminine resistance, but the 
opportunity for it to act.  
 
Despite the association between symptom and woman’s body, it is the symptom in 
language that is the cornerstone of psychoanalytic practice, and that has led to 
psychoanalysis being called “the talking cure.”341 Pacteau has made the case that 
woman appears in language as a hieroglyph. She embeds woman in language, or 
writing, at least, and suggests a “readability” of sorts; supposing, of course, that the 
symptom can actually be “read” at all (a point I shall address later in this chapter.) 
Hieroglyphs are a particularly apposite choice of metaphor here, as they are a form of 
writing that, by virtue of their visuality and their ambiguous relationship to language, 
precludes finite meaning and instead offer a dualism of “an undecipherable riddle and 
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the promise of knowledge beyond words.”342 These are precisely the same terms, in 
fact, that we use to talk about the unconscious, and Pacteau seems to be suggesting the 
parallels, explored in detail in the discussion of Seminar XX in chapter two, between 
the unknowable in language, woman, and the unconscious mind.    
 
Mary Ann Doane made the same point in a 1982 article in Screen, where she invokes 
the contradiction inherent in hieroglyphs that make them an ideal metaphor for woman 
in language. She argues that the hieroglyph on the one hand connotes an 
undecipherable and mysterious language but on the other offers an immediacy and an 
accessibility through its status as a pictorial language. This duality, Doane argues, 
suggests a paradigm of the position of woman in language.343  There is the suggestion 
here, set out by Doane and developed by Pacteau, that if woman is symptom, her 
appearance as a symptom is contingent upon the notion of image, and in particular the 
idea of image in/as language.  
 
Lacan, The Symptom and the Sinthome. 
 
Like Freud, Lacan returned throughout his work to the concept of the symptom. His 
initial considerations on the subject were set out in ‘The Function and Field of Speech 
and Language in Psychoanalysis’ (1953) and expanded on in his subsequent and 
equally influential essay, ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in 
the Freudian Unconscious’ (1960).344 In the first text, Lacan reiterates the centrality of 
language to the psychoanalytic project as a whole, and goes on from this premise to 
argue that the symptom is a signifier, operating within an unconscious that is 
structured like a language. This particular account of unconscious processes is central 
to Lacan’s thought, as it provides the conceptual mechanism by which the relationship 
between the subject, their unconscious, and the world in which they operate, can be 
understood. Lacan is of the view that the symptom itself does not manifest itself in 
language, but in fact is language. He suggests then that a focus on language will lead 
to a resolution of symptoms through the analytic process:  
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If, for a symptom, whether neurotic or not, to be considered to 
come under psychoanalytic psychopathology, Freud insists on the 
minimum of overdetermination constituted by a double meaning – 
symbol of a defunct conflict beyond its function in a no less 
symbolic present conflict – and if he teaches us to follow the 
ascending ramification of the symbolic lineage in the text of the 
patient’s free associations, in order to detect the nodal points of its 
structure at the places where its verbal forms intersect, then it is 
already quite clear that symptoms can be entirely resolved in an 
analysis of language, because a symptom is itself structured like a 
language: a symptom is language from which speech must be 
delivered.345     
 
Lacan follows Freud in the belief that symptoms are formations of the unconscious 
and that they represent incomplete repression. By embedding psychic processes in 
language and suggesting in particular that symptoms are signifiers of the subject’s 
unconscious, he argues that there is no such thing as a universal meaning for each 
symptom. Instead symptoms are experienced and articulated as unique to each 
individual subject:  
We always come back, then, to our, twofold reference to speech 
and language. In order to free the subject’s speech, we introduce 
him to the language of his desire, that is, to the primary language 
in which – beyond what he tells us of himself – he is already 
speaking to us unbeknown to himself, first and foremost, in the 
symbols of his symptom. 
 
It is certainly a language that is at stake in the symbolism brought 
to light in analysis. This language, corresponding to the playful 
wish found in one of Lichtenberg’s aphorisms, has the universal 
character of a tongue that would be understood in all other tongues, 
but at the same time – since it is language that grabs a hold of 
desire at the very moment it becomes humanised by gaining 
recognition – it is absolutely particular to the subject.346  
 
What is more, while the symptom may well be produced in language, and so belong to 
the symbolic, it is experienced rather differently by the subject, to whom the symptom 
is enigmatic and opaque. The experience of the symptom is in fact an experience of 
the real, a point made by Lacan when, in discussing neurosis, he links the symptom to 
jouissance and suggests that neurosis is a refusal of jouissance of the other:  
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What the neurotic does not want, and what he strenuously refuses 
to do until the end of his analysis, is to sacrifice his castration to the 
Other’s jouissance, by allowing it to serve the other.  
 
And of course he is not wrong, for – although deep down he feels 
he is the most vain thing in existence, a Want-To-Be or a One-Too-
Many – why would he sacrifice his difference (anything but that) to 
the jouissance of an Other, which, let us not forget, does not exist. 
Yes, but if by chance it was to exist, it would enjoy it. And that is 
what the neurotic does not want. For he figures the Other demands 
his castration.347  
 
Neurosis here emanates from a troubled relation with the symbolic and the castration 
that is central to this relation. What we see here is an instance of the problematic 
constitution of the subject in language, and the symptom appears as an instance of the 
processes of subjectivity gone awry. The question of jouissance and the real, crucial to 
the operation of the symbolic, appear as the cause of psychic distress in the subject 
when they underlie neurotic symptoms.   
 
In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1973) Lacan makes the 
connection between the symptom and the real much more explicit. The symptom 
becomes more topological, and is tied to the real because of its irresolution. It is the 
impossibility of the symptom, the fact that it comes about as a result of a failure that is 
irreconcilable by the subject’s unconscious, that makes it, for Lacan, an aspect of the 
real:  
The real is the impact with the obstacle; it is the fact that things do 
not turn out alright straight away, as the hand that is held out to 
external obstacles wishes. But I think this is quite an illusory and 
limited view of Freud’s thought on this point. The real is 
distinguished, as I said last time, by its separation from the field of 
the pleasure principle, by its desexualisation, by the fact that its 
economy, later, admits something new, which is precisely the 
impossible.348    
 
What is crucial in this later conceptual development is the implication that the 
symptom is separate from the subject. Lacan argues that the symptom is an 
experience, it is experienced, and does not necessarily emanate from the 
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unconscious.349 This separation of the symptom and the unconscious is remarkable, 
and it led Lacan, in his last seminar, to reclassify the symptom entirely. The symptom 
becomes the sinthome, Lacan’s last conceptual development before his death in 1981, 
and the thorniest and most intractable concept of his considerable legacy.   
 
The Sinthome. 
 
The sinthome was the subject of some of Lacan’s last seminars, in 1976. He was 
preoccupied in equal measure with the writing of James Joyce and Borromean knots, 
the trefoil insignia of the Italian aristocratic Borromeo family that were his final foray 
into the self-created world of mathemes.350 The sinthome comes from this unusual 
marriage of mathematical theory and Joycean text. What is of note is that the sinthome 
represents a fourth ring, looping through the other three rings of the knot that stand for 
the symbolic, the imaginary and the real, holding them together and allowing the 
subject to cohere. The knot is not suggested by Lacan as a paradigm or a model, but 
instead as a profoundly literal (i.e. non-metaphorical) description of a topology 
“before which,” as he puts it, “the imagination fails.”351  In the Borromean knot itself, 
meaning is located at the intersection of the symbolic, the imaginary and the real. It 
follows from this that the function of the sinthome, in terms of its topological purpose 
as the linking structure between the three realms, is beyond meaning. 
 
The pronunciation in French of the archaic word sinthome sounds like saint homme. 
Lacan’s biographer, Elisabeth Roudinesco suggests that, as well as retaining a 
reference to the clinical origin, Lacan simultaneously “invented a Joycean 
portmanteau word to suggest the idea of redemption through literature.”352 The 
themes of epiphany that run through much of Joyce’s work refer both to spiritual 
enlightenment and a more secular intuitive insight. For Lacan epiphany was a 
sinthome, and by designating Joyce through his symptom, renegotiated instead as 
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sinthome, writing becomes a mythical timeless ecstasy. Slavoj Zizek has suggested 
that the difference between Freudian symptom, as “a cipher of some repressed 
meaning” and Lacanian sinthome, which has “no determinate meaning; it just gives 
body … to some elementary matrix of jouissance, of excessive enjoyment,”353 lies in 
the status of jouissance.  
 
The sinthome, argued and evidenced as it is by Lacan in terms of the literary 
endeavours of James Joyce, retains the centrality of language to the psychoanalytic 
project, but as a particular instance of jouissance, and not, as had been the case 
previously, in terms of the unconscious structured like a language. Lacan describes the 
sinthome as the part of the signifier that resonates within the body. He refers, as he did 
in the Écrits, to the instability of the body brought about by the orifices as they 
confound the notion of surface and challenge the relative discretions of interiority and 
exteriority, but more importantly he refers to the visual as well as the auditory as 
central to the sinthomatic experience. The sinthome is the mechanism by which the 
corporeal and language are linked:  
There must be something in the signifier that resonates […] it’s the 
echo in the body of the fact that there is speech, but that in order 
that this speech resonates – in order that it consonates, to use a 
word from sinthomaquinas – the body must be sensitive to it. It is a 
fact that it is. It is because the body has several orifices, of which 
the most important is the ear – because it has no stopgap – that 
what I have called the voice has a response in the body. The trouble 
is, to be sure, that it is not only the ear. The gaze is a vigorous 
competitor.354 
 
Lacan’s reference to Aquinas here is instructive. I discussed in chapters two and three 
how Lacan uses quasi-theological concepts to indicate the otherworldliness of the real. 
Aquinas, the medieval theologian, argued that God is ultimately unknowable, and 
Lacan evokes him here, I believe, in order to emphasise, once again, the way in which 
the real eludes the operation of the symbolic but nevertheless makes itself felt. 
Moreover, without the sinthome, there can be no human subject as such. As Claude 
Milner points out, if there is just language, the speaking subject will become “the 
angel who has from time immemorial been the image of what becomes of the subject 
                                                
353 Slavoj Zizek, Enjoy Your Symptom!: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out (New 
York, London: Routledge, 2001), p. 199. 
354 Seminar of 18th November 1975, in Lacan, The Seminar, Book XXIII. 
  195 
when nothing of it is retained but the dimension of pure enunciation.”355 The link 
between the body and language must be retained for subjectivity to exist. 
 
Following this correlation of the body and language by way of the sinthome, Lacan 
goes on to suggest that it is the real that harmonises the body and language. He 
remarks that “at a distance from the body there is the possibility of something I termed 
last time resonance or consonance. And it is at the level of the real that this 
consonance is situated. In relation to its poles, the body and language, the real is what 
harmonizes.”356 This would suggest that the sinthome, with its designation as a 
particular jouissance and a signifier beyond analysis, is an aspect of the real that has 
(in a manner of speaking) broken free from its moorings in that realm and which then 
transverses the real, the symbolic and the imaginary at once. The sinthome becomes 
the impossibility that holds together the three psychic realms and is the connection 
between them and also their relation to corporeality; the end of analysis comes, for 
Lacan, with the subject’s identification with their sinthome, and their acceptance of, in 
the words of Verhaeghe and Declerq, their “Real identity, connecting it to the Real of 
its being.”357 The question for this chapter then becomes clear: If the end of analysis is 
the subject’s acceptance of the impossibilities of their subjectivity, is fashion an 
articulation of the process of acceptance, or the impossibilities, or both? 
 
In his analysis of James Joyce, the sinthome is Lacan’s radical solution to the 
problems raised by previous psychoanalytic approaches to aesthetics where art had 
been treated as a symptom, sublimated or otherwise, of the artist’s unconscious. The 
question, raised by Lacan repeatedly in the early sessions of the twenty third seminar, 
is how does art become, and function as, the sinthome? The answer comes through 
Joyce, whose “epiphanies” (intense psychic experiences that he recorded in his 
inscrutable, fragmented writings) Lacan argued were instances of “radical foreclosure” 
in which “the real forecloses meaning.”358 Because of their intractable nature, Joycean 
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texts suggest a particular relation to language, one in which the subject’s jouissance 
invades language and the symbolic in a way that is both destructive and transcendent.  
 
It is worth reiterating here that Lacan’s engagement with Joyce’s writing does not 
constitute “applied psychoanalysis”. He insists instead that his forays into topological 
interpretation are not merely a representational account, but instead form a creative 
endeavour in their own right, one in which reading and writing stand as paradigms of 
psychoanalysis itself, and Joyce himself is not so much a case study as an exemplar of 
the saint homme who manifests a new mode of language as evidence of the 
organisation of jouissance.  
  
I have argued throughout this thesis that woman is indivisible from fashion – a point 
that was central to the analyses in Chapter Two in particular. For Lacan, Woman is 
also a sinthome. In his 1975 introduction to Seminar XXIII (Le Sinthome) he refers to 
his earlier assertion that woman does not exist, from Seminar XX, when he says “the 
woman is not all except in the form of the mais pas ça, as one says tout mais pas ça. It 
was certainly the position of Socrates, the mais pas ça, and it’s what I’m introducing 
under this year’s title as the sinthome.”359 By February 1976 he is even more explicit, 
stating that “at the level of sinthome there is thus no equivalence in the relations 
between green and red; there is no sexual equivalence … There is no relation except 
where there is sinthome. It is the sinthome that supports the other sex. I would go so 
far as to say that the sinthome is … a woman. A woman is a sinthome for every man.” 
(My italics)360  
 
In previous chapters I have followed Lacan in suggesting that woman functions as 
objet a, and as fantasy, and here we see woman similarly presented as the asymmetric 
other by which the masculine subject defines themselves. What is consistent in all of 
the arguments in Lacan’s later work, though, is that the feminine is also the creative, 
disruptive presence through which the subject, contradictorily, perhaps, coheres. This 
idea represents femininity within the specifically Lacanian idiom discussed in the 
introduction, of the feminine being that which follows an impossible or contradictory 
logic, and will be central to my reading of fashion as sinthome.  
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The sinthome, as I have established, is Lacan’s explanation for the way in which the 
three psychic realms are held together - the fourth ring in the Borromean knot of 
subjectivity. Coalescing around it are concepts of femininity, jouissance, language and 
the body. For the purposes of this chapter, the question becomes one of fashion and 
language. If we posit fashion as a language, are there instances of fashion/text that 
entail a special relation to language and a destructive refashioning of fashion/text as 
sinthome in which the real forecloses meaning? Is it possible that the tensions between 
gender politics, sexuality and creativity that are embodied in fashion can be negotiated 
if fashion is conceived in the terms of the sinthome? If we assume that the sinthome is 
indeed an instance of radical subjective creativity, it would seem that it is ideally 
suited to an interpretation of fashion. Might it well be that, as Luke Thurston 
concluded: “At the point where the Other fails to function [and] the symbolic law 
cannot be sustained, the sinthome entails, in place of an ethic of pure desire, one of 
aesthetic self-invention.”361 
 
Fashion as Text. 
 
To approach fashion as text, it is first necessary to take a detour, as it were, through 
the work of Roland Barthes on fashion that was mentioned in the introduction. As I 
have already outlined, attempts at theorising fashion, as opposed to the empirical 
study of costume history, have generally fallen within the framework of cultural 
studies, and have often been influenced by semiotic and structuralist analyses. Roland 
Barthes developed the notion of “reading” culture with a semiotic examination of 
advertisements and magazine covers in Mythologies (1957), and with same 
investigative spirit he turned his attention to fashion in The Fashion System (1967); in 
doing so he started a branch of fashion analysis that influenced many subsequent 
critics. For Barthes, fashion is Fashion, a self-contained communicative structure that 
mirrors literature and that is constituted in and through the written communication of 
fashion magazines. For Barthes, fashion is a “narrative … a system of signifiers, a 
classificatory activity” and he argues that fashion comes into existence and acquires 
meaning through the transposition of the garment into language, specifically the 
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written word.362 Barthes’s talks less about fashion per se, and more about fashion 
magazines. He argues that “without discourse there is no total Fashion, no essential 
Fashion” and anchors the existence of fashion to a particular mode of its 
dissemination.363 Barthes’s choice of material upon which he predicated his thoughts 
on fashion is very sharply focussed. He analyses two magazines, a monthly (Le Jardin 
des Modes) and a weekly (Elle) for a year, from June 1958 to June 1959. The corpus 
is arbitrary, perhaps, but it serves to provide Barthes with evidence of a temporal 
pattern which shapes and structures fashion and that makes it both intelligible and a 
“system.” 
The most interesting aspect of Barthes The Fashion System is the way in which he 
constructs a tri-partite definition of fashion, the constituent parts of which he calls the 
rhetorical, the terminological and the real. The rhetorical code refers to the 
relationship between text and images in fashion magazines, the photographs and their 
captions, whether advertising or editorial. The terminological code refers to language 
itself in the magazines, and the real code refers to the actual garment that the pictures 
and text are referencing.364 Barthes gives primacy to the rhetorical code, as it is this 
that, in his view, creates the discourse by which fashion comes into being and is 
rendered intelligible. The language of the terminological code facilitates a shift from 
materiality to signification, while the real code, the garment itself, is a generative 
mother tongue that is concerned with the materiality of the garment itself, the fabric, 
the cut, the ornamentation, and so on, and that has its own internal logic around this 
materiality, but which is otherwise largely incoherent.   
 
Barthes’s approach is not without its problems. The Fashion System has been 
dismissed as “unreadably dull”, and a “headsplitting analysis … no more translatable 
than a grammar book [and] equally impossible to summarise.”365 The lack of a 
definition of fashionable and unfashionable as a means of assessing the difference 
between dress and fashion makes Barthes’s results, for Jonathan Culler, 
                                                
362 Roland Barthes, The Fashion System, trans. by M. Ward and R. Howard (London: 
Cape, 1985), p. 280. 
363 Barthes, The Fashion System, p.xi 
364 Barthes, The Fashion System, p.40. 
365 Philip Thody, Roland Barthes: A Conservative Estimate (London: Macmillan, 
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“indeterminate.”366 A more sustained critique of The Fashion System comes from 
Paul Jobling, who sees Barthes’s analyses as hopelessly out-dated, and more 
reflective of a particular view of fashion held by a man of a particular race, age and 
social class writing in the 1950s. Specifically, Jobling takes issue with Barthes’s 
emphasis on the text of fashion magazines, and the omission of any consideration of 
fashion photography. He argues instead that fashion photography evidences issues of 
power, knowledge and pleasure, and that far from constituting fashion as a vacuous 
form of signification, is in fact instrumental in forging an aesthetic by which 
contemporary social politics may be understood.367   
 
To my mind, Roland Barthes’s extensive critique of what he calls the “rhetoric” of 
fashion (i.e. the text of fashion magazines) takes fashion out of its social context, 
ignores the creative process that transforms clothing into fashion, and puts fashion the 
cultural form into a vacuum. This move is unusual for Barthes, because elsewhere he 
has been only too aware of the political and cultural content of his subjects, most 
notably in his analysis of the cover of Paris Match magazine in Mythologies, where 
he discusses the image of a black French soldier saluting the French flag.368 In 
transforming fashion into a system of signs, as he does in The Fashion System, 
Barthes’s intention is to demonstrate the artificiality of what is assumed to be 
“natural”, so that the irrationality of constant change that is a constituent of fashion 
can be rationalised in qualitative terms. This, though, is a move that neglects almost 
entirely the creativity, the materiality and the experientiality of fashion itself. Fashion 
relies on the human subject for its realisation. It is, as I have argued throughout this 
thesis, in the act of being worn that fashion comes into being, but unfortunately 
Barthes does not consider either the garment or the wearer with any degree of 
seriousness. He demonstrates a strong grasp of fashion magazines, but his grasp of 
fashion itself, and the women who wear it, is less clear.  
 
Nevertheless, while much of the criticism of The Fashion System is undoubtedly 
justified, there is one aspect of it that has been neglected by all critics thus far, both 
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structuralists and others, that may be appropriated and put to work in this chapter, and 
that is the idea that the original garment is a generative mother tongue upon which 
fashion as a language is based. Barthes did not address garments themselves, 
believing them to be inarticulable and reliant on their subsequent transposition into 
images and text in magazines for their meaning. I propose to take the original garment 
as an instance of language, however unintelligible it may be, and explore in this 
chapter how it can be negotiated within a definition of language that comes not from 
Barthes but from Lacan.  
 
If we usually consider fashion as an aspect of visual culture, as we have in this thesis 
up until this point, what is at stake in a reconsideration of it as language? That the 
connection between the conscious and the unconscious is conducted through language 
is one thing, but surely the visual and corporeal experience that is fashion is 
manifestly at odds with language, even as language is understood psychoanalytically 
rather than structurally? On the contrary, in her essay ‘Is Sensation a Language?’ Julia 
Kristeva has made the case for sensation and language being interconnected rather 
than independent, and her argument is based on both clinical work with autistics, and, 
more importantly, a reading of Proust and Joyce.369 In this essay she makes three key 
claims. Firstly, that sensations are experienced as and through language, and there is 
no demarcation, strictly speaking, between these two seemingly oppositional 
concepts. She argues that language is not only articulated language but instead that 
there is a continuity between language and experience. Following from her notion of 
the semiotic she argues that:  
We rehabilitate this ‘foliated’ functioning of the psychical 
apparatus in trying to restore to the logical order of judgement […] 
the prior or deeper stages of quasi-signs. [These are,] in my own 
terminology, ‘the semiotic’, that which, according to the Freud of 
The Origins of Psychoanalysis, is ‘cries’, ‘imitations’ and 
‘perception-excitations’. They can become conscious only by being 
linked to language and to unconscious desires, while relating to a 
different register.370   
 
                                                
369 Julia Kristeva ‘Is Sensation a Language’ in Lechte (ed.), Writing and 
Psychoanalysis.  
370 Julia Kristeva ‘Is Sensation a Language’ in Lechte (ed.), Writing and 
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Her second point is that, because the artist is creating an aesthetic by interpreting their 
own experience to one extent or another, the artist is in fact the analyst, rather than the 
analysand. Their creative output is not their symptom, but is instead an interpretation 
of sensation and the rendering of that sensation in language. Their creative output is, 
conversely, an interpretation of language that makes sensation possible:  
Whether therapist or writer, the one who is committed to bestowing 
signs or even a style on this sensory cave which, for the majority of 
people, is unnameable, is called to a true experience […] Having 
identified with both perceived and perceiver, he/she becomes more 
than just decoder – indeed, the ‘encoder’. A ‘nomothete’, as Plato 
puts it in the Cratylus, a Homer as poet and legislator, creator of 
language for a singular experience.371  
 
The unity of language and experience identified by Kristeva in creative forms is, one 
could argue, the sinthome, the resonance of the body (sensation) in language and 
independent of the subject, but a sinthome that has a particular relation to both 
language and the body that ensures a continuum between them.  
 
Her third point is that the relationship between sensation and language is enacted in a 
transubstantiation, an identificatory operation that is, according to Kristeva, both 
imaginary and real. The notion of a transubstantiation has come to Kristeva third-
hand, as it were, from James Joyce, who himself claimed it from the Catholic liturgy, 
where the bread and wine of Communion become the body and blood of Jesus Christ 
in substance if not appearance, and used it as a descriptor of the act of writing as the 
advent of both a literal and figurative corpus. Put simply, language becomes the body, 
in substance if not in appearance.372 
  
 
Hussein Chalayan. 
 
Hussein Chalayan (1970- ) is a London-based designer. He is Turkish-Cypriot, and 
spent the first twelve years of his life in Nicosia, moving to London in 1982 to live 
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with his father. Like Alexander McQueen and John Galliano he was trained in fashion 
at Central St Martins College in London, and with them forms the triumvirate of 
British designers that have defined British fashion for the last fifteen years. His career 
is peppered with awards and accolades, beginning with the display of his 1993 
graduate collection in the window of the prestigious London fashion store Browns on 
South Moulton Street. What was remarkable about this collection is that in terms of 
design it was relatively simple, but he sprinkled the garments with iron filings and 
buried them in his friend’s back garden for several weeks prior to the show. The 
process of interment and exhumation led to the garments absorbing the iron filings, 
taking on their texture and also their colour as they rusted away underground, and 
indicated the transfigurational power of an act that seemed at first glance mere 
destructiveness.    
 
In 1995 he won the first Absolut Vodka: Absolut Creation Award, and was twice 
awarded the British Fashion Awards Designer of the Year, in 1999 and 2000. His 
flagship store in Tokyo won Best Retail Interior in the FX International Design 
Awards in 2004, and he received an M.B.E. in 2006. His work has been exhibited in 
solo and group shows in major galleries in Europe, U.S.A and Japan, most recently in 
a retrospective at the Design Museum in London in 2009, and he represented Turkey 
at the Venice Biennale in 2005. Besides fashion he has designed theatre costumes, 
following Leigh Bowery in working with the Michael Clark Dance Company in 1998, 
and then working on a production of Handel’s The Messiah in New York in 1999. He 
has also made three short films, Temporal Meditations (2003) and Place to Passage 
and Anaesthetics (both 2004).  
 
The films are of note because they share many of the concerns that are addressed in 
Chalayan’s fashion designs, such as displacement, transformations and 
transubstantiations, mobilities and modalities, language and corporeality, that are 
discussed in this chapter. Place to Passage (2004) revisits the themes of the 
Afterwords (2000) collection, themes of psychic displacement that arise from geo-
political and cross-cultural movements. In this film, usually shown simultaneously 
across five separate screens, a model travels from London to Istanbul in a futuristic 
pod. She sits still and quiet as landscapes and cityscapes flash past. There is no sense 
of arrival or departure in the film though. The pod is moving throughout, and gives 
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the sense of perpetual motion. The instability of a present that is contingent upon 
shifts and movement in this film is indicative of psychic modalities that problematise 
the notion of physical location as a fixed and stable entity. Temporal Meditations 
(2003) was produced in the same year as the couture collection of the same name. It 
took the principle of genetic anthropology and demonstrated through fashion the idea 
that the body itself represents geographical instability. In a world where race is as 
crucial as it is disparate, the appealing notion of subjective identity as intrinsic to the 
body, whereby subjective identity is understood as a coherent whole that abides 
within the contained physical corporeality of the subject, is ultimately unsustainable. 
The idea that the relationship between the body and the subject is an impossibility is 
one that is dealt with in the Between (1998) collection too. The emphasis here is also 
on mobility and displacement, themes that recur in Afterwords. Anaesthetic (2004) is 
a disturbing look at ritualised and codified violence and features a scene where a chef 
prepares sashimi from a live fish which is then eaten by a woman screened from the 
visceral preparation of the dish by a veil. This film picks up the idea of 
metamorphosis that can be seen in the imposition and transpositions of the Echoform 
(1999) collection as well as the resistances to corporeality that underpin Between.    
 
What differentiates Chalayan from his peers, then, is his interdisciplinarity, and as 
well as working in several mediums besides fashion, his fashion itself is a hybrid of 
architecture, archaeology, technology and, notably for our purposes, language. A 
trawl through press coverage of his career sees the words “conceptual” and 
“intellectual” come up time and again, and while critical acclaim has followed his 
every collection, financial success has been more elusive, with his company being put 
into voluntary liquidation in 2001 with debts of £250,000.373 Perhaps because of his 
interdisciplinarity and his lack of commercial success, his work fits more readily than 
many other fashion designers into the rubric of art. I argued earlier that fashion is not 
art, but there are instances where it can be talked about in similar terms to art; Hussein 
Chalayan is one of those instances. His work is an example of the sort of fashion that 
behaves like art in terms of concepts and aesthetics, but uses the body as its frame and 
                                                
373 The London College of Fashion library holds an extensive collection of press 
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fabrics as its material. It is as at home in a gallery as it is on a runway and is afforded 
the same critical attention and rigour that is directed at other instances of 
contemporary art.  
 
For Chalayan, fashion starts with a concept, an idea, and his shows have been 
described as “cerebral rather than sexy, austere rather than pretty, […] shown in plain 
modernist stage sets and […] accompanied by boiler-suited experimental musical 
ensembles.”374 While he of course produces wearable, sale-able collections, like 
McQueen, Galliano, and all the other couturiers, his showpieces, the ultra-fashion 
creations that make fashion far more than a matter of wearable garments, are 
astonishing examples of an innovative creativity that challenge the distinction 
between fashion and art. 
 
Hussein Chalayan and Fashion-as-Language. 
 
Hussein Chalayan is well-known for working on the boundary between fashion, 
architecture and technology. He has sat on a panel at a design event at Tate Modern in 
London with the architect Zaha Hadid, and lectured to the architecture students at the 
Royal College of Art. His dresses have featured remote control panels and high-tech 
fabrics, and his films are on themes of futurity and science. The theme of language 
comes up frequently too, but for some reason this has not been developed in any 
sustained way by any critic or writer that I can find. In this chapter then, I will address 
the theme of language in Chalayan’s work, specifically in terms of the Lacanian 
conception of the sinthome.  
 
Previous efforts at treating fashion as a language, outlined earlier in this chapter, have 
posited language as a culturally defined linguistic structure by which day-to-day 
verbal and written communication takes place and wider cultural knowledge is 
constituted and maintained, and assumed that fashion will in some way “fit” this 
definition. They have failed because fashion follows an impossible logic that does not 
replicate or mirror existing linguistic structures as they are understood in neo-
structuralist terms. I showed in chapter two, for instance, how fashion is quite capable 
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of embodying the two contradictory modes of femininity simultaneously without 
either proposition cancelling the other out, and in chapter three I made the case for the 
articulation of the impossible queer in and through creative dress. In neither instance 
does fashion operate as a language as language is usually understood. However, 
Roland Barthes’s idea that the material garments that are fashion form some sort of 
generative mother tongue that cannot be understood in and of itself is one that is 
potentially illuminating, and I will develop that idea here. 
 
The idea of a generative mother tongue is at first glance problematic, because it 
presupposes a chronology of meaning and a process of interpretation that follows a 
linear form. What is more, by Barthes’s model, the process by which the non-
understood becomes understood is not clear. There is no reason why fashion should 
have a meaning in its linguistic/pictorial representation in magazines but not in and of 
itself. The possibility of Barthes’s model is not, I suggest, in its literal application but 
in its repositioning as simultaneous rather than chronological. To treat fashion as 
language I will begin with the notion of an aspect of language that is in itself, entirely 
inaccessible, but rather than seeing it as a starting point in a linear process, as Barthes 
does, I will follow Lacan’s Borromean formulations and suggest that it is a part of the 
topography of language as a whole, and that it is this, in fact, that holds together the 
structure of meaning. From this it will become apparent that that it is in fact this 
aspect of language that makes meaning possible at all, that without it the structure of 
language itself would fall apart, and that fashion, when it is considered as language in 
these terms, operates as an instance of the sinthome. 
 
I suggest that where Lacan used the writing of James Joyce as his exemplar, if we 
accept Lacan’s suggestion that the sinthome is that which links language and the 
body, that fashion is in fact a cultural form that is at least as well-suited to 
interpretation under the rubric of the sinthome as writing is. Admittedly, not all 
fashion would be suitable for this approach, but there again neither would all writing. 
Lacan chose Joyce because Joyce’s writing is particularly apposite, and for the 
purposes of this chapter Chalayan’s work is similarly specific. Where Joyce’s page is 
the scene of linguistic adventure, Chalayan’s body is the site of conceptual 
exploration. It is what happens on the surface of each, and how these literary/fashion 
activities might give us insights into the operation of psychic structures, that is of 
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interest here Admittedly, too, this argument will be approaching language from the 
body, rather than approaching the body from language, but as the conceptualising is 
topographical rather than linear this reversal is not a departure from Lacan but merely 
a restructuring that allows his concepts to move beyond their original remit and into 
the field with which we are concerned here. 
 
The treatment of fashion as a language in fashion criticism thus far has at best 
disavowed the intrinsic connection fashion has to the body. Writing on Chalayan 
himself, such as it is, emphasises his engagement with technology and architecture 
and his status as an “intellectual.” In this vein, Caroline Evans makes the point that 
the emphasis on concepts in Chalayan’s collections “writes out the haptic element of 
worn clothing – the physicality of the garments and the sensory pleasure of wearing 
them.” 375 Nevertheless there is a sense in which these distinctions are false 
distinctions. Kristeva has argued convincingly, as I have said, for the intrinsic 
relationality between language and the body, and given fashion’s unique relation to 
the body it is not unreasonable to speculate that if fashion is understood as language 
in psychoanalytic terms, its relation to the body is in fact intrinsic to its status as 
language. We should, therefore, treat them as acting out a transubstantiation between 
themselves, and not as separate entities that can only be discussed under the 
opposition of either “linguistic” or “haptic.”   
 
Having started with the premise that the relationship between fashion and language is 
best understood in Lacanian terms, the rest of the chapter will consider the work of 
Hussein Chalayan in terms of the questions that arise from this relationship. The first 
question is the one set out earlier in this chapter, namely: If the end of analysis is the 
subject’s acceptance of the impossibilities of their own subjectivity, is fashion an 
articulation of that process of acceptance, or the impossibilities themselves, or both? 
The second question is one that has been the major preoccupation of this thesis, and 
that is the status of woman and the feminine. Lacan went so far as to suggest that the 
sinthome is woman. If this is the case, given that fashion is, as I have already argued, 
inherently tied to the feminine, what is there to be said about this connection between 
the feminine subject and radical subjective creativity? Is it that the reconciliation with 
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the sinthome at the end of analysis entails, as Luke Thurston suggests, “in place of an 
ethics of pure desire, one of aesthetic self-invention.”376 Throughout his later work, 
Lacan presents woman in a variety of guises, all of which constitute her as the 
asymmetric other by which the masculine subject defines themselves. Woman is 
sinthome, as well as objet a, and an instance of radical jouissance. I suggested earlier 
in this chapter that the consistent theme in Lacan’s later work is that the feminine is 
posited as the creative disruptive presence through which the subject, paradoxically, 
coheres. The relation of this procces to the sinthome in particular is its representation 
of an unintelligibility that evidences a foreclosure of meaning and a consequent 
sinthomatic jouissance of the kind that Lacan saw in Joyce and that I argue can be 
seen in instances of fashion. Can we speculate, then, that the failure of the Other and 
the collapse of the symbolic that the sinthome enacts, and that appears in instances of 
impossibly inaccessible creativity, is constituted in fashion and represents the 
impossible or contradictory logic that Lacan posits as the feminine?  
 
Between (Spring/Summer 1998). 
 
The theme that occurs repeatedly in all of the garments in this collection is the 
covering of the face. I have chosen two items from this collection for discussion, a 
simple sleeveless red dress with an ovoid, polished wood headdress that covers the 
entire head and face, and a set of six chador-like garments of varying lengths. 
Chalayan himself has pointed out that there are many possible interpretations of this 
collection, and he cites the constitution of a culturally-imposed subjective identity, the 
paradox of the veil and the way in which it attracts attention even as it repels it, and 
the notion of surveillance and control through looking as three possible meanings one 
could derive from the garments.377  
 
There is nothing particularly innovative in Chalayan’s obscuring of the face through 
veiling and other means in a creative context. In 1982 Robert Mapplethorpe produced 
a series of eponymously titled photographs of a female body builder, Lisa Lyons, with 
her head and faced covered with white muslin, for instance, and an Iraqi artist, 
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Jananne Al-Ani photographed a series of Western and Arab women in various states 
of veiling/unveiling and dress/undress, for the work Untitled (1986).378 What is of 
note is the way that all of these works are interpreted today. Alison Donnell has 
identified a decisive shift in attitudes to veiling post-9/11, and that the veil has, rightly 
or wrongly, become synonymous with Islam and the oppression of women:  
The veil or headscarf is seen as a highly visible sign of despised 
difference […] Post-11 September it would appear that attitudes to 
and representations of the veil have overwhelmingly demonstrated 
the intransigence of the veiled woman as an icon of oppression […] 
a strategic figure constantly evoked as a visible reminder of the 
incommensurability between Western and Islamic societies.379 
 
Of course, Chalayan’s veiled women were on the fashion runway several years before 
the atrocities of 9/11, and although it would be quite reasonable to suggest that the use 
of chadors in his work is offensive or obscene, I feel that a more contextual reading 
for fashion and for this thesis would come from considering them, and the rest of the 
collection, in terms of veiling and femininity, following on from my discussion of 
these issues in terms of desire in Chapter Two.   
 
There is evidence throughout history of women (and to a much lesser extent men) 
covering their heads and faces. There are instances of veiling across the world, in all 
cultures, and the association of veiling with Islam is a relatively recent phenomenon 
that has only arisen in the last twenty years.380 Regardless of its cultural location 
though, veiling is synonymous with femininity. From Western brides in their white 
gowns, to Catholic nuns, to the little fishnet veils attached to the pillbox hats that were 
popular in the 1950s, to the religious dress codes of Islam and the hijab, niqab, chador 
and burqa, the veil is an icon of femininity and is situated at the intersection between 
dress, body and culture. It binds all three together without ever belonging entirely to 
any of them, and renders them all alien and unknowable. Dress and body are hidden 
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behind the culturally contextualised and defined veil, at the same time as the veil 
foregrounds them as questions and as provocations. The veil demands a response, 
even as the respondent has little or no idea what it is that they are responding to. 
 
What is of note in this collection for our purposes is the way that both the chadors and 
the ovoid headdress cover the face and so suggest a duality, depriving the wearer of 
individuality but at the same time offering a protection of sorts from the scopophilic 
gaze of others. The models in both cases can remain hidden while scrutinising their 
audience. It could be said that the collection is concerned with interaction and the 
(re)invention of the self in light of a failure of recognition of the other. The nature of 
reciprocity, relationality and exchange that underpin human encounters is challenged 
in this collection, and where in Chapter Two the other is integral to the aesthetic 
created by McQueen and Galliano, and in Chapter Three it is problematised, or 
queered, by Bowery, here, I suggest, we see the notion of the other fail completely. 
 
 
Chalayan, Between, (Spring/Summer 1998) 
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Let us consider the ovoid headdress and red dress first. The red dress is a simple 
round-neck sheath dress, but with the unusual feature of the arm holes being set at hip 
height rather than at the shoulder where one would ordinarily find them. The effect of 
this is to negate the corporeal expectations of both viewer and wearer, and to present 
the body as being an entirely different shape to the presumed “natural” form that it 
usually follows. Where other couturiers, notably Galliano most recently, have 
imposed an artificial model of femininity on the female body that presents itself as 
natural when it is nothing of the sort, here Chalayan is offering an entirely different 
subjectivity, one in which assumptions and presuppositions about the body are 
dismantled and replaced with an impossible body that is and is not woman at one and 
the same time. By connecting the arms and legs to the torso in and through the dress, 
the body is reformulated and loses it significatory power. It ceases to be 
understandable in the terms of Seminar XX set out in Chapter 2, either in the 
symbolic, as objet a or a site or instance of woman’s experience as other/another 
jouissance, or in the imaginary, as a part of the ongoing process of identification by 
which the subject is constituted, that I set out in Chapter One. What happens instead is 
that through the dress the body becomes unintelligible as such, and is instead rendered 
beyond meaning.  
 
The headdress itself is remarkable, again because it is an agent of reformulation, this 
time altering the head beyond all recognition. Given that the face is one of the 
primary visual mechanisms by which subjective recognition and identification takes 
place, it’s covering is a remarkable act of resistance to these crucial intra-psychic 
processes. What is unusual though, is that the headdress not only covers the head, it 
completely disguises it, making it an entirely unrecognisable size and shape. The 
polished wood and the curved egg-like shape suggest an organic matter, but one that 
is most certainly at one remove at least from a human subject.  The featureless front 
where a face should be is unnerving, and the cut-out slot for eyes suggests a viewer 
(the wearer) that the viewed (the audience) cannot see. In this sense, Chalayan is 
turning fashion on its head, and where it is usually is a spectacle to be looked at, here 
the spectacle acts as a trap for the viewer, letting them know that they themselves are 
the ones being viewed, although they have no idea by whom, or to what intent or 
purpose. The act of interpretation becomes impossible and is transformed instead into 
a disquieting experience. 
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Frantz Fanon has argued that the capacity to see without being seen lends itself to a 
political strategy, citing colonial Algeria, where veiled Algerian women came to stand 
for the nation itself while those who acceded to the French colonisers demand to 
remove their veils personified the nation’s acceptance of its colonisation.381 By 
constituting woman as standing metonymically for her nation through her dress, 
though, Fanon is misappropriating the relationship between femininity and 
masquerade and assuming not that femininity is a cultural effect of the masquerade 
but rather that masquerade is the natural function of femininity. The appropriation of 
the veiled woman by Fanon has been criticised by, amongst others, Diana Fuss, who 
has objected to the over-burdening of the female body with contesting ideologies and 
meanings, all of which are posited by Fanon as natural to women, none of which are 
ever ascribed to men.382 Clearly, while covering the face is a political act, to attribute 
it to woman as signifier of nationhood, as Fanon does, is problematic. 
 
I propose, instead, that there is here an act of transubstantiation between fashion and 
the body that creates an entirely new meaning for both, but the meaning created is one 
that cannot be readily interpreted by anyone external to the transubstantiation process. 
This headdress is, perhaps, an instance of the impossibility of subjectivity, rendered in 
fashion by Chalayan and suggestive of the sinthome that Lacan found in the 
inaccessibility of Joyce. This piece is impossible to grasp, to get even the slightest 
purchase on, both conceptually and indeed physically, for where would one grasp it, 
given its smooth curvilinear shape? This may be an instance of fashion/body as 
sinthome and its intractability is at once intolerable and, precisely because of this 
intolerability, a site of sinthomatic jouissance. We see in this collection Lacan’s point 
that the experience of the symptom as an experience of the real, discussed earlier in 
this chapter, but one that is, following from the reconfiguration of symptom as 
sinthome and the arguments of Seminar XXIII, embedded in language (or in this 
instance fashion) and taking on a separate life of its own. 
 
 
                                                
381 See ‘Algeria Unveiled’ in Frantz Fanon, Studies in a Dying Colonialism (London: 
Earthscan Publications, 1989), pp. 35-67. 
382 See Fuss, Identification Papers, pp. 149-154. 
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 Chalayan, Between, (Spring/Summer 1998) 
 
The second item under consideration is the set of six chador-esque garments. When 
these were first shown, the model in just the veil came into view first, and the ones 
that followed were all veiled and in varying stages of dress up to the final, almost-
full-length chador that appeared last. Like the red dress described above, the armholes 
that appear in the longer chadors are cut at waist or hip-height. With all of the 
chadors, the bodily joints – shoulders, elbows, wrists - that suggest mobility are 
hidden, and corporeal normalcy is negated. What is more, given that corporeal 
normalcy is usually articulated through dress, with the body being presented in a 
familiar way as a familiar form, by presenting the body naked as well as mis-shaped, 
this set of garments goes further than the red dress, by suggesting that the impossible 
body is, unequivocally, the female body. 
 
With each of the chadors, the wearer’s face is covered, although unlike the ovoid 
headdress the eyes are visible and there is at least a semblance of subjectivity in the 
wearer. What is of note in this collection is that the models appear in varying states of 
undress, with one being entirely naked save for a veil on her face, and another being 
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naked from the waist down. Martha Nussbaum has pointed out that a primitive sort of 
shame is inherent in the human condition, and emanates from the infants realisation of 
its own neediness and dependency; later another sense of more social shame develops 
that is often gendered and is concerned with the emotions and the notion of self-
discipline and self-control.383 Thus, when one appears naked in public there is the 
assumption that one should feel a sense of shame at ones own nakedness. Of course, 
whether one does or not is another matter, and affecting pride rather than humiliation 
at public nakedness is an artistic device used repeatedly in theatre, from the tableaux 
vivants of famous paintings of nudes in London theatres that used naked but 
unmoving women to circumvent theatre censorship at the turn of the twentieth 
century, to the 1960s musical Hair, to the actor Daniel Radcliffe appearing naked in a 
production of Schaffer’s Equus in London in 2008. It is also a political strategy used 
by naturalists who proclaim the health benefits of going without clothes. Even with 
these examples, though, they implicitly acknowledge shame, even as they reject it. Its 
presence in relation to public nudity cannot be entirely negated. 
 
What shame is there, then, in the nakedness of the models here displayed? Because of 
their veils, their shame is invisible, if it exists at all. Indeed, they could well be 
entirely unashamed, as they might be in a theatre performance. They may well be 
blushing, but we will never know. Instead, the shame of public nudity is reflected 
back onto the viewer, whose familiarity with the body clothed is challenged by the 
paradox of the wearer being simultaneously covered and uncovered. These bodies are 
clothed, in a manner of speaking, but they are also naked, in that what is usually 
covered is exposed, and what is usually exposed is covered. Given this confusion, the 
notion of shame by which we usually frame public nudity may not be not appropriate, 
nor particularly helpful, in this instance.   
 
In terms of the female nude in particular, there is a sense in which Chalayan’s nudes 
here fit in with the trope of the female nude that is found throughout the history of 
Western art. Lynda Nead’s comprehensive study of the female nude considers high art 
as well as various forms of pornography and she suggests that representations of 
                                                
383 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 172 – 217. 
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naked women, in whatever form they take, extend far beyond the female body in the 
picture and are in fact central to cultural negotiation of the subject. For Nead:  
The female nude not only proposes particular definitions of the 
female body but also sets in place specific norms of viewing and 
viewers. The Enlightenment ideal of the contemplative viewing of 
an art object works to reinforce the unity and integrity of the 
viewing subject and sets up an opposition between the perfection of 
art and the disruption and incompletion of non-art, or obscenity. 
The obscene body is the body without borders or containment, and 
obscenity in representation that moves and arouses the viewer 
rather than bringing about stillness and wholeness. The 
representation of the female body can therefore be seen as a 
discourse on the subject and is at the core of western aesthetics.384 
 
Where these images depart from Nead’s interpretation is that they are real women in 
the live situation of a fashion show. They may well operate at the nexus between 
beauty and obscenity, but crucially, they are not a representation as such. They are 
real, in-the-flesh women. I suggest instead that we should consider the dissonance 
between the body and fashion that these part-chadors evidence as in fact reconciled by 
the sinthome. Because the sinthome is designated as a disruption, a particular form of 
jouissance, an element of the real that has, as I said earlier, broken free from its 
moorings in that realm and transverses the real, the symbolic and the imaginary at 
once, the discomfort we feel at viewing these garments is, perhaps, an effect of the 
sinthome. The discomfort is an effect of the sinthome precisely because it arises from 
the sinthomatic unintelligibility of the garments themselves. The contemporary 
political significance of the veiled woman in real-time current affairs augments this 
unintelligibility, so that besides the tensions surrounding the body un/clothed that this 
collection presents, there is also the tension, as Chalayan himself has intimated 
through these designs, between the symbolic constitution of the political category of 
the feminine in supposedly oppositional Western and Islamic culture. Assumptions 
about veiling are challenged by these garments, in that the straightforward association 
of the practice with Islam is problematised, and the supposed symmetrical opposition 
between Islam and the West is shown to be misplaced. The impossibilities represented 
by these garments are, I suggest, the sinthome that connects the three psychic realms 
                                                
384 Lynda Nead, The Female Nude: Art, Obscenity and Sexuality (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 2. 
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to the very visible, albeit distorted, corporeality evidenced by the wearing of the 
garments. 
 
The French-Algerian artist Zineb Sedira has said the question that underpins all of her 
work is this: “How do you represent the unrepresentable, unrepresentable due to over-
exposure or lack of exposure? How do you represent that which has been drained of 
meaning, misrepresented to the point of over-saturation, yet under-appreciated and 
neglected to the point of absurdity?”385 In the chador series, Chalayan appears to start, 
as Sedira does, with the idea of the unrepresentability of woman, and uses the device 
of degrees of corporeal un/veiling to illustrate the process by which this 
unrepresentability is maintained in dress. Even when she is completely naked, there is 
something of woman that is inaccessible, unknowable, veiled – literally, by Chalayan 
in this collection, and figuratively, at the level of the psyche, where woman is 
sinthome.     
 
What we see in the Between collection of Spring/Summer 1998, with its themes of 
anonymity and corporeal incoherence, is, I believe, an instance where fashion 
becomes the sinthome as an instance of the real that harmonises the poles of language 
and the body.386 The “gendering” of cultural forms that makes fashion feminine 
almost by default might also suggest a way in which Lacan’s belief that the sinthome 
can be understood as woman; and it will perhaps do so more readily than might be the 
case in the literary examples that Lacan selected. It may well be, though, that the 
woman-sinthome we see in fashion is more accurately, a feminine subject, and not 
necessarily an anatomically-defined woman - we could easily subject Leigh Bowery 
to a similar analysis, say, but a phallic woman like Marlene Dietrich, who (in a 
reversal of Bowery’s representations of sexed subjectivity) intimates that the 
masculine can be accessed by a woman, would present such reading with problematic 
resistance. What is crucial here is the unintelligibility and the disquiet that arises from 
this, not least because we are accustomed to dress presenting us with a readily 
understandable corporeality and subjectivity. When this is not forthcoming, when it is 
resisted, in the same way that a Joyce text resists being readily understood, we are left 
                                                
385 Sedira, Z, ‘Mapping the Illusive’ in Bailey and Tawadros, eds., Veil, p. 58 
386 Discussed earlier in this chapter, from Seminar of 18th November 1975, in Lacan, 
The Seminar Book XXIII. 
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with a failure of meaning that represents an instance of impossible and contradictory 
logic of the Lacanian feminine as it is constituted in and through the sinthome.   
 
Echoform (Autumn/Winter 1999/2000).  
 
This collection is famous for just one of the items in it, the so-called “Aeroplane 
Dress,” a dress made from fibreglass with panels like those on an aeroplane’s wing, 
that opened and closed mechanically. The dress concealed a battery, operated by a 
switch controlled by the wearer, that allowed the various panels to slide open and 
closed, revealing either the body of the wearer or a pink tulle underskirt.  This dress 
was also the central feature of an untitled film made by Marcus Tomlinson in 
collaboration with Chalayan in 1999, and was revisited by Chalayan in several 
subsequent collections. Many print inches have been devoted to the analysis of this 
dress, and it has featured in many exhibitions, including, most recently, Skin and 
Bones: Parallel Practice in Fashion and Architecture at Somerset House in London 
in 2008, and the Chalayan retrospective at the Design Museum, also in London, in 
2009.  
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Chalayan, Echoform, Autumn/Winter 1999/2000. 
 
The critic Bradley Quinn argues that the dress “suggests technologised sexualisation 
of the body. It reveals and conceals erogenous zones while also equipping and 
manipulating the body to conform [to] ideals of sex appeal.”387  Caroline Evans 
instead links it to key hallmarks of modernity, suggesting that in this dress Chalayan 
“took the tropes of modernist progress (travel, technology, aerodynamics) and 
inflected them with modernist trauma (alienation, reification and the uncanny).”388 
While both of these analyses are of merit, what concerns us here, I suggest, is the way 
in which the dress rejects accessible corporeality and confounds subjectivity, resists a 
reading that would make either of these readily understood, and instead offers a 
sinthomatic failure of meaning that is an instance of a particular sinthomatic 
jouissance and quintessentially feminine.    
 
The aeroplane dress has a wearer, obviously, but unlike the other garments considered 
in this thesis it appears to have a peculiar relationship with the body. It is, perhaps 
uniquely, a quite clear addendum to the body. It could not be considered an extension 
of the body, whose boundaries seem rather more intact here than they do with other 
                                                
387 Bradley Quinn, Techno Fashion (Oxford: Berg, 2002), p. 51. 
388 Evans, Fashion at the Edge, p. 275. 
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garments. The materials used may play a part in this – fibreglass is always going to 
oppose the form it covers, by virtue of its inflexibility, its unyieldingness. The pins at 
the shoulders augment the sense of this garment as being more like a structure in close 
proximity to the body than a covering of the body. In this regard it is interesting 
because it departs from the usual ambiguity of the fashion/body relationship, which 
raises the question of whether fashion is either an extension of the body or an addition 
to it. Here, there is no such ambiguity. This dress is an imposition, but unlike the 
impositions of Dior or Galliano, discussed in chapter two, it is an imposition that 
knowingly acknowledges its own artificiality. The body here is used unapologetically 
as a vehicle for something else entirely. It is used by the dress as a mechanism for 
foregrounding the impossibility of the female body. Where fashion can act as 
woman’s ambassador in the symbolic, here it is instead showing the female body as 
cipher. The mechanisation of the dress augments its artificiality, by evidencing its 
(literal and figurative) man-made qualities. The panels slide to reveal pink tulle, the 
fashion that stands for woman, or sections of her body, which here serves only to 
disembody her even more, because she is presented in fragments, not as a whole. 
Then, at the flick of a switch, the panels slide back into place, the ambassadorial 
fashion and the fragmented subjectivity, are both neatly covered up and hidden away 
again, if indeed they ever existed in the first place. Certainly, there is no trace of them 
left on the aeroplane dress itself. 
 
Chalayan seems to be enacting here the failure of both the other and the symbolic in 
one creative artefact. The process of wearing this dress, and it’s moving mechanical 
parts that change its shape and form suggest that it is a process, follows the Between 
collection discussed above, in that it renders the body as an impossibility, but it is 
more specific than the Between collection in that it renders the body’s understanding 
in either the symbolic or the imaginary as impossibilities. The wearer-operated remote 
control offers, one could argue, the possibility of aesthetic self-invention in which the 
imperfect unresolved subject is lost within the superimposition of the order of the real 
manifesting itself in the technological innovation of the dress. It is the process of 
invention that confronts the subject with their existence just as it confronts them with 
the impossibilities of their own subjectivity. The meaning of their very selves is 
foreclosed by the dress, and for all its technical and conceptual brilliance, this is an 
enterprise that is also both destructive and transcendent. It is destructive because it 
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negates the body and any notion of a corporeal subjectivity that emanates from the 
body. Transcendence arises here in the possibilities of reinvention that go beyond the 
frameworks in which the self is usually constituted. 
 
Afterwords (Autumn/Winter 2000/2001).  
 
The third and final collection we will consider in this chapter is Afterwords. This is 
Chalayan’s famous “furniture” collection. It featured three generations of a refugee 
family who sat in a line across the front of the stage, and once they left the stage was 
turned into a domestic interior, with a coffee table and four chairs. A Bulgarian 
women’s choir sang from behind a translucent screen, and four models came in, 
wearing simple slips. They took the chair covers off the chairs, turned them into 
dresses and put them on, then folded up the chair frames into suitcases. A fifth model 
came in, again in a simple slip. She removed the centrepiece of the coffee table, 
stepped into the resulting hole, and pulled up the table so that it formed increasing 
concentric circles that made it into a three-quarter length skirt that attached to her 
waist. 
 
 
Chalayan, Afterwords, Autumn/Winter 2000/2001 
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 Chalayan, Afterwords, Autumn/Winter 2000/2001 
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Chalayan, Afterwords, Autumn/Winter 2000/2001. 
 
The theme that underpins this collection is displacement. Chalayan is a migrant, from 
Cyprus to England, and as such is a part of the Turkish Cypriot diaspora that has 
made its home in London, alongside, often enough, the Greek Cypriot diaspora, and 
the divided island of Cyprus is reconstituted in suburbs of north London like 
Harringay and Palmers Green. In the years prior to this collection migrancy within 
Europe was a particular concern, not least because a series of armed conflicts in the 
Balkans led to large numbers of people in eastern Europe being obliged to leave their 
homes, often at short notice, with many of them ending up scattered across other 
European countries, cultures and languages. According to a report by the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.), some 3.5 million 
people were made refugees during the Balkan wars in the early 1990s.389 Against this 
background, the collection foregrounds several aspects of migrancy, including the 
need for mobility, and the illusion of stability that is provided by the domestic 
                                                
389 The report is available on the internet: U.N.H.C.R., 'Refugees’, 2001 
<www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/briefing/refugees/refugees.pdf> [Accessed 14th May 
2009]   
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environment. As the furniture on the stage becomes clothing, homes and the 
constancy they represent become unstable and contingent upon the subject for their 
realisation, just like language. What is crucial here is the turbulence, the lack of fixity, 
of environments that are assumed to give subjectivity some sort of meaning.  
 
The challenges presented to both individuals and nations as a result of migration was 
the theme of the Oxford Amnesty Lectures of 2006, a lecture series which brought 
together writers, activists, politicians and academics to present a series of public 
lectures on the theme of displacement, asylum and migrancy. In this series, the issue 
of psychic trauma as a result of migration is argued by a several of the contributors. A 
paper given by the writer Caryl Phillips discusses displacement and the difference 
between migration through choice and forced migration, the most obvious example of 
which is the slave trade but also refers to migration undertaken within as well as 
across borders because conditions in the country of origin have become intolerable 
due to war, persecution, poverty, famine, and so on. He suggests that forced migration 
is a source of profound trauma that marks the lives of generations, saying: “My 
experience with internally displaced persons and refugees in Sierra Leone served only 
to confirm my belief that the psychological damage that accompanies forced 
migrations – either within or across national borders – is far more enduring than 
physical trauma, and its effects cannot be treated with food rations, plastic sheeting or 
artificial limbs.”390 Jacqueline Rose, another contributor, reminds us that 
displacement is a Freudian concept as well as a humanitarian one. In its 
psychoanalytic sense, it denotes the mobility of the human mind and is one of the 
mechanisms by which the mind maintains a kind of perpetual motion. Rose combines 
the two meanings in her paper in order to show how psychic migration can never be a 
complete rupture with the pre-migratory state. “There is,” she argues, “a baggage of 
the mind. When you move across a national boundary you are just as likely to carry 
your enemies with you. Nothing, as psychoanalysis will testify, is ever simply left 
behind.”391  
 
                                                
390 Caryl Phillips, ‘Border Crossings’ in Displacement, Asylum, Migration: The 
Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2004, ed. by Kate E. Tunstall (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p. 222. 
391 Jacqueline Rose ‘Displacement In Zion’ in Tunstall, ed., Displacement, Asylum, 
Migration, p. 268. 
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What is evident, then, is that migration is never simply concerned with the movement 
of people. It is not simply a matter of either geography, or demography, or politics. 
Instead it is a shift in the psyche, inflected by subjective experience and destined to 
resonate through a history yet to come that is instituted by a physical relocation 
caused by the intolerable effect on the human subject by external forces and events.  
 
Gilles Lipovetsky has argued that contemporary fashion has produced a new type of 
connection between fashion and the individual, that there now exists a “fashion 
person, who has no deep attachments, a mobile individual with fluctuating personality 
and tastes.”392  This fashion person, moreover, is a “new type of kinetic, open 
personality” upon whom rapid social transitions depend.393 This overly optimistic 
reading of a “fashion person” as central to social/societal transition seems to assume 
that these transitions are inevitable and ultimately benign. The dislocation shown in 
the Afterwords collection is anything but benign. On the contrary, it suggests 
profound disturbance, albeit rendered in an artful and aesthetically pleasing manner. 
The fluctuation identified by Lipovetsky as central to contemporary fashion is in fact 
profoundly destabilising. It is not simply a matter of wearing different hats, to coin a 
phrase, but instead a concern that one is compelled to wear different hats. What is 
more, the destabilisation that is sensed in contemporary fashion, at least as this 
fashion is rendered by Chalayan, inflects both the subject and their social world. It is 
not utopian, as Lipovetsky suggests, but profoundly alienating and disruptive. One 
could suggest that it is in fact the work of the sinthome, connecting the subject to the 
Real and articulating the impossibilities of subjectivity.  
 
However remarkable Chalayan’s creative output may be, and there is no doubt that 
the Afterwords collection is an astonishing feat, when one reads the work in terms of 
Lacan’s notion of the sinthome, it becomes a disturbing intimation of the instability of 
language and subjectivity. By foregrounding migrancy, Chalayan is foregrounding a 
constant state of flux that pertains to both the subject and their circumstances. As Iain 
Chambers puts it, migrancy “calls for a dwelling in language, in histories, in identities 
                                                
392 Gilles Lipovetsky, The Empire of Fashion: Dressing Modern Democracy 
(Princeton, N.J.; Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 149. 
393 Lipovetsky, The Empire of Fashion, p. 149. 
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that are constantly subject to mutation.”394 The dwelling, the domesticity, of the 
Afterwords collection is not concerned with a physical/geographical location 
necessarily. They are, rather, concerned with the psychic modalities that make 
physical/geographical location contingent upon the subject and language rather than 
fixed and stable entities. What is particularly pertinent is that the ease with which the 
furniture becomes clothing and suitcases, the speed at which a generic domestic 
interior is broken down to nothing, suggests that this contingency is common to all 
human subjects, and not just civilian victims of war. The disruption associated with 
migrancy that underpins this collection, when viewed through a Lacanian lens, is 
given a more particular corporeality that serves to move the psychic effects of 
geographical and political displacement to the furthermost boundaries of what can be 
mastered or even known. By using the trope of domesticity in this collection, with its 
emphasis on woman and home Chalayan further links the psychic instability of 
subjectivity to the feminine. The notion of an interior life is played out on the stage 
(this collection was shown at Saddlers Wells Theatre in London, not on a Fashion 
Week runway) with the domestic living room standing metonymically for the 
unconscious mind. As women are in turn metonymically associated with domestic or 
interior worlds, so the shifts in psychic modalities can be read as paradigmatic of the 
feminine in the unconscious. 
 
The models who wear the chair covers as dresses are of note not because of anything 
inherent in the garments they wear, but because the garments are suggestive of a 
movement that results in the stability of the present being entirely demolished in a 
matter of minutes. They are ready to go, almost in a heartbeat, and they leave behind 
no evidence of ever having been there. Everything is packed up in easy-to-carry cases. 
The effortlessness of the transformation suggests that the transition is more “natural” 
than the stability that preceded it. There is perhaps the intimation that it is the 
transformation from one state to another that marks subjectivity, rather than the states 
themselves. Interestingly, because Chalayan is working in fashion rather than 
painting, or photography, or architecture, this movement, as disruptive as it is 
inevitable, is enacted in and through women. The reliance on woman in/as fashion 
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allows us to conjecture that what I have been describing as sinthomatic aesthetic self-
invention is writ large in this troubling collection. 
 
The coffee table skirt is equally remarkable, in that, unlike the chairs, it retains an 
intimation of its previous life. Although unrecognisable as a table once it has been 
transformed into a skirt, it is equally unrecognisable as a skirt, because it is made out 
of wood. The materiality of the garment means that it is neither or both a skirt and a 
table at one and the same time, and that it is instead in a state of perpetual transition. 
What this transition suggests is that neither of the material conditions in which this 
artefact exists, as either skirt or table, actually exists in the artefact itself. Instead these 
two positions are constituted by the wearer and/or the viewer in the moment of 
transformation. The wish, then, to frame an object within a set of material conditions 
by which it can be understood is impossible, and what takes place instead is a 
contingency of meaning based in the transformation that destabilises the object. This 
movement, this transubstantiation, in fact, reliant as it is upon the body and meaning, 
is perhaps an instance of intervention that is suggestive of the operation of the 
sinthome. There is a foreclosure of meaning here that suggests, again, an aesthetic 
self-invention that has little if anything to do with desire, and everything instead to do 
with a sinthomatic jouissance that emanates from the impossibility of language.   
 
What we see in all of the work we have looked at in this chapter is a preoccupation 
with meaning and subjectivity that is concerned with femininity, but, unusually for 
fashion, not with desire. Chalayan operates at the interface of fashion and language in 
that he articulates the impossibility of adequate expression, and the frustration this 
causes underpins much of his work. Chalayan’s work evidences the failure both of the 
other and of the logic of the symbolic, and suggests instead a model of femininity that 
circumvents both of these structures by which femininity is usually known. The 
aesthetics of self-invention presented by Chalayan, when interpreted as language in 
the psychoanalytic sense of the word, suggests a radical unintelligibility that denotes 
the impossible and contradictory logic that is the feminine. His work is difficult. It is 
hard to read. It is resistant and it is intractable. It eschews the usual references by 
which fashion and femininity are understood; in fact, it stands in direct opposition to 
these things. The models of corporeality and subjectivity that are central to fashion 
are rejected by Chalayan in favour of something all together more obscure. His work 
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evidences instead a relationship between fashion and the body that represents the 
failure of meaning and the fallibilities and limitations of subjectivity. The body in 
Chalayan’s work is neither tamed through fashion (as it is with Galliano) nor 
disrupted and equivocated (as it is by McQueen and Bowery.) Instead, it is presented 
as a disorderly corporeality that cannot be contained in or through language. Fashion-
as-sinthome is inarticulate inasmuch as it does not clearly state anything that can be 
understood. However, its inarticulacy is not one borne of stupidity or ignorance but 
instead comes about as a consequence of the sinthome as an aspect of the real. Its 
inarticulacy is in fact a deliberate strategy that posits the body as the aspect of 
language that is beyond meaning but that is, conversely, central to what Lacan 
describes as the harmonisation of body and language. It may be that Chalayan is 
suggesting, through the challenges presented in the images and scenes we have 
discussed in this chapter, a resolution of sorts between the various oppositions that 
constitute subjectivity; and it is a harmonisation such as this that is crucial to the 
acknowledgement of ones own impossibilities that marks the end of analysis.
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Conclusion. 
 
It has been apparent throughout this thesis that fashion offers insights into the 
difficulties of subjectivity as they are set out in psychoanalysis, and indeed that an 
account of these difficulties goes a considerable way to explaining fashion. By 
bringing psychoanalysis and fashion together, with art, it has been possible to 
illuminate fashion in the same way that Lacan illuminated, for instance, the work of 
James Joyce. Just as Lacan was insistent that cultural forms and practices could not be 
put “on the couch” as it were, as Ernest Jones attempted to do with Hamlet, fashion 
here has not been put “on the couch” – but instead has been read as paradigms of 
psychoanalytic concepts themselves. In terms of fashion photography, the conflicted 
self that is the inevitable consequence of being a self at all, and psychic resistance to 
the compulsoriness of the masculine order in which the self is expected to operate, are 
both apparent in readings of fashion photography. Additionally, couture manages to 
accommodate both phallic jouissance and jouissance of the other at one and the same 
time, and its success is that it can embody these two conflicting premises without 
either cancelling the other out. Also played out in couture is the asymmetry of desire, 
and the resistance of the feminine against its silencing in the symbolic. We see in the 
performative challenge to corporeal gender normativity presented by Leigh Bowery 
that nothing about the human condition is ever safe or secure, and that even 
masculinity itself can be unstable. We see also in Bowery that the acknowledgement 
of this instability intimates a simultaneous transcendence and destruction and this 
contradiction, which is not unique to Bowery but which is something we all could 
potentially experience, is what makes his work so profoundly disturbing. In the 
conceptual design of Hussein Chalayan we see the failure of desire and the failure of 
the other, the two touchstones around which we constitute ourselves and our relations 
with others, and the sublime nihilism that arises in the acknowledgement of the 
impossibilities of our own existence. 
 
In particular, the key Lacanian concepts of femininity, jouissance and language show 
precisely how the conflicts at the heart of human subjectivity can be seen to be 
presented in the relation between fashion and its wearer. Lacan links the notion of 
femininity with the disruptive, the challenging, the contradictory. Femininity is 
associated with the operation of psychic life, and although it is also indicative of the 
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female subject, woman, this is not inevitable. The feminine denotes a particular 
psychic structure, and the experience of femininity is one of psychic paradoxes and 
impossibilities. From this, the actual, flesh-and-blood woman comes to stand 
metonymically for these experiences. Lacan uses the idea of the feminine as 
shorthand for trouble, but this trouble is a necessary part of psychic structuring, and 
marks the essential acknowledgement of the unknowable at the heart of human 
existence. It can no sooner be expunged than it can be ignored.  
 
Baudelaire associated fashion with the feminine, by which he meant women. By 
taking the association of fashion and femininity, but defining femininity in Lacanian 
terms rather than Baudelairian ones, we can interpret fashion in terms of the psychic 
modalities of subjectivity, and see in fashion the paradoxes and contradictions and 
conflicts of subjectivity, writ large on the human body itself. We can see that the 
experience of fashion as it is viewed and as it is worn, is at times the experience of 
jouissance, and because of the inextricable connection between the subject and their 
world, we can interpret fashion in the terms set out by psychoanalysis. When we do 
this, we see that fashion is not simply a matter of consumer culture, nor the 
construction and/or expression of “identity,” nor a marginal and ultimately pointless 
hobby or interest. Instead, fashion is repositioned as a cultural form that is the 
aesthetic rendering of the most profound dilemmas and crises that lie at the heart of 
what it means to be human. In particular, the proximity of femininity and women, 
however arbitrary this proximity may be, means that the political consequences of this 
are more keenly registered in the feminine subject, and offers the potential for fashion 
to be framed within the terms of feminism and the queer as well as psychoanalysis, all 
themes that have taken little if any interest in fashion thus far.  
 
There are political consequences to the readings of various instances of fashion that 
we see in the chapters of this thesis. The subject inevitably operates within a culturally 
determined bind which means that psychic processes will take on particular shapes and 
forms, and Julia Kristeva has argued that the contemporary subject is labouring under 
new types of disorder – narcissistic, psychosomatic, borderline – that are manifested in 
the body because the psychic space that was their usual repository seems to have 
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disappeared.395 While there is, of course, the question of the extent to which these 
disorders are merely a contemporary version of historical conditions, what is at stake 
is not the overhaul of traditional classifications but instead a revival of psychoanalysis 
itself in light of changes to the dilemmas of the very subjectivity that psychoanalysis 
may be said to have created. These dilemmas are played out simultaneously at the 
level of culture and of the psyche, as my reading of particular cultural moments has 
shown, and what is crucial is that the body is central to psychic processes and 
problems, and fashion, as either an extension of the body or an addition to it, is then 
complicit in the visual manifestation of these processes and problems. From this we 
can propose that when a viewer of fashion engages with an image, or a garment, or a 
performance, it is because these cultural forms reflect existing psychic issues or 
conditions, and not that they have created a new psychic issue or condition. There is 
no causal relationship between fashion on the one hand and mental life on the other. 
Instead, we see connections and interplays that shape and frame on-going themes of 
the subjective experience and social ordering. 
 
Jacqueline Rose’s argument, that the viewing subject can and does form a primary 
identification with the visual image is particularly pertinent to fashion photography.396 
Rather than serving as a reflection of a unified self, what fashion photography 
exemplifies is the tension between the illusory subjective wholeness and the 
fragmentary lived experienced of the subject prior to their entry into language and the 
symbolic. The traumatic transition from the pre-linguistic imaginary to the symbolic 
order of language is revisited constantly through the viewing of images of others, and 
it is through the visual that the traces of the subject’s pre-linguistic state make 
themselves felt within the status of subjectivity itself. What fashion photography 
demonstrates is firstly how fashion operates on the surface of the body as a means of 
maintaining the tension between illusory unity and the fragmented and unwhole self. 
and secondly how the viewer relates precisely to this on-going tension, rather than, 
any purely illusory symbolic wholeness. The appeal of fashion photography is not that 
it reflects ourselves as we could/should/would be, but that that it is the mirror that 
frames our fragmented, alienated selves while simultaneously upholding the myth of 
unity in the medium of photography itself. It can be held as obscene or objectionable 
                                                
395 See Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul.  
396 See Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision.  
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only by reference to the fiction of a unified subjectivity that has political and social 
capital.  
 
It is popularly assumed that the subject identifies in a straightforward and 
uncomplicated manner with fashion’s visuality. This identification is considered 
detrimental in some way to the subject and fashion as a cultural form is denigrated as 
being coercive or manipulative. Thus, in 2000, the editor of British Vogue, Alexandra 
Shulman, was part of a fashion industry delegation called to a summit at 10 Downing 
Street to account for the rise in eating disorders. In 2006 Madrid Fashion Week 
banned models with a BMI of under 18 (the point at which a person is thought to be 
medically underweight). The then-Culture Secretary, Tessa Jowell, called for London 
Fashion Week to follow suit, arguing that images of fashion models shape how young 
women feel about their own bodies. Popular ideas regarding the association between 
fashion imagery and eating disorders can be found in wide circulation, from 
government departments to newspapers and magazines, and yet there is no evidence 
that fashion imagery is responsible for these conditions, and that eating disorders are 
often found in women (and indeed men) who are not models, who do not read fashion 
magazines, and who are not young, is conveniently ignored. Blaming fashion imagery 
and/or the fashion industry for eating disorders, will not only not address the very real 
problem of eating disorders, it will also detract from a more constructive reading of 
fashion photography that may be able to articulate more productively what the 
relationship between these images and their (largely women) viewers might be.  
 
It is not the case that fashion is a behemoth of an industry intent on shaping, literally 
and figuratively, women in its own image. Nor are women simple-minded dupes 
whose feeble minds are over-run with feelings of inadequacy that are imposed on them 
psychically by the act of reading a magazine. Rather, fashion, visual culture and the 
subjects who engage with it are bound together in a wider set of circumstances that are 
framed within the terms of cultural discourses. In the case of fashion in particular, 
psychoanalytic critiques can demonstrate that the appropriation of the myth of unified 
subjectivity by politicians, industry figures and the popular press perpetuates precisely 
the myths of femininity that feminist criticism has been challenging for years. 
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Chapter two argued that, because of its psychic affect, fashionable dress can function 
as a tool of political statement and opposition. This is particularly the case in the show 
pieces of haute couture that operate as works of art as much as they do items of 
clothing, however there are instances where this practice transposes itself into real 
life. In June 2008 I was in a bar in Shoreditch in London. Shoreditch is a vibrant area 
that is known for attracting artists, designers, photographers, there are innumerable 
independent galleries and boutiques, there is even a circus school. In the bar, there 
was a young woman with a taxidermied rat clipped to her hair. The rat had a cream-
coloured fur, and was about seven or eight inches long, not including the tail, which 
was artfully coiled and had little red l.e.d. lights inserted into it, which flashed 
intermittently. Most of the other young women in the bar were recipients of male 
attention to one extent or another. The girl with the rat in her hair was getting no such 
attention, and I think that was probably the point. Her choice of adornment made men 
look at her and think “I wouldn’t dare.” She had turned a metonym of dereliction and 
disease into a decoration, and because its original meanings were still intact it served 
to encourage a physical distance between her and her rat-ornament and those men 
who might wish to approach her desirously. 
 
This anecdote illustrates the point that the political consequences of the arguments of 
chapter two are not exclusive to the rarefied world of haute couture. On the contrary, 
the potential for the disruptive interjection of the feminine can also be seen in 
innovative dress worn by women in everyday situations. The aspirational élitism of 
haute couture is, I believe, more concerned with the possibility of the articulation of 
the feminine than with merely the expression of an individual’s economic success, 
and its enduring appeal is that it offers a cultural and creative space in which the 
feminine can appear in and on its own terms, and register its persistent resistance to 
its own marginalisation. Even in the most pedestrian instances of fashion, where it is 
only intended or assumed to provoke male desire, the feminine is never completely 
passive or acquiescent. This spirit of feminine resistance can appear in all innovative 
dress, not just couture, although the dominance of the symbolic means that it can only 
actively appear in the charmed enclosures at the edge of the symbolic where the real 
overlaps. Such charmed enclosures are both psychic and profoundly literal, and refer 
to the operation of the unconscious as well as the very real cultural and geographical 
spaces (an arty area of London, a Fashion Week runway) in which the operation of 
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the unconscious can manifest itself in tangible creative output. They allow for the 
subversive challenges to existing social structures within the terms that are available, 
and although the structure still stands, its instability and its contingency are constantly 
restated.    
 
The AIDS crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s was a particular moment in history 
where problematising normative sexuation and destabilising usual gender categories 
had a specific political impetus. The perception of AIDS as  “gay plague” led to a 
politicisation of a public health issue around lines of masculinity and sexuality, and 
art was just one of the arenas in which the questions of sexuality and corporeal 
integrity that arose around AIDS, were played out. That this occurred during the 
Thatcher years, with their accompanying moral shrillness and rhetoric of personal 
responsibility, merely augments the oppositional potential of any engagement with 
issues of sexuality and sexed subjectivity that occurred at the time. Leigh Bowery was 
living and working in this cultural environment, and indeed was living with HIV 
infection himself. His life/work was an inevitable consequence of the specificities of 
the culture in which he lived. His opposition to normative sexed subjectivity came at a 
time when such subjectivity was seen, quite literally, as essential to survival, and the 
relationship between psychic processes and disorders and the cultural conditions in 
which the subject operates can be seen quite clearly in his work.   
 
That said, Bowery’s relevance is not restricted to the time in which he worked. 
Although he was very much a product of his time, I do not believe that his 
significance is purely a matter of cultural history. The liminality of the human 
condition is a constant, as is the notion of stable gender identity, and both of these 
themes arise in other chapters of this thesis, in other contexts. To occupy, as Bowery 
did, the margins of life, is to represent a fundamental part of life itself, and from his 
marginal position as an HIV positive gay man he produced work that resonates to the 
very core of human experience. Fashion and/as art are the tools that Bowery used to 
create instances of transgression that queer not just sexuality but existence itself. In 
that sense, Bowery addressed themes that are a part of the human condition, albeit in 
ways that were specific to his circumstances and the time in which he lived. If he (or 
any other artist) were addressing those themes today, the devices of corporeal 
deformation in costume and scatological motif in performance would be as resonant 
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as ever, albeit without the subtext of the AIDS crisis that underpinned their original 
appearances. 
 
The political impetus behind the conceptual work of Hussein Chalayan is perhaps less 
overt than that found in the other examples I have looked at. Despite the perception of 
him as a designer, his work appears to be far less concerned with fashion than any of 
the other practitioners I have looked at, insofar as fashion is heavily reliant on its 
relation to the human body for its meaning. However, the point at which fashion is the 
least obviously concerned with fashion is the point where it becomes credible as a 
language, and arguably the point at which it becomes most challenging. Chalayan’s 
designs, rather than constitute a relationship between the work and the body, serve 
instead to link the body to the ideas that underpin his creations, and so subvert the 
usual sense of fashion’s intrinsic relationship to the body. The body for Chalayan is a 
conceptual apparatus, and so concerned with language.  There is a rejection here of 
desire, and a failure of meaning, that constitutes an acknowledgement of the 
unbearable impossibility of being. Such nihilism is profoundly destabilising to both 
fashion and to the idea of the subject, and to link it to the female body, as Chalayan 
does, makes it a conceptual rebellion against the idea of fashion and, more 
importantly, the idea of the subjectivity itself. It may well be that the seditious 
nihilism that underpins his work is precisely why it has not been subject to conceptual 
scrutiny thus far.   
 
Psychoanalysis reminds us that the feminine, for all its perceived problems, in fact 
assumes a central rather than a marginal place in the human experience, and it is the 
feminine cultural form of fashion that demonstrates this. Fashion’s innate and 
inherent femininity relies on the operation of the feminine in ways that more 
masculine cultural forms do not, and so is better placed to evidence the feminine 
within the cultural landscape, as well as demonstrating how that interplays with the 
individual, to create connections between the subject and the world in which they live. 
The problems of subjectivity are played out in the public arena as well as in the dark 
unknowable unconscious mind, and the question of what can be said, and what can 
only be experienced, and how these may be reconciled, are questions that fashion 
addresses on an almost daily basis. The inevitable political consequences of this are 
felt, if not understood, in the euphoria that is engendered by creative output, and in 
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the wide and varied responses to it. The patrician cluelessness of government 
ministers when faced with fashion images, the hostility and fear with which 
creatively-dressed women are met, and the censorship of performances, publications 
and events, argue convincingly for the frightening truths to which, I believe, fashion 
testifies.  
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Postscript: Eonnagata. 
 
While writing up my thesis, the Saddlers Wells theatre in London presented a new 
dance/performance piece, called Eonnagata. Regrettably I did not have time to 
include a full study of this performance in my thesis, but equally it could not go 
unacknowledged, hence this postscript. 
 
The performance told the story of the Chevalier d’Éon, an eighteenth century French 
diplomat, soldier and sometime spy. The Chevalier lived as both a man and a woman, 
and despite submitting to medical examinations his sex was never determined in his 
lifetime. Eonnagata was conceived and performed by Sylvie Guillem, Robert LePage 
and Russell Maliphant, all of whom played the Chevalier, often at the same time, and 
between them they amply illustrated that the matter of being a particular sex is less 
significant than the processes one goes through in order to establish a sexed identity 
of any sort. What is particularly interesting for my enquiry, though, is that the 
costumes were designed by Alexander McQueen. This is the first time McQueen has 
been involved in design for theatre, and his costumes amply demonstrate here, as his 
fashion designs do on the runway, some of the conceptual difficulties of sexed 
subjectivities, in particular femininity, and the centrality of the body to the subject. In 
an interview for the Guardian newspaper regarding his collaboration with Guillem, 
LePage and Maliphant, McQueen said: This male-female character was so up my 
strasse [...] I'm interested in the dark psychosis of his mind. There's a melancholy 
there, especially after he was exiled and became the puppet of the ladies who lunch, 
[He cackles] I know what that feels like."397 McQueen was insistent that he needed a 
creative collaboration rather than a commission, and as a result the costumes worn by 
the three dancers suggest as much about the Chevalier as their movements, the music 
or the narrative.  
 
Two particular costume designs are of note in the performance. Firstly, the crinoline 
that he first designed for the disabled model Aimee Mullins, and that she wore for the 
                                                
397 Judith Mackrell, ‘The name's d'Eon. Chevalier d'Eon’, The Guardian, 19th February 
2009, Arts section, p. 21.  
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1998 Access-Able series of photographs by Nick Knight, is redeployed in Eonnagata, 
acting as evidence of the incomplete boundaries of subjectivity, suggesting that the 
contained whole is in fact leaking and incomplete, with porous perimeters that give 
the illusion of a framed and substantive subjectivity but which in fact allow for 
precisely the sort of psychic and corporeal mobility for which the Chevalier was 
famous. These crinolines lose their historic and gender specificity in this context, and, 
worn as they are without any skirts over the top to conceal them, they assume a new 
modality, one that allows for the framing of the body and the subject whilst still 
acknowledging that such framing will inevitably be incomplete. The second costume 
that is of particular interest is the outsized kimono, supported on a wooden frame, 
within which two performers danced. A literal reading of this design might suggest 
the duality of the masculine and the feminine in one person, however, another 
possible suggestion is that the costume expresses the duality of the subject, yes, but 
not of the masculine and the feminine but instead the duality of what can be said to 
exist, and what can be experienced, in opposition to what can never be known. 
 
McQueen articulates in his designs the impossibilities of sexed subjectivity, and 
creates a space in which the feminine can register a voice where otherwise it is 
obliged to remain silent. The stage, like the runway, is a charmed enclosure that 
allows for the interjection of the real, and for the metonymy of subjective experience 
to present itself. That McQueen should work with dance in particular is instructive, as 
dance is as reliant on corporeality for its expression as fashion is, and by marrying the 
two, as happened in Eonnagata, the body and its coverings are foregrounded in a way 
that not only tells the story of the Chevalier d’Éon, but that presents the all-too human 
dilemma of sexed subjectivity that underpins all human experience. 
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